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Introduction

The agreed approach adopted by Working Group 1 was the submission of a written case study from each delegate’s home country which illustrated substantive "outskirts' issues and their implications for the governance of the region. It was accepted that the working group case studies had to be based on original empirical work considered within a theoretical context, so there is no attempt to include comparative analyses of the eleven C10 case study areas visited during the course of the Action as it was felt that this could be superficial. However, three of the working group case studies presented – Belfast, Copenhagen and Madrid – were also the subject of C10 case study visits and two – Fribourg and the generic French case– have similar governance contexts to the Swiss and French C10 case study visits. These can be contrasted with two working group case studies from Nordic countries not visited by C10 – Stockholm and Stavanger/ Tromso - which offer fresh insights on the governance response to outskirts issues.

All of the working group case studies combine theoretical consideration of the concepts of "outskirts" or "governance" with empirical analysis of stakeholder and government practice and in most cases contain internal comparisons between two planning sub-areas. The structure of the synthesis therefore reflects these components – it starts with a section on the concept of "outskirts" (or the process of "outskirtisation" if such a word can be employed), continues into the substantive section on the concept of "governance and government" which has a threefold sub-division into theory, structures and processes, and concludes with some reflections on the examples considered and the lessons arising.
1 Outskirts and "Outskirtisation"

A useful starting point for the consideration of this phenomenon is the Swiss Case Study (Ruegg, 2003) in Fribourg wherein it is argued that urban outskirts are fundamentally a product of Enlightenment thinking and of the concept of Modernity - particularly the notion of "individuation" which can be understood as the means by which an individual can increase his or her autonomy. This impulse is reinforced by the mechanisms of "disembedding" which Giddens (1990) describes as the "lifting out" of social relations from their local context and their restructuring across time and space. Mobile phones and the Internet are contemporary examples of these mechanisms - they provide opportunities for freeing the individual from his or her local context and increase the potential for social relations on an international or global scale. The downside of this "disembedding" is the discrediting of the "local", which can be pejoratively seen as "parochial", and the potential negative implications of this for family and community life.

Ruegg argues that urban outskirts are a physical manifestation of this particular form of modernity - a convenient way of setting the building industry free of local space/time constraints and providing for an increase in individual autonomy in locational choice at a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, this form of development does not accord with planners' ideals in relation to sustainable forms of urban development, nor are local municipalities equipped to deal with development which is "network-based" rather than "surface-based" in its origin and application. The often-transient residential inhabitants or the multinational industrial/commercial concerns which occupy urban outskirts produce territorial forms which are "network" or "relational" in their character, whereas the state operates on the basis of a "container" for developmental activities - a "surface-based" territorial model which has worked well from the beginning of the century until the 1960s, but is now struggling to relate its regulatory powers to the shifting boundaries of network activities.

Estebe, in the French Case Study, also reflects on the post-war evolution of outskirts' character - according a distinctive political complexion to three phases of development - the "municipal communism" period (up to the mid-seventies), the "socialism with an urban face" period (from mid-seventies to early nineties) and the current era in which, worryingly from his point of view, the outskirts are beginning to be seen as "laboratories for the extreme right". In contrast to the relative affluence of Swiss outskirts, the French outskirts populations are identified as working class or upwardly-mobile lower middle class people with constrained life-style choices and, in the modern era, a "precarious" economic situation, vulnerable to exploitation by populist right-wing political arguments.
A more differentiated political pattern is discernible in the Copenhagen Case Study (Andersen, 1994) where the outskirtisation process has been a feature of post-war urban decentralisation - classified, according to Van den Berg’s (1982) model as a four-phase evolution over the twentieth century from urbanisation to suburbanisation to desuburbanisation to reurbanisation. To the north, the middle- and upper classes established themselves in areas of high environmental amenity from the nineteen twenties onwards, while to the west the increasingly affluent working classes were housed in innovatory "new-town" developments (based in some cases on the British post-war models) from the nineteen-forties onwards. These were (unlike the British model) well-served by high-frequency public transport systems and were represented politically by social democratic parties. In the sixties and seventies the southern "fingers" of the settlement pattern were extended when private transport became increasingly dominant and the political complexion of the municipalities more differentiated and volatile.

Such trends reinforce planners’ concerns about the need for more sustainable forms of urban development, which is a dominant theme in the Norwegian Case Study (Saglie and Vabo 2003) wherein the Brundtland Report understandably sets the policy agenda. Its preference for the "compact city" as opposed to low-density "sprawl" as the vehicle for urban sustainability is the basis for a hypothesis that the strengthened role of private actors in governance is a threat to sustainability, particularly in relation to the development of urban outskirts. Interestingly, a "network" model is also introduced in this case study, but as a resource allocation approach in which it is contrasted with the traditional "hierarchical" model (allied to "surface-based" territorial definitions as above) and the laissez-faire "market" model (from Stoker, 1999). In this case the network is comprised of public and private actors which are dependant on each other to achieve objectives in a situation where the responsibility for housing land supply has largely passed from the public to the private sector, but regulatory planning power still resides with the municipalities.

The Norwegian tradition of owner-occupied housing is contrasted with the situation in Sweden, where public sector involvement in housing provision as well as in land policy has been a dominant post-war feature. The "million-programme" of the 1960s was an ambitious governmental initiative to build one million apartments over a period of ten years in well-planned and expensively-infrastructured urban outskirts. However, these same outskirts are now the recipients of 1990s high-tech industrial and commercial complexes and it is the relationship between the inhabitants of these very different forms of outskirts development which is the subject of the Swedish Case Study (Nylund, 2003). Ironically, it is the "surface-based" locational impact of high-tech multinationals (such as Ericsson, Nokia, Microsoft) which are at the forefront of the "network" society that is at issue here - the author is concerned about growing social polarisation in Swedish society and is looking at opportunities to increase physical integration between the poorer, ethnic minority-dominated, residential populations and the newly-affluent employees of the multinationals. The fact that both occupy well-planned and well-connected urban outskirts (as compared with the unplanned sprawl of other case studies) adds an interesting twist to the tale.
Such unplanned outskirts are the focus of the Spanish Case Study (Walliser, 2003) which contrasts the very different governance approaches adopted in the peripheral Villaverde and Usera districts of Madrid with those in the more integrated Trinitat Nova district in Barcelona. The author's focus here is on structures and processes of governance rather than on "outskirts" per se. This is also true of the United Kingdom Case Study (McEldowney et al. 2003) although here there is some consideration of the particular British preoccupation with "green belt" control of urban decentralisation which gives a distinctive character to the outskirts debate. The author draws attention to the UK's traditional geographical as opposed to functional conception of outskirts (analogous to the surface-based and network-based models discussed above) and contrasts this with the American "edge-city" concept (Garreau, 1991) which is generally peripheral in location but defined essentially by network activities. Most "edge city" developments in Britain are on "brownfield" rather than "greenfield" sites as a consequence of planning policy, and these definitions were central to the strategic planning debates around the Regional Development Strategy and Belfast Metropolitan Plan which are the subject of the case study. These debates, in turn, were closely related to the issue of urban densification (Rogers, 1999) as a contribution to sustainability - the "compact city" concept which seeks to control "outskirtisation" by the application of policy controls. This has some interesting parallels, albeit at different settlement scales, with the Norwegian case study examples above.

2 Governance and Government

2.1 Theories of Governance and Government

Some of the case studies discuss theories of governance and government, and the relationship between them. Walliser quotes Kooiman (1993) and Rhodes (1997) in their assertions that the concept of governance is wider than the concept of government and, indeed, that governance actually contains government within it. However, although the state may play a minimal, or even non-existent, role in a particular governance coalition, it may still exercise significant indirect influence and, according to Kooiman, modes of governance are always an outcome of private and public interaction. At a deeper level, governance can influence people's indigenous norms of conduct so that they contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government's model of social order. This is not the same as its political ideology, however, and Walliser's case studies make the important point that in an effective governance process the political "colour" of local government may be less important than its personalities and its policy style.
McEldowney et al. refer to Byrne's (2001) definition of governance as "a set of processes undertaken by the state at every level, and the institutions, agencies and interests with which it operates in partnership in maintaining an existing social order". This, interestingly, also emphasises the maintenance of social order as a subliminal objective, as well as the cooperation between public and private sectors. They go on to examine some aspects of regime theory, which, although more relevant in an American than a European political context, offers some valuable insights into emerging processes and provides a useful categorisation of coalition "regimes" which help in the analysis of the Belfast case study.

Saglie and Vabo also refer to Kooimann and Rhodes in their definition of governance as looking beyond formal structures of government and representative democracy to more complex decision-making with external actors, concerns and interests. The use Stoker's (1998) threefold categorisation of governance structures into "markets" (which have prices as their medium of exchange and courts as their conflict resolution mechanism), "hierarchies" (which use statutory authority and rules/commands respectively) and "networks" (which have "trust" and "diplomacy" in the respective categories). Outskirts governance as a "quasi-market" (as advanced by Tiebout in his public choice theory of urban areas in the 'fifties) is a key theme in Estebe's argument in relation to France - he suggests that this may be a better theoretical model now than in the past three decades, as the prerequisites of more mobile populations, more autonomous municipalities and more competitive stakeholder organisations are now in place.

These are useful, if over-simplified, categories, and in the Norwegian case study a combination of all three often offers the best explanation. Nylund takes a more jaundiced view of the alleged shift from government to governance in the Swedish situation - suggesting that local residential interests may become bypassed by more powerful stakeholder representation at the strategic planning level - a point also highlighted in the Belfast case study.

2.2 Structures of Government

A major concern across all of the case studies was the capacity for existing governmental structures - based as they are on the geographical "surface-based" definition of administrative territory - to accommodate the demands of "network-based" development interests which fuel the "outskirtisation" process. Ruegg's case study addresses this directly by examining an interesting Swiss reaction to the perceived problem. Recognising that disparate tax regimes and competition between cantons was causing the "nation-state to come apart at the seams" most local authorities in Switzerland are involved in "territorial recombination" projects which can be summarised into three broad categorisations - associations, amalgamations and agglomerations. The first and last of these are similar to the two new associations sponsored by the 1999 Act in France (Estebe 2004), which have proved so popular that more
than 60% of urban municipalities are now involved in them - although, interestingly, small "outskirts" municipalities have been the most reluctant to embrace the idea, for fear of losing their political autonomy.

Associations are a practical form of co-operation between municipalities to effect certain specified tasks but with limited capacities and no tax-levying powers. Amalgamations are in effect new municipalities, created by the voluntary fusion of two or more existing ones and generally applicable to small-scale or remote local governments. Agglomeration is conceived as a combination of the other two models in the Swiss case, and is exemplified by the Grand Fribourg agglomeration which comprises ten existing municipalities which are now devising statutes for the agglomeration to come into existence in 2005. Several options are being considered, but the final scheme should be better able to address emerging "outskirts" issues on the basis of a more functional territorial definition, a transparent "bottom-up" process of agreement (allied to a top-down process of ratification) and the availability of relevant tax-raising powers. It is recognised, however, that this is only a partial solution and that it is now impossible for any institutional territory to fully recover its ability to perform as an effective "container" of activities - this is a "Sisyphean" task which is always going to fall short of requirements.

Another example of shifting boundary definitions occurs in the Belfast case study, wherein the original Belfast "city region" plan definition was criticised for being too limited, and the plan boundary was extended to incorporate the whole region of Northern Ireland. Pending changes to local government boundaries-expected in 2005 - will be influenced by the success or failure of this new planning definition and its sub-regional outworking. Although there were particular local political motivations for this change, it reflects the situation in the United Kingdom generally, where traditional "structure planning" (carried out at county, or city-region level) is now also regarded as too restricted, and strategic planning is beginning to focus on the regional scale, in line with political and administrative devolution to Scotland, Wales and the more autonomous English regions such as the North-East and the South-West. Such regional devolution is already well-established in Spain, although strategic planning here operates more indirectly through control of the municipalities.

In the Scandinavian case studies the re-drawing of planning, if not administrative, boundaries is also an issue, although here the scales of operation are more local. In Stockholm the district-planning tradition -originally physical in orientation, but more recently social and individually targeted - has been criticised for its "stigmatising" effect as well as its lack of tangible results, so the new focus is on "transboundary" planning initiatives which incorporate much larger spatial entities, and, more particularly, involve private-sector organisations as well as public-sector housing residents. In Copenhagen, the relationship between the municipalities and some form of city-region governance has been the subject of recent administrative reorganisation while in Norway, although no changes were demanded in municipal designations, the strains that emerged between local, regional and national decision-makers reflected the same question - what,
if any, spatial scale is the most appropriate one for the regulation of investment and functional decisions in an emerging "network" society? As argued in the Swiss case, this is a question which is unanswerable purely in terms of political/administrative government structures, so we must also consider governance processes.

2.3 Processes of Governance

The three governance structures identified in the Norwegian case study provide a useful starting point for the discussion of processes, identifying three stakeholder arenas - markets, hierarchies and networks - amongst which it is necessary to establish processes of collaboration to ensure effective planning in the contemporary world. Discussion of the concept of "collaborative planning", therefore, features strongly in most case studies.

In Spain, the contrast is made between Madrid, under conservative control since 1991 and characterised by an inflexible governance, and Barcelona, still under social democratic control and amongst the most progressive cities in Europe in relation to the devolution of power and the active involvement of citizens. In the former, relations between urban stakeholders tend to be dominated by confrontation, while in the latter there is more of a culture of consensus. The consequence of these different collaborative cultures for deprived outskirts communities is that in Madrid an opportunistic political alliance can make investment decisions for short-term political advantage, while in Barcelona the involvement and development of the citizenry in investment decision-making is an end in itself, not a means to an end. Political ideologies are less relevant, therefore, than collaborative culture.

Such a culture was a significant feature of the "socialism with an urban face" period in France in the 'seventies and 'eighties, where, Estebe argues, middle class activists dominated a form of governance based on the promotion of citizen participation and the arts. Participation presupposed a property-based citizenship and a middle-class way of life and the promotion of the arts and public imagination underpinned this perception. The contrast between this approach - which successfully provided a stepping-stone to political advancement for alliance-building socialist politicians - and that of the inward-looking communist municipal bastions of the previous era, neatly echoes the contrast between Barcelona and Madrid as outlined in the Spanish case.

Collaborative culture is well-established in the Swiss system, with a strong emphasis on "bottom-up" initiatives from local communities and small municipalities. It is also, rhetorically at least, well-established in Scandinavian society, but in the Norwegian case study the authors suggest that Government still retains the ultimate "default" power in planning decisions - negotiating and bargaining with the increasingly-influential private sector in areas of general consensus (governance), but resorting to hierarchical powers in situations of conflict (government). In the Stavanger case, this meant central government ultimately overruling one of its own ministries.
as well as the Stavanger municipal council, to protect "outskirts" farmland from residential development, while in Tromso, limited demand for peripheral development meant consensus governance and the reinforcement of "compact city" objectives.

A collaborative culture is evident in the Swedish situation also, although this particular case study raises some important questions about differential power structures within that culture. Here, as in Madrid, and in Norway, there was an alliance between different tiers of the stakeholder hierarchy which to some extent marginalized the most immediate level of representative democracy - in this case the Kista district council, whose concerns about the social development of its residents were considered less significant than the integration of municipal strategic planning strategies with the economic imperatives of Kista Science City. The suggestion here is the danger of "tokenism" - where superficially positive governance structures and processes may hide significant differences in stakeholder power and influence.

A similar story, but with a happier ending, is told in the Belfast case study. Here Healey's (1997) prescriptions for effective collaborative planning - interpreting "different systems of meaning" and involving "different discourse communities" in "the democratic project of making sense together while living differently" - were fully implemented, with more than 500 stakeholder organisations involved in a range of participatory exercises. However, the private housebuilding lobby remained slightly aloof from these preliminary activities, "keeping its powder dry" for its well-financed intervention at the public inquiry, where it effectively overturned the planners' housing targets in its own favour. A change in governmental structure, however - the establishment of a local power-sharing Assembly at regional (Northern Ireland) level - and effective lobbying by environmental (green belt protection) organisations overturned the public inquiry decision, so the original (environmentally favourable) targets were reinstated. This was a victory for new government and responsive governance working together - although a salutary reminder also of differential power structures within stakeholder organisations.
Reflections and Conclusions

The process of "outkirtisation" obviously puts strains on traditional hierarchical, surface-based forms of government. To suggest, however, that this means that the "nation-state is coming apart at the seams" may be something of an exaggeration. There is always the danger in these situations of the "nineteen -eighty-four syndrome" -forecasting cataclysmic change on the basis of trends which simply presage incremental transition. The function of the Governance working group, therefore, is to identify the scale of potential change, the aspects of government which require adaptation to cope with that change, and the potential of emerging forms of governance to "bridge the gap" between existing regulatory structures and developing network-based activities. All of the case studies outlined above provide valuable lessons in this regard.

The models of governance identified in the Norwegian case (market-based, hierarchical and network-based) are useful in presenting the total spectrum of possibilities. It may be, for example, that we are all moving into the market-based governance era, which in effect means as little government and spatial regulation as possible, and the growing redundancy of the other two models. There is little evidence from the case studies to support this, however, as in all cases private sector interests participate willingly, and in some cases opportunistically, in the governance processes, and there is long-standing evidence of private development interests' need for the land market "certainty" provided by effective public planning and regulation. We can assume, therefore, that the value of strategic planning and local regulation in relation to urban outskirts remains high - it is simply a matter of learning how to do them better. Here the above examples of "best practice" or at least "trial and error" are very useful.

On the mis-match between the state as "container" and the "uncontainability" of modern network activities at the urban fringe, the Swiss and French studies offers some interesting examples of the potentially "adaptable state", and this is an important model - all of our European countries need more flexible governmental administrative structures which can respond to shifting spatial requirements, otherwise the plethora of "transnational", "cross-border", "inter-regional" and "transboundary" initiatives beloved of the EU will become the only viable planning enterprises, to the detriment of genuine local democracy. Here also, however, it is important not to jump too far ahead - the Swedish case is a timely reminder of the fact that even "cutting-edge" representatives of the network society (Nokia, Ericsson etc. in Kista Science City) have a surface-based impact on their locality. Here the problem was not how to contain their global activities, but to prevent their employees' exclusive colonisation of a local shopping centre.

While governmental systems may struggle to adapt to changing trends in the present era, there is much evidence in the case studies of their considerable evolution during the course of the twentieth century. Both the French and the Danish case studies documented shifts from laissez-faire through collectivist and social democratic to liberal approaches in municipal government of
the burgeoning outskirts over the post-war period. Both countries also have tried, and failed, to successfully create functional metropolitan governmental structures, although this may remain a laudable objective. Nevertheless, it is always necessary to tailor new governmental structures to encompass the more isolated or peripheral outskirts - in France the under-utilised "departement" is an example of an existing governmental unit which could now provide effective co-ordination, and a better-financed regional government could provide strategic direction and control. This chimes with experience in the UK and most other European governmental systems.

On the other key structural problem - the reconciliation of competing tax-regimes and the control of opportunistic, even parasitic, outskirt municipalities - these case studies are less specific, although there was ample evidence of the problem in the C10 case study visits- Helsinki, Innsbruck, Berlin, BAB, Zurich - for example. In the situation of an accepted market-based governance this would not be a problem - the competing municipalities would simply be part of the market. But in a network or hierarchical governance, the benefits of a strong upper tier - as exemplified in the Norwegian case - are obvious. The key objective here is the protection of the parent city and its city-centre from commercial disinvestment, and this is obviously less of a problem when that city has a strong tourist economy - like most of our case study examples. In most "ordinary" cities, however, (Belfast, for example, has about five percent of the number of tourists that Florence attracts) strong regulation is required and even crude policy instruments such as the "green belt" are understandable, even necessary.

On processes of governance, the Spanish case study is instructive, with the "collaborative culture" of Barcelona contrasting with the more traditional conflict-based political practices of Madrid. The establishment of that kind of culture should be an objective for all cities, and the Belfast and Stockholm examples demonstrated progress towards this objective. They both demonstrated, however, the power differentials that exist within and between stakeholders, and the need to guard against "tokenistic" participation as a form of modern governance. Powerful economic interests are involved in the development of outskirts, sometimes beneficially and sometimes detrimentally in relation to local community interests or sustainability objectives, and it is important that governance processes are sufficiently transparent to highlight the significance of relative influences. As Albrechts (2002) has observed: "the power of the better argument does not always and everywhere persuade dominant interests".
References


GOVERNANCE OF SWISS URBAN OUTSKIRTS
Setting the context, and discussing a new law

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Abstract

The article is based on two parts. The first one is conceptual. It discusses the relationship between outskirts (UOs) and "Modernity". The main argument is to claim that Modernity is producing UOs. It follows that public actions are not giving rise to "outskirtisation", they are mainly increasing or decreasing its scope and its growth-rate. Therefore one should focus on public actions that have the potential to cope with UOs, rather than look for public actions that could eventually get rid of UOs. To better address the "public actions" issue, the author introduces a distinction between "surface-based territory" and "network-based territory". Traditional planning policies designed by state agencies generally refer to the first one, while UOs oblige us to consider the second one. They shelter people whose behaviour strongly depends on mobility (leisure, work, social life, cultural events) and whose relations draw vast webs that cannot be properly contained in any surface-based territory. This situation obliges us to analyse how surface-based territories – eg. territories of institutions like municipalities, counties or even nation-states – can develop collaborative strategies to cope with UOs.
It is the purpose of the second part to discuss the pros and cons of three different collaborative forms at the local level. The first one refers to the idea of "variable geometry". Usually based on the "association" form it results in defining a new territory for every single task that municipalities are willing to handle together. The second one is based on the "fusion" scheme. It is produced by municipalities which are ready to merge in order to extend their surface-based territory. The major argument here is to claim that the bigger the surface-based territory the more relevant it is as a container. The third one addresses a kind of "in-between" path. Mainly based on the French concept of "communauté de communes", it tries to take the best of the two previous forms without their disadvantages. In order for the discussion to be robust enough, the article refers to an original attempt which is under construction in the Swiss canton of Fribourg. Thanks to a law which is still unique in the Swiss legal landscape, this canton calls for a new institution: the agglomeration. This form is to be designed through a procedure which combines "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches. Although the first experiment is not completed yet, it allows for interesting observations which, in turn, provide an opportunity to reflect on the UOs issue.

Keywords

Agglomeration, commune, governance, institutional reform, modernity, network, switzerland, outskirts of European cities.
1 Introduction

This paper deals with institutional reform in Switzerland. More specifically, it discusses the pros and cons of a law that was adopted in 1995 in canton Fribourg (see map 1) to promote the "agglomeration" (Loi cantonale du 19 septembre 1995 sur les agglomérations - LAgg).

It is the purpose of this law to define the agglomeration as a new institutional form, in addition to the more traditional one called "commune". Both the agglomeration and the commune are designed to deal with governance issues at the local level. Although it does not expressly address urban outskirts (UOs) cases, this law provides for an interesting discussion on governance issues.

The text is based on two main parts. The objective of the first one is to provide for some theoretical arguments designed to better understand why institutional reform is needed. The many processes that are causing urban outskirts to happen are calling for institutional reform. From this perspective, the Swiss case is not unique (see for example: Organisations et Territoires,
2002). It only differs from many European countries in terms of timing. At the federal level, the concept of agglomeration has been officially discussed since late 2001 only and a specific policy designed to promote agglomeration is about to be launched (ODT 2003). Despite this peculiar situation, the Swiss case offers various opportunities for comparisons with other countries where institutional reform is on the political agenda as well. The second part is dedicated to more in depth developments regarding the Fribourg law. Interestingly enough, this law has been advertised all over Switzerland as an innovation that could suitably address persistent problems which urban municipalities are facing. These problems are linked to both a decline in terms of financial resources (due, on the one hand, to net losses of population and tax-payers and, on the other hand, to cost increases to provide for central services), and a lack of schemes to enact satisfactory inter-communal co-operation. More precisely, this law originated from the observation that the existing institutional arrangements (what we call associations of communes or amalgamations) did not properly fit urban areas conditions, although they are used by rural municipalities.

2 Setting the context

The main argument is based on two starting points:
- various processes are giving rise to UOs and they are related to Modernity as defined by Giddens (1990);
- public actions are not producing "outskirtisation" per se: they mainly increase or decrease its scope and its growth-rate; it follows that one should focus on public actions that have the potential to cope with UOs, rather than look for public actions that could eventually get rid of UOs.

To fully understand these two points, it has to be explained that UOs are defined, in this paper, as built-up areas that were erected since the 1980s in mainly rural places. Accessibility to these places strongly depends on individual vehicles such as the car, or the motorcycle. But these vehicles tend to be easy to use because drivers are benefiting from a road network which is not yet congested and because they are facing almost no parking problems while accessing diverse and numerous places to practice their daily activities (working, enjoying leisure, shopping, socialising, visiting friends and family).
2.1 UOs and Modernity

UOs are to be fundamentally linked to our society's ongoing quest to intensify one's potential for social relations. Strengthening this potential requires "individuation". In other words, individuation must be understood as a means for an individual to increase his or her autonomy. Referring to the concept of Modernity might help to understand this point. For authors like Werlen (1997), and Giddens (1990) Modernity originated in the philosophical teachings of the Enlightenment. With its characteristic focus on the Self, Modernity links its representation of the world to individual perception (Werlen, 1997). Individuation finds itself reinforced by mechanisms of "disembedding" (Giddens, 1990). Through these mechanisms, the spatial and temporal frameworks wherein social relations take place are modified.

"By disembedding I mean the "lifting out" of social relations from local context of interactions and their restructuring across indefinite spans of space and time" (Giddens, 1990, p. 21).

History provides for many examples of "disembedding mechanisms" that we have fully integrated. Writing, coining, commercialising land, time, or one's labour-force (Méda, 1995; Polanyi, 1983), as well as using transport facilities, mobile phones or the internet are just examples of these mechanisms. There are all means that were developed - within our society - to set ourselves free of the local context in order to increase our potential for social relations. While becoming more and more abstract, these means drive us through various processes designed to escape from the local space-time constraint (Raffestin, 1980). This phenomenon is illustrated by our society discrediting the family, the local community, and/or the village as the only loci where someone can achieve his or her highest aspirations. Being mobile is a must, while staying at the same place is discredited. It is often associated with parochialism. It should be noticed however that although "disembedding mechanisms" are valorised they offer no guarantee that we shall be able to make any use of this potential which we are so eager to enlarge. Among our society there are no equal opportunities between individuals to take benefit from this potential.

Within this perspective, UOs, together with city centres and suburbs, are all parts of the same territorial expression of Modernity. UOs are certainly not affordable to everybody, but due to extensive mobility, and changing life-styles they are becoming more and more attractive for a growing number of people, especially because they offer land prices which are far more appealing than those in central city locations. In this way, UOs can be considered as perfect artefacts of a modern ideal of urbanisation - they are the product of a development process which is "disembedded" i.e based on the lowest possible costs available.

In comparison, areas like traditional city centres, industrial districts, or residential neighbourhoods are extremely difficult to recycle into new urban forms, once there are built. Two arguments can be used to illustrate this peculiar situation:
- although these new urban forms would eventually better suit the follow-up of Modernity, they are crippled by any kinds of constraints, norms and limits; For example, an old industrial building might have to be decontaminated prior to any redevelopment;
- to develop a piece of land requires a lot of money - in terms of buying a lot, paying for experts (notary, contractor, and architect), actually building the house, and getting public services (water mains, roads, planning codes); future owners can only support such a massive investment if they can amortise it over a long span of time... this mechanism is perfectly viable but it calls for stability and for regulations designed to prevent never-ending changes in the neighbouring building stock\(^1\).

For all those reasons, experts consider that the built environment has a very low degree of convertibility... meaning that hyper-central locations - where a full range of transport modes are simultaneously available together with a top quality physical environment - are only accessible to the wealthiest, who, paradoxically, do not even need anymore to own a car. Urban sprawl, which might produce urban forms like UOs, and/or leap-frogging kind of urbanisation, should therefore be understood as a very convenient way to set the building industry free of the local space-time constraint in order to increase individual autonomy at a reasonable overall cost. In other words, being urban - in the strict and precise meaning of being modern - does not compulsorily require one to live in a city. This phenomenon is certainly representative of the urban mutation most of the European countries are experiencing since the 1980s.

If we agree upon this link between UOs and Modernity, it follows that UOs are only an illustration of a very thorough pattern that governs our society as a whole. In most cases it is certainly too late for planners - and for the public sector - to oppose UOs. The point is rather to try to do the best of them in a context where:
- local, regional, and national policies have counter territorial effects;
- UOs do not fit planners ideals in terms of compact urban forms and controlled mobility;
- local municipalities are not well equipped to deal with territories that are based on the "network" rather than on the "surface" scheme.

### 2.2 Counter territorial effects linked to the Swiss national context

Other factors are fuelling "outskirtisation". The following two are more Swiss specific:
- tax rates disparities between cantons (regional level), and between municipalities (local level);
- lack of co-operation between municipalities and cantons.
Tax rates disparities

The Swiss political system is characterised by federalism and "subsidiarity". It gives a lot of autonomy to both municipalities and cantons- two institutions located at the local and the regional levels, respectively.

For example, municipalities and cantons can manoeuvre the rate which they will apply to tax their inhabitants' income. Reported to the average of the Swiss cantons (100) the index varies from 52 (Zoug - ZG) to 128 (Jura - JU). Based on this criterion only, the most interesting cantons in which to live in Switzerland are not far from the great Zürich area (see map 2).

Within cantons there are a lot of differences as well. In canton Vaud (VD), the index (reported to the taxes due to the cantonal level - 100) varies between municipalities from 40 to 135. Residential municipalities that are nicely connected to the road network, or to public transportation facilities, and that can take advantage of positive urban externalities are clearly benefiting from this situation. Some of them, which experienced their highest demographic growth during the 1970s, are now adopting a Malthusian strategy. Reproducing the characteristics of the "club theory", they restrict access to their territory to the wealthiest people. By the same token, they push other people to look for locations that are always further away from the already built-up areas. Parochialism, in this way, definitely contributes to the mechanisms of urban sprawl.
Lack of co-operation

This point is linked to the previous one. Rather than developing collaborative strategies, most cantons and/or municipalities are involved in competing schemes. Actors involved in developing huge commercial or leisure centres take advantage of this situation. As Switzerland is a small country, there are a lot of traffic interchanges offering potential locations for their projects. And because there are a lot of cantons, developers tend to behave like auctioneers waiting for the best cantonal bid in terms of tax abatement, public servants' courtesy, and legal assistance. Indirectly, this lack of co-operation reinforces UOs again. Co-ordinated and concerted actions to promote strategic locations are too uncertain and too difficult to design. Developers tend to always find a canton, and a municipality, which are ready to behave like "free-riders" in order to attract them.

This second point leads us to another major theme which is linked to UOs' stakes: governance. Governance is a concept which enlarges the more traditional government one. Government directly refers to the precise political institutions that are available in a specific jurisdiction. Governance adds to these institutions various cooperative schemes (public-public, and/or public-private partnerships) and participation mechanisms designed to provide for more flexibility and adaptableness in order to better cope with contemporary issues (Kübler and Leresche, 2003, p. 130). From a geographic point of view, it is possible to assert that government refers to the state's surface-based territory, while governance is more typical of the network-based territory. This idea is made more explicit in the next section.

2.3 The state's surface-based territory

According to Raffestin, territory is a product that is constantly being revised by a player, or a group of players, who interacts with others.

"Territory is generated from space, it is the result of a player's action at any level. By taking possession of space, through representation for example, the player 'territorializes' it." (Raffestin, 1980, p. 129)

This quote implies a number of propositions which are outlined below.
- Space should be seen as a raw material that precedes territory. Taking possession of space is a prerequisite for any kind of human activity. The production of territory(ies) is inherent in all human beings, whether they act alone or as a group.
- Territories themselves may vary immensely: they may be abstract or concrete, ephemeral or permanent, informal or institutionalised, invisible or tangible. Whatever the case, they constitute major stakes and lead to "territorial" conflicts; notably when it is difficult to superpose them or make them hinge upon each other.
- Territories are first and foremost the outcome of a relationship between a player, or players, and a "space-time" unit. Geographers consider this relationship as one to "exteriority", and to "otherness": the player who seeks to implement a project will have to "consume" physical environment (designated as "space" above), thereby generating a territory; since several players interact, in most cases this relation also involves "otherness" (i.e. the social environment). Needless to say, this relationship to the outside and to the other is highly complex. It seems nonetheless that its simplest representation is invariably the network. The network consists of nodes (i.e. the players), and of flows (i.e. the energy and the information exchanged). Such a network has several noteworthy characteristics: participants join it on a free and optional basis, and may be excluded if they do not "play according to the rules"; it allows for a vast range of actions and a random set up of relations. Assuming that a territory results primarily from a relationship of which the network is the most basic representation, we venture to conclude that the network is the territory's basic form.

Pursuing the Modernity line, our society includes a host of players producing more and more territories, which are organised on a network pattern. For example, Uos' inhabitants, or multinational firms, assume territorial forms which we can call "network-based territories", or "relational territory".

This is not the case for the state. The state is based on the more sophisticated "surface-based territory" model. This model was in fact adopted quite recently- in the wake of the various tensions that developed in the wider context of the Industrial Revolution and urbanisation, the Enlightenment, and the tenets of the French Revolution. Putting it more precisely, it was born of the upheavals of 1848 that spawned the nation-state. Any state in the modern understanding of the term epitomises this singular union of constitutionally based political institutions with a territory (in the sense of a surface, or a portion of the globe strictly delimited by a border). A French "circonscription" (i.e. electoral district), or an English "jurisdiction", clearly exemplifies this combination. We shall call "surface-based territory", or "institutional territory" the territorial form of the state.

The institutional territory functions as a "container" (Taylor, 1995) - an entity that contains the material and human resources within its borders. More significantly, it also contains the relations generated by most economic forces and civil society users, thereby transcending their network-based territories. However, the nation-state is not an exogenous model imposed upon society - its success depends on its functioning as a proper container. It owes its legitimacy to its compatibility with the dominant interests represented by the economic and political hubs, and to its capacity to somehow internalise the demands of the forces from the civil society. From the end of the 1910s until the 1960s this model worked well, and enabled the institutional territory to develop a political regulatory system that gave it authority over most of the strategic relations found within society. In fact, it was so effective a container that society found itself almost "institutionalised": broken up and fragmented by the web of the combined state organisations -both from a horizontal perspective (between nation-states)
and from a vertical perspective (by local, regional and national authorities). It was a fragile structure however, or in any case one contingent upon outside circumstances.

This consideration brings us back to the issue of UOs and Modernity, and to the idea that UOs are outcomes of "disembedding mechanisms". Within this perspective the basic question in terms of governance is the following: can the surface-based territory still act as an effective container? At the local level, and especially in UOs, the adequacy between the institutional territory - the economic boundaries required for an efficient provision of many local public goods - and the relational territory (which arises out of the inhabitants' private life as consumers, users, and commuters) is at stake. Dealing with the governance issue implies the need to think about the adequate reorganisation of these various kinds of territory that refer to the circles of the deciders (the elected bodies at the local level), the beneficiaries (the users), the inhabitants (the consumers, and the commuters), and the (tax)payers in a coherent public institution. Such are the settings within which one can now discuss the Fribourg law on agglomerations.

3  The 1995 law on agglomerations in canton Fribourg (Switzerland): a case of governance "best practice"?  

Spurred on by the awareness that the nation-state is coming apart at the seams, nearly all legal authorities at the local, regional, or national level are involved in territorial recombination projects. These come in a host of different shapes. But, in Switzerland, and by now, recent institutional territorial reform is performed at the local level only. This is certainly linked to a characteristic of the broader Swiss political context that always calls for "bottom-up" procedures. In comparison with most international examples where new institutional levels are created through "top-down" measures, Swiss inhabitants always have their say through the use of direct democracy. But as Norris (2001) argues: "bottom-up" procedures are often considered as improper to successfully produce territorial recombination. The purpose of this section is to challenge this precise argument through a presentation of the case and a brief discussion of what have been already achieved in the Grand-Fribourg agglomeration proposal.

The "association", the "fusion" (amalgamation), and - since 1995 and solely in canton Fribourg - the "agglomeration" are the main forms of co-operation between local municipalities. These structures have their pros and cons. But it must be recognised, and this is a crucial point, that none is likely to be well designed enough to ensure that any institutional territory can recover
its ability to perform as an effective container. Such a feature seems to be out of reach. It resembles a Sisyphean job, or a piece of work that is constantly on the stocks. Prior to discussing the agglomeration scheme, some basic characteristics of the two other forms are worth mentioning.

The association has a legal status that the 26 Swiss cantons define through a specific law (*Loi sur les communes*). In most cases, municipalities willing - or having - to co-operate are involved in building associations in order to reassign to themselves the production of one specific task (organising a fire-fighting department; managing water mains, building and operating a waste management plant, designing a regional master plan). Once it is created, the association delivers its benefits within the perimeter of the participating municipalities. Association is a very popular form of local co-operation. However, many drawbacks are attached to it (*Dafflon et Perritaz, 2000a; Swiss Political Science Review, 2001*). First, an association is not entitled to levy taxes—most of its funding comes from money transfers that are directly made by the participating municipalities. Therefore, the association is not accountable for its expenses to the taxpayers, but to the authorities of the participating municipalities only. Second, they present a democratic deficit—they are run by people who are not elected, but chosen by the local authorities from the elected executive body. These two points also mean that associations are suffering from a lack of visibility for the local citizenry. Third, associations tend to be created to perform one task - or group of related tasks - only. It follows that most municipalities are involved in numerous associations serving each a different perimeter. As representatives of the elected body are not innumerable, their availability is constrained. They tend to limit their participation in the management of the most prestigious and visible associations only. This situation harmfully impinges upon the necessary co-ordination of the tasks that are placed under the responsibility of local authorities. For all these reasons, associations can hardly be controlled through a fair and democratic procedure (*Kübler et Leresche, 2003, pp. 132-134*).

In comparison with the association, the fusion (amalgamation) is more promising. It consists of a new institutional territory - a new municipality, which is produced by merging two or more municipalities. In Switzerland, fusion (amalgamation) can only be generated through a voluntary "bottom-up" procedure initiated by willing municipalities with the support of their respective citizens. But no "top-down" mechanism is available. Therefore, fusion is mainly considered by remote and rural municipalities which cannot afford to stay on their own. Despite the noticeable exception of Lugano, it is considered a less accessible institutional arrangement to more populated municipalities, where far more issues are at stake. Therefore, as it is defined in the Fribourg law, agglomeration should be regarded as an innovative intermediate form between association and fusion.

The law on agglomerations (LAgg) was adopted in September 1995. But it took five years of serious debate and overt reluctance before a first attempt to apply it was launched through a popular initiative signed by the citizens living in five different municipalities of the "Grand Fribourg" area (see map 3).
Following the procedure of the LAgg, the government of the Fribourg canton determined in July 2000 a provisional perimeter of the "Grand Fribourg" agglomeration. This perimeter includes the five municipalities\(^8\) where signatures were collected for the popular initiative and five other neighbouring municipalities. A constituent assembly, made out of representatives chosen by the ten municipalities of the provisional perimeter, was formed in June 2001. This assembly is now responsible for elaborating the statutes of the future "Grand Fribourg" agglomeration. These statutes should determine the agglomeration's political bodies, its functioning rules, its organisation, and its funding. They have to be completed by Spring 2005 and will be enacted if a majority of inhabitants within the ten municipalities agrees on them and if at least five of the ten municipalities approve them as well.

It is not yet possible to discuss these statutes. But, interestingly enough, the LAgg itself is offering several options to the constituent assembly. Before discussing these options, we shall first define what a "theorised agglomeration" should be, if the agglomeration were to be an institutional form which is not yet available within the Swiss institutional framework. After that, we shall discuss the merits of the LAgg in the face of UOs governance.

\(\text{Map 3: The "Grand Fribourg" perimeter}\)
3.1 The agglomeration from a theoretical viewpoint

Several financial or spatial solutions are available to restore a decent coincidence between the circles of the deciders (the elected bodies at the local level), the beneficiaries (the users), the inhabitants (the consumers, and the commuters), and the (tax)payers. Financial transfers put aside, the "theorised agglomeration" refers to inter-governmental local co-operation (Della Santa, 1996, p. 139). It is located between the traditional association de communes and the fusion de communes (amalgamation). To provide for a new institutional form, it has to obey the following theorem containing five propositions:

1. the agglomeration is a "selective" amalgamation, where the re-assigned functions concern only a limited number of local public services, explicitly stated;
2. the agglomeration has its own financial resources (taxes and user charges), which are independent of the budgets of the municipalities lying within its limits;
3. members of the political authorities of the agglomeration (executive and legislative bodies) are elected following the same rules as those that prevail to elect local authorities in the canton of reference;
4. the democratic rights - especially the rights to launch a popular initiative or a referendum - that are available in the agglomeration are similar to those in the municipalities of the canton of reference;
5. the agglomeration builds a sole electoral ward (its citizenry is not a patchwork of many municipal citizenries).

Because it is defined as a selective amalgamation, the "theorised agglomeration" cannot cover the entire national territory. It does not result in a new intermediary level of government. It is rather imbedded in the local framework. From a horizontal perspective, municipalities and agglomerations (the latter for a limited number of specific functions only) are the two types of governmental organisation that are available at the local level. From a vertical viewpoint, and provided local authorities have to deal with an upper tier such as a canton, agglomerations replace municipalities when specific functions that have been assigned to them are at stake.

Following proposition 1 of the theorem, a first concern is the problem of overlapping responsibilities. For clarity and to avoid any tendency towards a progressive dilution of responsibility, the power given to the agglomeration should be exclusive, and well defined. The limits of any function should be explicitly stated as well. For certain tasks, local authorities (involved in a municipality and/or an agglomeration) might have to co-operate and to envisage joint and complementary actions. In such cases their intervention should take place in accordance with clear legal provisions. A second concern stems from the relationship between an agglomeration and its neighbouring municipalities. The aim of the agglomeration is to provide for an institutional territory that better internalises spillover effects. However, since "free riding" from outside residents cannot be ruled out, residual spillover effects may remain. The agglomeration must be in a position to decide whether these effects are relevant or not. If they are, the agglomeration should have the power to obtain financial compensation from the benefiting municipalities.
Proposition 2 states that financial autonomy is necessary to promote a fair fiscal accountability. Propositions 3 and 4 have much simpler implications. Electoral and democratic rules differ among Swiss cantons. Therefore, these two propositions establish, in relative terms, that the rules in an agglomeration to run an election or to launch a popular initiative or a referendum should be exactly the same than the ones in a municipality in the canton of reference.

Proposition 5 derives its logic from the production of local public goods within an agglomeration. If these goods are collective in nature, their "benefit" can neither be attributed to individual residents nor divided among the municipalities within the agglomeration. The logic of collective action makes it necessary to consider the agglomeration as a unique jurisdiction, and not as an addition, or as a patchwork of municipalities.

3.2 The options offered by the 1995 law on agglomerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Institutional forms</th>
<th>&quot;Theorised&quot; agglomeration</th>
<th>AGGLOMAX</th>
<th>AGGLOMIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Functions (exclusiveness)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Financial resources</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Elected bodies</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Democratic rights</td>
<td>yes condition : 1/10 of the citizens of the agglomeration</td>
<td>yes condition : 1/10 of the citizens of the agglomeration or 1/3 of the local authorities</td>
<td>yes condition : 11/10 of the citizens of the agglomeration or 1/3 of the local authorities</td>
<td>yes condition : 11/10 of the citizens of the agglomeration or 1/3 of the local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Vote : majority rules</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>voters</td>
<td>double majority voters</td>
<td>double majority voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>voters</td>
<td>double majority</td>
<td>double majority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>voters</td>
<td>voters</td>
<td>double majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Dafflon and Perritaz (2000b: 33).

Table 1: Agglomerax and Agglomin in comparison to the "theorised" agglomeration
The 1995 law leaves latitude for municipalities to decide their institutional organisation. Five
specifications define the upper and the lower limit of the options that are available. These upper
and lower limits are called Agglomax and Agglomin. With Agglomax, municipalities are totally
using the innovative leeway given by the law. Agglomin is the outcome of a minimalist interpre-
tation of the law. It describes an institution which is similar to the actual regime of association
de communes. Therefore, Agglomin cannot be regarded as a new institutional form. It rather
resembles an old wine in a new bottle... with the only difference that Agglomin offers municipa-
lities the possibility to transfer to themselves several tasks pursuing multiple goals. The options
concern: (1) the transfer of functions from the municipalities to the agglomeration itself; (2) the
financial resources of the agglomeration; (3) its authorities; (4) the democratic rules and (5) the
decision making rules. These specifications are presented in Table 1, where they are compared
to the "theorised agglomeration".

The following arguments stress the differences between the three institutional forms.

Functions

The three institutional forms are providing for policy co-ordination mechanisms and exclusive
functions. The members of the constituent assembly of the "Grand Fribourg" agglomeration will
have to decide how exclusive the functions to be transferred to the agglomeration will be and to
what extent these functions will be specific. If they take a minimalist approach, they will have
to put more emphasis on policy co-ordination mechanisms. Their choice is not going to be an
easy one- full authority over the transferred tasks might cause too much offence to the municipal
authorities. But persuasion in order to promote co-ordination might also be at risk as neither the
LAgg nor other legal texts of canton Fribourg allow a municipality to sanction legally if it is not
doing its fair share of co-ordination.

Another fundamental question remains open. It concerns the actual constitution of an agglome-
ration. After the procedure has been launched, it is the cantonal government's task to set a pro-
visional perimeter. Once this is done, municipalities within this perimeter have to design their
representatives to the constituent assembly. And it is the constituent assembly's job to elaborate
statutes that determine the tasks, the functions, and the resources of the future agglomeration.
In other words, the designation of the tasks follows the definition of the perimeter. According to
the canon of fiscal federalism, the sequence should be reversed. The optimal size of a jurisdiction
is closely related to the function that it is supposed to perform. Its institutional territory should
be assigned on the basis of criteria such as scale savings, spillover effects, congestion costs,
preferences, information and organisation costs (King 1995: 55-57). From an operational and
pragmatic perspective, the assignment of functions and the definition of the perimeter should be
settled on simultaneously. However, this has not been done for the "Grand Fribourg" agglomera-
tion, and serious opposition from municipalities has arisen. They wanted to know the detailed
arrangements before joining the agglomeration.
The last serious issue to be mentioned relates to the articulation between both the agglomeration and the association institutional forms. As said earlier, associations are very popular. The municipalities involved in the provisional perimeter are all members of many different associations displaying specific perimeters. In other words, most of the conceivable tasks are already produced through the association mechanism. Therefore it is not going to be an easy job to transfer a task from municipalities to the agglomeration without reconsidering an association. According to the LAgg (or to other legal texts), there is no provision for arbitration between associations and agglomeration over conflicting goals or overlapping perimeters.

Financial resources

A weak point of the LAgg is the impossibility of giving taxation powers to the agglomeration (whether it is closer to the Agglomax upper limit or to the Agglomin lower limit). In all cases, the main financial resources will be provided through annual transfers from municipalities to the agglomeration. The LAgg perpetuates a situation where inter-municipality co-operation forms strongly depend on municipalities from a financial perspective. This runs against the logic of local public goods. It would be more fruitful if financial resources were to be general and independent within the agglomeration.

Rules of majority

Agglomax and Agglomin differ from the theorised model. In the model, the electorate constitutes a single entity and it refers to the total territory of the agglomeration. Spatial reference for voting should coincide with the territory of the agglomeration and its functions/tasks. Because the LAgg does not provide for such a rule, it does not fully respect this "territorial" logic. Initiatives and the compulsory referendum succeed only if they are approved by a double majority - a majority of the voters and a majority of the municipalities imbedded in the agglomeration perimeter. Such a democratic procedure suggests that the agglomeration is not a single institutional territory - it is rather viewed as the addition of many electoral wards, each one corresponding to the perimeter of one participating municipality.

Constitution of the agglomeration

The first step of the procedure follows an innovative "bottom-up" scheme. Inhabitants (through the initiative procedure) or elected bodies are entitled to launch the procedure. But the second step is a pure "top-down" one. Once the cantonal government has determined the provisional perimeter of the agglomeration, the concerned municipalities are not allowed to use a veto right. They must participate in the procedure and have to designate representatives to the constituent assembly. Municipalities in the provisional perimeter are not masters of their fate any more, for two reasons:
- the provisional perimeter can only be modified by a majority of two thirds of the members of the constituent assembly;
- once the statutes are ready for final approval, and in case of a referendum, the agglomeration will be enacted if it is approved by the majority of both voters and participating municipalities.

This lost of control/autonomy is quite unusual for the Swiss institutional landscape. It is probably counterproductive, as reluctant municipalities are tempted to use lobbying and informal strategies to hinder the whole procedure. Such behaviour is perilous, and not compatible with transparency rules. It impedes a fair debate and an open treatment of difficulties that will inevitably occur during the constitution procedure.

3.3 Conclusion: back to UOs governance issue

The final form of the "Grand Fribourg" agglomeration will possibly be fairly comparable with the "theorised" agglomeration, providing the constituent assembly works following the Agglomax line\textsuperscript{13}. To transform Agglomax into a "model", three challenges should be faced. First, following the logic of local public goods, the assignment of functions and the definition of the perimeter of the agglomeration should be designed simultaneously. Second, for financial independence and accountability, the agglomeration should receive taxation power. Third, once it is enacted, the agglomeration should be regarded as only one single electoral ward.

For the time being, the constituent assembly has created three working groups within its members. Each working group has a specific task in order to define:
- what are the tasks the agglomeration should perform within which perimeter?
- what funding devices should be promoted?
- which legal statuses should be endorsed?

The three working groups have delivered a first draft version of their report. The first one proposes a two steps strategy. A-3 combines three tasks: urban planning, transport planning, and environmental issues. If the agglomeration is successful with the A-3 scheme, it could then adopt the A-7 one. A-7 would add promotion of economical activities, tourism, culture, and sport activities. The second working group thinks that the time has not yet come to provide the agglomeration with its own fiscal authority. But it is suggesting that the law (LAgg) should be reconsidered in order to offer such a possibility in a near future. These various elements tend to demonstrate that the constituent assembly is now working with enthusiasm and determination while following a line which is clearly innovative rather than conservative. But, of course, the whole procedure is not completed yet. The Agglomeration du Grand-Fribourg will be enacted only if it gets the final approval of the canton, the involved municipalities and their respective constituency.
How pertinent is the agglomeration for the UOs governance issue? First and foremost one has to admit that there is no universal answer, and no ready-made recipe. As already said, designing an institutional territory that better fits the territory of modernity is a Sisyphean job. The "theorised" agglomeration and the discussion of the Fribourg case are interesting in relation to the promotion of the "selective amalgamation" option within a context of direct democracy that imposes to follow "bottom-up" procedures. The LAgg mixes "bottom-up" rules with "top-down" ones. The idea of mixing the two approaches makes reasonable sense. For example, it is definitely original to let people launch the whole procedure of building an agglomeration through a popular initiative. And it is also wise, once the procedure is launched, to ask the upper tier to look after the agenda (definition of the provisional perimeter, guidance and management of the constituent assembly, definition of deadlines for producing the statutes). However, for the time being, the "mixture" results in some paradoxical schemes. On the one hand, the participating municipalities keep the power over the agglomeration, once it is enacted (financial resources, rules of majority). On the other hand, municipalities are losing their autonomy during the constituent procedure (conditions to be met prior to any modification of the provisional perimeter). Such a situation is counterproductive. However, provided some adjustments are made, the LAgg can fruitfully inspire the UOs governance issue by suggesting that local authorities should be allowed to use both the traditional municipal institution form and the new agglomeration/selective amalgamation one.
Notes

1 Perin (1977) convincingly demonstrates how zoning was successfully introduced in the States in order to prevent depreciation in land and housing values. See also Ruegg (2000).

2 These figures are based on the following case: a couple with no kids and that had a 70'000.- CHF taxable income in 1999.

3 For more in-depth considerations on networks see for example: Monnoyer-Longé (1996, pp. 204-218), and Ruegg (1996, pp. 14-17).

4 This part is based on Dafflon and Ruegg (2001, 2002).

5 Eight municipalities have merged at the end of 2002. La Nuova Lugano has now 46'000 inhabitants and is the tenth biggest city of Switzerland.

6 The procedure to create an agglomeration can be launched either by municipal authorities or by citizens through a popular initiative, provided the following three conditions are fulfilled:
   - the municipalities to be involved in the agglomeration are sharing a unique and common urban centre;
   - they are closely linked in terms of urban development, economy and culture;
   - altogether, they have at least 10'000 inhabitants.

7 Fribourg designates both the name of a Swiss canton and the name of its chief town.

8 These municipalities are Fribourg - the 31'000 inhabitants chief town -, Belfaux, Corminboeuf, Givisiez, Granges-Paccot, Grolley, Marly and Villars-sur-Glâne (which are French-speaking municipalities in the Sarine county), Düdingen and Tafers (which are German-speaking municipalities in the Singine county). These ten municipalities have approximately 66'000 inhabitants, altogether.

9 This interpretation conforms to the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Council of Europe 1986), in particular to its article 10, paragraph 1. Experts in the field of fiscal federalism and decentralisation theories generally share it.

10 For example, local public transport is often an exclusive function of municipalities. But this function is not specific. Public transport is only a component of a much larger strategy dealing with urban mobility, which also includes private transport, pedestrian zones, biking lanes or parking policies.

11 We identified only two tasks that are "free". The first one deals with planning power, and the second one with taxation procedures. These are certainly the two tasks that are the most difficult to transfer from municipalities to another institutional form.

12 This comment is valid for both the association and the agglomeration.

13 If it follows the Agglomerin line, the "Grand Fribourg agglomeration" will be a conservative and not very promising form, very similar to multi-purposes associations of communes that are already possible under another law (Loi fribourgeoise du 25 septembre 1980 sur les communes).
Reference


Loi du 19 septembre 1995 sur les agglomérations (LAgg), RS Fribourg 140.2.

Loi du 25 septembre 1980 sur les communes (LCo), RS Fribourg 140.1.


Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to address urban outskirts as a laboratory for transformation of the territorial governance system in France. It is based upon the assessment of the historical marginalisation of big cities in the French political system. This marginalisation has its roots in the republican compromise that took place in the end of the nineteenth century, when the Third Republic was established. For more than 50 years, big cities stood out of the political scene—partly because there were few big cities, partly because the central state was keen on keeping the local authorities fragmented. While changes in big cities are very slow, they occur faster in the surroundings municipalities, mainly because outskirts are new places generated by urban growth. Therefore, outskirts should not be seen as "anti cities" (as most urban planners do), nor as "the future of the city" (in the sense that every urban area should look like outskirts). They should be seen as places of experiment, were new way of life, new way of governance are put into test.

This paper intends first to give some hints on the French political territorial system and tries to explain why big cities have, until recently, been "cast out" from the political scene. Second, it will stress that, since world war II, outskirts have been, in France, a place for experiment in new governance patterns, first run by the Communists, then by the Socialists. Third, I will try to explain what is happening now, when outskirts of big cities have turn to vote for the extreme right.

The main point of this paper is that the present situation of outskirts points out the political fragmentation of urban areas which are mainly run through the "public choice" model. This model is both appealing and frightening. In the end, I put forward three suggestions about how to deal with such a situation.

Keywords

France, outskirts, governance.
1 Some lights on French territorial organisation and outskirts as laboratories for governance

One may think that one major paradox of French politics, is the unique entanglement of national and local powers. The fragmentation of local authorities appears as a consequence of centralisation, France has more municipalities (36,000) than the rest of the EU’s countries. The roots of this "local inflation" should be found in history. Several authors (Viard, Roncayolo, Agulhon, and even Weber) argue that the French political map finds its origins in an agreement set after the 1870 war, between the early Republicans and the rural elites. At the time, Republicans found strong support in cities, but the rural populations - as K. Marx argued in the 18 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte - showed great reluctance towards a regime held as a threat for small-scale property owners. In order to succeed, the Republicans had to win the support of the rural population, mainly small farmers. Among the terms of agreement one was to stop the growing influence of cities, and to prevent the incorporation of the small rural municipalities into big political organisations dominated by the urban leaders. This explains why, since the end of the XIXth century, the political map did not change: governments and parliament would prevent any attempt to build stronger and bigger local authorities, involving the cities and their rural outskirts. One could call this an "affirmative action" in favour of rural areas and population and this can be regarded as one of the strongest and oldest structure of French politics. It explains the odd way of election for the Senate - that does not represent one level of local authority (as it is in most federal States) but every level of local authorities, giving an outstanding advantage to the small rural municipalities. It is not only an anecdote to remember that General De Gaulle had to resign after losing a referendum on the Senate reform. By contrast with other European States that cut down dramatically the number of local authorities in the early 1970s the French government neither succeeded nor really tried to change the distribution of local authorities. The decentralisation reform that occurred between 1982 and 1984 changed some rules but kept the "communes" untouched. This permanence of boundaries maintained (and still maintains) a sharp division between urban and rural "regimes", though the growth of outskirts tended to erase the social and economic differences between the two kind of space. Most geographers now have stopped using this urban/rural distinction that still exist in territorial politics.

The consequence of this territorial fragmentation is the huge number of associations between local authorities. Some 18,000 associations exists, using a great variety of formulae, from single targeted organisations (dealing with water, electricity, solid waste disposal) to multi targeted associations in metropolitan areas, dealing with the whole range of urban services and facilities, urban planning, housing, economic development, and so on. These associations tend to be, more and more, the real place for territorial decision, for the governments have tried for many years to strengthen their powers. But, as they grow in power, they still don’t have the legitimacy given by a direct election. On this field, those associations cannot compete with municipalities.
This system was efficient in providing two main conditions:
- first, the growth of urban population could be contained within the cities’ limits and the old suburbs; most of big cities, as matter of fact, enjoyed large territories, that could contain a growing population without spilling out onto surrounding municipalities;
- second, most of basic services such as education, health, security, even housing policy, were provided by the central state; this meant (and still does) that the central state would provide great support to small rural municipalities, themselves fighting to keep schools, post offices, police stations and hospitals²; on the other hand, the state offices would do much of the planning.

However, the growing of outskirts, that really begins, as far as France is concerned, in the early seventies put into question this old distinction between urban and rural regime. Outskirts didn’t, in many ways, fit with the stable, traditional way of governing rural municipalities; so there had to be invented new ways of governing this unidentified territorial object.

For many years, outskirts of big cities were to be laboratories of new urban governance. In those places, new urban regimes were experimented, that would later affect the governments of big cities.

1.1 1945-1977: Outskirts as the laboratory of municipal communism

It is, of course, difficult to distinguish between outskirts and suburbs. One can say that the present suburbs are former outskirts -if one take outskirts in the literal sense of "periphery". The line of outskirts is moving, and outskirts change a great deal according to the rhythm and nature of urban growth. Let us assume that outskirts emerge when the social segregation is no longer associated but dissociated, i.e. when spatial mismatch occurs. This means that in industrial towns, social segregation was associated with industry and jobs. In the twentieth century towns, social segregation is dissociated from jobs and industry: outskirts go with commuting (Damette, 2002).

Therefore, the first outskirts of the major French cities (Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseilles) were dwelling places for workers. As Fourcaut (Fourcaut, 2002) argues, those outskirts crop up in the early twenties, when the industrial workers began to yearn for individual housing. Thousands of households settled in the surroundings of industrial cities, mainly Paris. This phenomenon lead to many social and urban problems, as the settlements were insecure and the buildings flimsy. Among those first individual houses, many were mere shantyhouses. The situation grew worrying in the thirties, and gave birth to the so called "mal lotis" (bad settlements) movement, protesting against the lack of facilities and urban networks within those new outskirts. Those dwellers would be charged with a lack of foresight, with words that could still be used nowadays: the working class yearning for independent housing was regarded as an urban and social disaster, both by scientists and politicians, for its consumption of land,
its "lack of beauty" and its consequences on increasing traffic. There, the Communist party planted its roots, leaning on discontented households. This gave birth to the so-called "red belts" that surrounded (and, to some extent still surrounds) Paris, Marseilles and Lyon.

Though the Communist party was, on the whole, waiting for the Revolution - and, as a matter of fact stood against hic et nunc socialism - it achieved in its municipalities a genuine urban regime. Three main components characterised this regime:

- the first component was the control exercised by the satellite organisations: women unions, youth organisations, cells of the party; this control would shaped, to a great extent, the conception of municipal interventions on a large scale; it still represents an example for the policies aimed at deprived urban area, which subsidise associations in order to restore territorial and social control;
- the second component was the regeneration of the old municipal welfare (as a matter of fact, Communist municipalities carried on after world war two the experiments that socialists municipalities started after world war one); health centres, day-nurseries, cheap holidays in countryside, and, of course, social housing… all these services now usually provided by municipalities were experimented (though not only) in the outskirts run by communists;
- the third component was the attention given to youth, education and sports: the library, the gymnasium and the stadium (often called Yuri Gagarin) were among the main buildings of such outskirts.

The Communist party have been running municipalities, such as Saint-Denis in the suburbs of Paris, since 1936. This make a great difference between France and Italy, were Communists run (and still do) some of the major cities. In France, except for Le Havre, Bourges, Le Mans and Amiens (which are not really "big cities"), the Communist Party mainly stayed in the outskirts of major urban regions such as Paris, Lyon and Marseilles. This model was so strong during the 1960s that the State could hardly intervene. When the General de Gaulle wanted to re design the administrative system of the Paris region, he had to create two "départements" (territorial division) specially dedicated to the Communist party. Today, those "départements" are still run by Communist majorities.

One should not underestimate the influence of communist municipalities during the 1950s-1960s period in France. One can speak of a special culture - or even a social microcosm. But, at the same time, those regimes invented a great variety of techniques and placed issues on municipal agenda that were taken up, at the same period or later, by other municipalities, whatever was their political orientation.
1.2 1977-1990: Outskirts as a stepping stone for the "socialism with an urban face"

During the 1970s and the 1980s, new outskirts gradually surrounded big cities. Those outskirts were peopled mainly by middle class or lower middle class households achieving a successful course toward ownership. The outskirts of the 1970s also included "new towns" (such as those built in the surroundings of Paris), designed to break with the massive social housing estates built during the 1950s and the 1960s, and to organise polycentric metropolitan areas. Often, though, those households began their residential careers in such estates: purchasing a house was the mark of their social achievement. As in the Communist days, those new urban outskirts became laboratories for the new Socialist party, rebuilt in 1971. The "new towns" in the outskirts of Paris were one of those laboratories, where middle class activists tried to build a socialism "with an urban face" (a joke after the "socialism with a human face"). The main features of this "socialism with an urban face" were participation and arts (as the features of the "real socialism" were soviet and electricity).

Participation meant that the municipalities should be run as non-profit corporations: they should be more democratic, they should ask frequently the population for advice, they should inform better on their purposes and projects, they should be careful about the needs of minorities, etc. Arts meant that this new urban governance was to "make the difference" as compared with the old one in this field. The "imagination was to be in charge".

These features built up a new pattern of governance that spread widely into the local political elites. The "socialism with an urban face" had three main consequences:

- it popularised the idea that urban governance was mainly a middle class business; in other words, the dominant pattern of urban happiness would be the middle class way of life; participation, for instance, was very far from the Communist pattern: it supposed, to a great extent, a property-based citizenship;
- it replaced the previous communist pattern that had been, for many years the only alternative to the traditional way of governance;
- and, overall, it gave to municipal affairs a special place in national politics: out of outskirts, the socialists politicians gained central cities and took a growing part in designing national public policies thank to the holding of the mandates of mayor and deputy; at a local level, the mayor (and often deputies) of big cities tried to extend their powers to the surrounding area.

The example of Nantes is relevant to illustrate this process. The present mayor (who is socialist) was trained in a small town in the outskirts of Nantes. There, he tested policy instruments, which he used later for governing the central city (such as neighbourhood consultative councils). After gaining Nantes, he stood for the post of Deputy and was elected. Later he was chosen to be the leader of the socialists in parliament. Then he created a strong association at the agglomeration level joined gradually by the other municipalities; this association (communauté urbaine) is now running most of urban services and facilities in the
Nantes metropolitan area. Then he signed an agreement with Saint-Nazaire (which is a big seaport and a place for shipbuilding) for a joint development project. Now, he begins talks with Rennes (historical capital of Brittany), so as to set up a European scale project.

This is, of course, the main difference between Communist and Socialist outskirts: while Communists stayed within their bastions, Socialists used outskirts as a stepping stone to gain more power, and, on the whole, as a start for their strategy to win a presidential election -which they did in 1981.

One can see a major difference between Communist and Socialist outskirts. For the Communists, outskirts are chiefly bastions, where a "counter society" is built in, supervised by the Party and its organisations. For the Socialists, outskirts provide the bases for a political conquest, of big cities firstly and of national power, secondly. Anyway, in both cases, outskirts provide a pattern of municipal governance that is later adopted by other municipalities.

2 1990-2000: Outskirts as a laboratory for far right?

During the 1980s and the 1990s, urban growth went faster. Since 1975, 80 % of the demographic growth is explained by the growth of urban population. From 1990 to 1999 (dates of census), 677 new municipalities became "urban". 75.5% (44 million) of the French population live in 6,000 urban municipalities. (On the other hand, 25% of the population -14 million- lives in 30,000 municipalities). During the same period, 2,500 municipalities were included in urban areas.

Facing this urban growth, two Acts of the Parliament in 1999 tried, as in Fribourg canton, to enforce the political and technical organisation of the urban areas. Those Acts created two kinds of Associations and a set of new instrument for urban policies. But are those instruments compatible with outskirts?

2.1 New institutions and new instruments

The smaller municipalities are, the more they have to cooperate. The legislator has, since the end of the nineteenth century, set a great variety of institutional devices to encourage this kind of cooperation. At first, these institutions were single targeted (eg. water, electricity, solid waste
Francois: Outskirts or the Laboratories for Governance Patterns?

Disposal…) and aimed at primary services and facilities. During the second half of the twentieth
century, the institutions for municipal cooperation became more sophisticated: they included gradu-
dually urban planning, housing, economic development, employment policy and social policy. They
got the right to raise their own taxes and became more and more powerful. No less than 18,000
such Associations exist in France. But still those Associations are weak for two main reasons.

- First, they are not compulsory: each municipality is free to join. It can even join an association
  for only one or two of its services and facilities. This means that the territorial design of such
associations is much alike some US constituencies. This leads too to an confuse entanglement
of associations, as one municipality can join as many associations as it wants.
- Second, they have no political legitimacy: municipalities elect deputies who nominate a chair-
man; the people, though paying taxes to those associations, are never directly involved in the
choice of deputies and chairmen. This explains also the incredible number of such associa-
tions: they became a "political niche" for a lot of notables who could preserve their power and
improve their career thanks to those functions.

These Associations did not carry out political competition with municipalities, they were rather
instruments used by municipalities to achieve their missions of providing services to their popu-
lation. One could speak of quangos: even if their are run by a political counsel, they are, de facto,
non-governmental objects.

Facing the urban growth, the legislator wished to enforce such Associations, so as to transform
them into urban governments. The 1999 Act instituted two new formulae - close to the Swiss
example. The first formula is called "communauté d’agglomération" (agglomeration community)
and the second is called "communauté urbaine" (urban community). The first formula cor-
responds to the Swiss "agglomomin" and the second to "agglomax".

Those communities are designed to shape urban areas over 50,000 inhabitants (over 500,000 as
far as urban communities are concerned). They both have compulsory and optional competen-
ces (ie. the joint municipalities may or may not chose to devolve to the community). Among the
compulsory competences, one find urban planning, economic development (planning of econo-
ic areas, facilities and services for business…), social urban policy (policies aimed at deprived
urban areas). Optional competences are almost unlimited, as long as the counsel regard them as
"community interest", and the members accept.

In order to give those institutions more strength, the legislator has enacted two rules. First,
those institutions are to be all in one piece: no "hole" is allowed. This means that any munici-
pality involved in the perimeter of a new community has to join, willingly or not. Second, all
previous associations within the perimeter are dissolved: a municipality cannot belong to more
than one community, this to stop the "channel flick" municipalities were used to. Overall, the
legislator enacted a financial carrot: for three years after the creation of the community, the state
increases its subsidies.
Simultaneously, the legislator created two instruments for urban policy. First, it created a new planning instrument (the "SCOT" or territorial coherence scheme, i.e. a new form of masterplan). The SCOT is compulsory for each urban area over 50,000 inhabitants and must involve any municipalities within a perimeter of 15 Km beyond the urban area limit -so as to manage urban sprawl. It deals with housing, transport, roads, activities and facilities locations, etc... and its regulations must be respected by the municipal plans. The second instrument is a global contract, signed between the State and the community that provides guidelines and subsidies for the main issues of urban management. Those contracts are signed for 3 years till 2006 and then for 6 years. It ensures that the state will stand by its commitments (mostly financial), provided the community does the same - this contract being a flexible way of steering urban development.

Those institutions and instruments have been an incredible "hit" with the municipalities. Three years after their implementation, more than 400 new communities have been created. One may think that the problem of urban governance is sorted out. But outskirts municipalities do not seem to be willingly part of the new urban scene. They resist strongly integration. Have outskirts lost their innovation ability? Or does their resistance point out new urban issues?

2.2 The isolation of outskirts

The first point is that those new institutions may be overtaken by their success. As a matter of fact, they are so popular that most urban areas have generated not one but, on average, 8 communities! Two patterns occur:
- first, in the case of monocentric urban areas (as for example, Rennes), the communities are more or less organised according to a concentric pattern ; the core city has organised its own community with the suburbs, and the outskirts (if they are organised), have created their communities of their own, in order to "exist" on the local political scene ;
- second, in the case of polycentric urban areas (as for Marseilles, Toulouse, Paris), each polarity has organised a self-centred community with its surroundings territories; therefore, those urban areas are divided from now on between institutional blocks, facing each other and waiting for arbitration.

Hence, the 1999 Act may have simplified the urban political landscape, but it did not achieved the declared purpose to create one big community at the "right scale" in each urban area. One can wonder, on the contrary, if this act did not contribute to create sharper divisions within urban areas, for those new institutions are politically stronger than the previous ones.

But the second point is more a cause of concern. More than 40 % of the municipalities included in urban areas did not join the new communities. The more distant municipalities are the less organised. This can be explained by two mechanisms.
- First, the communities are based on a centre/periphery pattern: municipalities are organised around a central city and this city dominates the organisation (it gets votes in proportion of its population). Often, the mayor of the central city claims chairmanship for himself (or one of his henchmen). That frightens small municipalities unwilling to lose their autonomy.

- Second, those communities are also based upon common social and economic features. In other words, municipalities that cooperate have a great deal in common. For instance, in Toulouse urban area, there are three such communities. One consolidates the municipalities with strong economic bases, providing jobs for the whole area. The other consolidates high middle class suburbs. Municipalities specialised in malls and big stores created the third community.

The small municipalities of outskirts do not match in this pattern: they have no (or few) jobs for their inhabitants; the households living there are rather poor -regarding the average income- and they have not (yet) big stores or malls. In a word, they are totally dependent on the rest of the agglomeration. While clubs are being organised in the core agglomeration, those municipalities can't join.

Outskirts resist consolidation, both because they are afraid to lose their political autonomy and because they don't match with the club organisation that characterises urban areas. Outskirts resist consolidation because they are politically isolated and economically dependent.

### 2.3 Outskirts and the far right

During the last presidential and legislative elections (April and June 2002), France was shaken by a strong push of the "Front National"- the far right party. Moreover, this event showed a new political geography. Very often, the core cities-such as Nantes, Marseilles, Strasbourg, Toulouse-kept their previous orientations; Paris and Lyon confirmed their changes (they have been won by the left in the last municipal ballot in 2001). On the whole, the left and the "Republican right" made good scores in core centre cities and in the old suburbs.

The surprise, though, came from outskirts. The left have been swept out of the outskirts of the major cities: the remote outskirts of Paris, the periphery of Lille, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, etc… Very often, those outskirts have voted for the extreme right, even though the Front National did not catch any municipality in the 2001 ballot. Jacques Lévy - a geographer - has calculated that the vote in favour of extreme right was increasing with the distance to the centre of the urban area. The more distant people are the more they have voted for the extreme right.

How can one explain this shift in the political position of outskirts?
The main explanation is that outskirts themselves have changed. The urban growth and urban sprawl have produced an outstanding social sorting of populations. The social and economical specialisation of municipalities is increasing within big urban areas. In Toulouse, Nantes, or Marseille, the spatial segregation is crystal clear: the old centre are inhabited by rich households, old people and student; in the periphery of the centre city live poor households and immigrants in social housing estates; the old suburbs have became fashionable and the richest household of the urban area often live there; beyond the suburbs, workers and employees are going further and further to find affordable land and real estate. This social geography is very sharp and clearly legible on income maps. It has its translation in political terms. Urban areas contain a "social belt" (social housing estates, immigrants) "golden belt" (individual property, high income) and a "precarious belt" (individual property, low income).

Qualitative surveys carried out among the outskirts population in Toulouse urban area (Jaillet, 2001; Brevard, Rougé, 2002) outline some features of those populations, sometimes living about 20/30 Km from their working place.

- They are often coming from the social housing areas. As a lot of them have rural roots, often in the region, they do not feel, in the first place that their location is "remote". On the contrary -at least in the beginning of their settlement- they feel a relief both to get closer to their rural roots and to have succeeded in leaving social housing estates (were the cohabitation with immigrants was unbearable for them).

- They have full times jobs but precarious with low wages. They have not integrated in their budget prevision the cost of commuting every day -and other costs such as taking children to / from school, everyday shopping, etc. They often had to buy a second car, as they can’t manage with only one. Therefore, their budgets are very tight, even in chronic deficit.

- The villages where they have bought a piece of land and a "ready-made" cottage are still rural and lack services and facilities. Those may settle later but, for a long while, the place is dedicated to housing. The lack of facilities increases the need for mobility and thus increases the overall costs on the household budget. At the same time, the local political elite is often still rural (the mayor is often a farmer or a large-scale property owner) and they are not always welcome among the natives, though they claim having roots in the nearby.

- They feel both precarious and threatened. They feel precarious because, as time goes, they realise that this was not such a bargain -and they feel deceived. At the same time, they feel threatened: they are reluctant toward newcomers who might trouble the neighbourhood. As they have a social housing experience, they particularly fear the settlements of immigrants in the neighbourhood.

- On the whole, they see themselves as victims. They are working, often in bad conditions, they have spared money (or, more often, borrowed too much), they have achieved the successful course towards ownership and yet they feel trapped. The problem is that they have nobody to complain about, for themselves. They have though someone to complain to.
The National Front fosters those frustrations. It even makes its business out of it. It denounces immigrants as the source of all diseases; it cares (at least, it says it does) for ordinary people, against the upper middle class; it claims that France must be protected (against foreign countries, globalisation…); it argues that the taxes are too high. All those topics match with some of the outskirts dwellers. This may explain why some of them moved directly from the Communist party to Front National. When asked, most of Front National voters say that they never wanted this party to win elections (at least national elections) and that their vote is merely a vote of protest against… everything that goes wrong. Those protest votes, though, had led the Front National to win some municipalities -mostly in the outskirts of Marseilles.

Thus, outskirts still behave in a different way than the rest of the city. The meaning of this peculiar behaviour is though different from one period to another. In the 1950s and the 1960, it expresses the building of an "counter society", based on working class suburbs and run by the communist party. In the 1970s and 1980s, it expresses the growing of the middle class and was used as a stepping stone by the socialist party to gain local and national power. In the 1990s and 2000s, it becomes the place were lower middle class households feel trapped and is a land of opportunities for the extreme right. One can’t say that outskirts are to be laboratory of an extreme right way of municipal governance, as they had been for Communists and Socialists. But they point out a central question: how can be solidarity addressed in a fragmented political city?
3 Outskirts and the issue of urban solidarity

After more than 30 years of spatial specialisation and social sorting, French urban areas look more and more as a perfect illustration of the public choice theory. This theory, in its urban consequences, has to be exposed and discussed. I then try to understand whether this theory applies or not to French urban areas. I finally discuss the different path to restore solidarity within urban areas.

3.1 The public choice theory and its urban consequences

This theory is based on the notion of club, suggested by Buchanan. A club is an organisation (a municipality for instance) that delivers public services and goods to its members. It can’t forbid membership (one can freely join the club). But clubs tend toward an optimum size, when the cost of a new member exceeds its contribution (through taxes). Tiebout (1956) extended this notion to urban areas. According to Tiebout, "clubs" should be the foundation stones of territorial governance. For Tiebout, the society is made of a great diversity of communities that have specific needs: the sailors do not live like the woodlanders, the upper class, the workers, the farmers, etc... So, its better for everyone if one may join the right club. Hence, a politically fragmented urban area should be better than a holistic one. Actually, in a fragmented (or polycentric) urban area, jurisdictions are in competition to attract people and activities. They offer a wide range of cost/benefit ratios: benefits are the quantity and the quality of urban services and facilities; costs are the local taxes rates. Thus, an urban area should be seen as a "quasi-market", where municipal jurisdictions compete and people choose between different "bundles of services". In other words (Tiebout’s), they "vote with their feet". The more fragmented is the agglomeration, the better it is governed, at least the more satisfied the citizen/consumers are. Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (1961, 1972) refined the model and gave new research perspective, though in a normative direction.

This model is appealing mostly because of its simplicity and its efficiency. And also because it links individual behaviour and institutional policies. Beyond the many criticisms concerning its remorseless pray for social sorting, the model faces two major problems.

- First, it is based on a highly arguable hypothesis of individual mobility: not only poor people but a lot of people are, in a way or another, "stuck" to one jurisdiction (because they have bought a house, because the children are going to a peculiar school...). This leads to another arguable hypothesis: individual should be perfectly informed of the qualities of any "bundle of services" offered by various jurisdictions; which, of course cannot totally be true.

- Second, it claims for a fiscal subsidiarity, arguing that the more local the taxes are, the more efficient the services are. In other words, what is good for local communities is good for the state and the nation. Alonso (1965) has challenged this conclusion. He showed that a conflict could occur between two scales: a local community, acting as a club, might close its boundaries to
newcomers, arguing that the club has reached its optimal size. On the contrary, the state, or the nation would need newcomers, because itself has not reached its optimal size. In other word, the state or the nation could benefit form an urban growth that local communities may reject.

These were, actually, the two main reasons why this model was scarcely discussed in France till recently.

3.2 France, new homeland for "public choice" theory?

As fragmented as the local authorities are, they have been, until recently, in but little competition, for three main reasons.

- First, the mobility was, in fact, very low till the beginning of the 1980s. One knew few removals within one’s life. Home buying was a tough business and took years of saving. Once at home, people would not move easily. Such a behaviour was the opposite of "voting with one’s feet".

- Second, the local taxes are rather… national. Actually, the central state operates a strong redistribution among local authorities, cutting the resources of the richest to help the poorest. More than 50 % of local resource is, in France, distribute by the central state. This gives little margin for manoeuvre to municipal jurisdictions. Moreover, they are not free to determine their tax rates, which are controlled by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior.

- Third, most of the services and facilities - such as education, health, police - were (and still are) provided by the central state. Several studies have demonstrate that the per capita expenditure on urban services is remarkably stable from a municipality to another; therefore, the "bundle" does not change a great deal. Thus, competition between municipalities should not be that fierce.

The French urban situation used to be a perfect anti-Tiebout and pro-Alonso model. But, as we have seen before, things have changed a great deal.

- The French individuals and households are moving more and more. The removal ratio has raised from 4 to 7 in average in a lifetime. The average age for home buying has decreased within the last ten years and is now around 30. Many surveys notice that people are not so much attached to their house than they used to be.

- Over the past 10 or 15 years, even if municipalities haven’t gained any fiscal autonomy, they have gained considerable margins of manoeuvre concerning services and facilities. The central state is more and more giving power to the local authorities, even in the most "jacobin" sectors, such as education or police.

- Overall, the recent reform of local authorities has generated strong organisations, with a lot of power and a lot of money, that are in competition more sharply than were the isolated municipalities. Hence, one can predict that these organisations will try and offer a wider diversity of services and facilities.
Increasing mobility, decreasing centralisation, birth of strong local jurisdictions able to compete within urban areas. Maybe Tiebout is gaining ground, while Alonso is losing, as far as France is concerned?

Under these conditions, the isolation of outskirts can be interpreted as a protest against the way urban politics are organised. It can be regarded as an awkward and ambiguous protest, as it is both a reject of the consolidation within bigger organisations and a fear of being invaded by poorer people. But it is the consequence of the consolidation of the central jurisdictions in "clubs", gathering homogenous municipalities that concentrate either jobs or high-income households.

3.3 Can one save the outskirts?

Outskirts have always been considered as non cities, as it means urban sprawl, social sorting, land consumption and greenhouse gas due to commuting. But outskirts are the result of a long story, i.e. the people's trek for an independent housing and property ownership. The point with outskirts in contemporary France is, in a way, the people's place in the cities. For years, as outskirts were ill-considered by urban planners and state official, nobody would really deal with them. Though the central state has (apparently) strongly intervened on urban issues, it has prevented neither the ghettos of social housing, nor the present sprawl of outskirts. Sellers (2000), comparing France, Germany and US urban regions shows that in spite of its strong central resources, the French state was less successful than the German Länder, associated with local authorities, in dealing with outskirts. Moreover, Sellers argue that it is in the contradictions within national policies (i.e on the one hand, infrastructures and automobile development and, on the other hand, attempts to control the land use) that lays the growth of outskirts. The state intervention cannot be the solution: its local officials have lost a lot of power, often, lack of fighting spirit facing mayors or chairmen of urban communities. The centralisation has lived; it cannot be restored.

Should have the central state imposed stronger regulation for land use, such as the so-called "green belts", as in UK? The Belfast case study shows that this kind of regulation does not prevent the sprawl beyond the green belts: one cannot stop the urban growth simply by forbidding house building.

The attempts to create a local Leviathan (i.e. greater metropolitan authorities) have been so far unsuccessful. As it has been said before, the new regulation leads to political fragmentation rather than consolidation. This might not be a French "exception": different cities in Europe tried to established great metropolitan governments and, most of them, failed (Jouve, Lefèvre, 2000). One cannot give a general theory for this failure, for one find very local circumstances - but the fact is that this strategy does not work everywhere. Hence, one has to cope with the present political fragmentation and its urban and social consequences. The only way is to build cooperative local structures between local authorities ans supra local authorities. The case of Rennes, a fast growing city during the sixties and the seventies, that successfully attempted to constrain
the spreading of outskirts by developing a polycentric urban scheme, provides a useful example of what a cooperative action can achieve.

- The political fragmentation - even between powerful communities - does not mean that all the urban problems are solved within the jurisdictions. A lot of issues remain that take place between the jurisdiction. One can think of public transportation, of course, but also of main public facilities such as airports, university, theatre, central library, etc. Till now these facilities were to a great extent financed by the State; its subsidies are decreasing. This means that new communities will have to associate and to get involved with supra local authorities, such as Régions or Départements in order to run the metropolitan-scale issues. Again, this means that the process of consolidation is not yet finished, for the new jurisdictions are not able to deal with urban areas as a whole. In this kind of associations, outskirts municipalities should find their place and their part.

- Those municipalities cannot go discussing alone and isolated with greater central communities. They have to be organised in order to reach empowerment. Yet, they are not. So, one has to help them to organise. There is, in France, an institution called the "Département" that is located "between" the regions and the municipalities. This institution is very old (it was created in 1792) and controversial: modernists think it should disappear. Yet, it is an interesting institution for it is deeply rooted in rural areas (and, therefore, new outskirts). Helping the urban outskirts organising could be a genuine and useful political function. Such organisations exist already: for instance, the outskirts of Rennes are organised into a "Pays de Rennes" (meaning the countryside around Rennes). This organisation gives them more weight when starting talks with the community of Rennes.

- Another point should be the rivitalization of planning, along with the dissemination of sustainable development principles. The new instruments (SCOT, mentioned above) may help. But again, local authorities, even consolidated within urban communities should not be left alone dealing with land use, public transport, housing issues, public facilities... The planning methods can only be implemented if the supra local authorities get involved and set out their regulations and their point of view on the local situation. This means that, as in France no local or supra local jurisdiction has any power of enforcement on the others, the actors of urban planning have to build "inter scale" cooperation systems. This "multi level governance" (which, I must admit, is very "trendy") is the only way to deal with outskirts. It should operate not only on urban planning, but also, as it has been pointed out before, on helping organising outskirts, and on cooperation with greater urban communities on large scale urban issue.

In a way, as the Communist and Socialist outskirts did before, the new "populist" outskirts put into question the pattern of urban governance. One of the issues is how to deal with the clubs that have appeared in the core of metropolitan areas; the other issue is how to grant the people's wish for autonomy. But the main issue is this: outskirts point out that greater cities cannot be run from only one point of view, either the State or the local one: urban governance is, more than ever, a matter of multi scale governance.
Notes

1. Republicans remained for a long time known in the countryside as "partageux", a French synonym for "communists".

2. The French government signed with the National Post Office an agreement by which the restructuring of the post office network is frozen till 2006, in order to keep the small mayor satisfied.

3. Lille did not get its "red belt", because of the strength of catholic beliefs among the workers (most of them coming from Poland).

4. Urban areas (aires urbaines) are a statistical concept, based on two notions. First, an agglomeration (municipalities of more than 2000 inhabitants, in which the maximum distance between buildings has to be 200 m.); second a periphery containing municipalities no less than 40 % of whose active population is commuting toward the agglomeration. A municipality is considered as urban if its population is over 2000. A municipality can be considered as rural and while belonging to an urban area. (see INSEE).

5. See Jean Ruegg paper

6. "Republican right" points to right wing political parties in order to distinguish them form the exterme right or "Front national".

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GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES AND URBAN GOVERNANCE IN MADRID

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Abstract

This paper focuses on a couple of urban governance cases in Madrid and Barcelona. Based on these cases we will make some theoretical considerations in relation to the issue of governance, the nature of urban policies, and the importance of local governments’ policy styles with regard to citizen participation. Our aim is to analyse urban governance from the perspective of coalition building and urban policy design. From this perspective we are analysing two cases which show a rather unusual development in the European urban policy context. Both have a “bottom-up” origin and imply the development of patterns of governance in which some civil society actors have a leading role in the design and implementation of long term urban renewal projects. We will regard the role of the institutional structure, the political “colour” and the weight of an associative culture. The study of these two cases shows alternative patterns of interaction between the citizenry and the political elite, as well as the existence of different policy styles at the local and regional levels of government, in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona.

In the first section some theoretical notions about governance will be discussed. In the second one, we will look at the process of network and coalition building, with emphasis on the patterns of participation, and on how those strategies relate to the normative frameworks guiding the action of the local governments of Madrid and Barcelona. To conclude we will compare both cases, relating them to the theoretical concepts provided.
1 Urban Governance in Perspective

The debates around the concept of governance have focused on the issue of the relative weight of different kinds of actors within governance coalitions, the neutrality of the policies finally implemented in relation to the objectives and goals of the different actors involved, and the role played by the different state administrations in such processes. We consider it particularly interesting to include within those debates the importance of governments' policy styles for the feasibility and success of bottom-up initiatives.

According to Kooiman, "...the patterns that emerge (from governance processes) form governing activities of social, political and administrative actors. These patterns form the 'emerging' outcome as well as a more abstract framework for day-to-day efforts at governing. Modes of social political governance are, in our opinion, always an outcome of public and private interaction" (Kooiman; 1993: 2). Following this definition, governance would include government within it, and it could set more or less lasting patterns of behaviour, affecting the daily interaction among the different actors involved in the process.

For Rhodes the concept of governance should be conceptualised in a broader sense for it would refer to, "...self-organising, interorganizational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the State" (Rhodes, 1997: 15). The two main features of this definition would be the existence of mechanisms for co-operation, and the lack of hierarchical relationships between the different actors involved. This author also considers that the concept of governance is broader than that of government, but he points out the need to analyse more in detail the interaction between actors aimed at exchanging resources and negotiating goals. He considers governance relationships as being based on trust, and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed among the different participating actors, with a minimal role played by the State (that in some cases may not even be included in the coalition). For this author, although the State may occupy only a secondary position in the network, or even be absent altogether, it may steer the networks in an indirect way (Rhodes, 1997:53).

Governance constitutes a group of goals shared by the actors, while government is a group of goals shared by a formal authority (Rosenau, 1992). Each actor's interests are defined by sets of values and goals that do not necessary coincide. These values might not only mould the final result of the process, but also strongly affect the definition of the way to carry the process out, by defining which means are compatible with the desired goals. The core idea of governance, a common action mobilised through a set of common goals, does not come only by agreeing on which interests are common to all actors, but also by arriving at a consensus on the means to achieve them. While different actors pursue their own goals, and use some specific means to achieve them, we can easily realise that the aims proposed by each actor may, and in fact
often do, become openly incompatible with the objectives of others. Both goals and aims in a governance coalition will depend on the capacity to lobby of each specific actor involved in the process. In other words, their power is going to be an important asset in establishing their *participating quota* in the final *common goals*.

The consideration of the role of institutions is also relevant to our analysis. March and Olsen defined governance in two directions: the first built around the classic notion of rational exchange and according to which each actor would trade according to his/her own interests; the second built around the influence of the institutions that fix the rules of the game according to which that exchange takes place (March and Olsen, 1995:12). These authors identify three intervening variables in the coalition building process that are exogenous to governance: the structure of rules and regulations in which the process takes place, the distribution of preferences among the actors, and the distribution of resources and capabilities among them.

From this last definition of governance three aspects contrast with the ones previously discussed.

a- The role of institutions is significant although limited, while for Rhodes it is imperfect and indirect.

b- There might be a certain hierarchy among the actors established by the differential in available resources, so we have hierarchical co-operation. Interests would not be simply aggregated, but rather there would be the definition of a minimum common denominator among the different actors involved.

c- The importance of identities and political conceptions from the institutional side of governance - we could talk about ideologies or political programs, but that would only refer to elected representatives. Instead we are going to use the term "policy styles", a concept that includes the whole set of institutional actors (bureaucrats, clerical staff, etc).

Public institutions contribute to provide legitimacy to the policy networks, but they also control key mechanisms of the processes, even in those cases in which management and decision making capacities have been transferred to non-institutional actors. The role of institutions is to provide legal ratification, executive and legal intervention, and in case the actors involved in the process cannot reach agreements on the way forward, to ensure that public interest prevails (Maytz, 1998: 13).

Public policies are normally the main outcome of governance processes, but we should also assess to what extend certain public policies may act as inputs of those processes. By looking at public policies from an anthropological point of view we can overcome the instrumental vision of policies that reduces them to action oriented, intrinsically technological tools to solve problems, and analyse the impact they may have on people's behaviour and social relations. From this point of view governance can be understood as, "... the more complex processes by which policies not only impose conditions, as if from "outside" or "above", but influence people's indigenous norms of conduct so that they themselves contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government's model of social order" (Shore and Wright, 1997: 7). In other
words, governance would act over and through individuals and groups, and the main instrument for that would be the public policies that emerge from it. This argument is not so much directed at contradicting the argument of the neutrality and rationality of public policies as strictly technical and administrative tools, but rather at placing public policies and governance within the realm of values and ideas. Policies would seek rationality, but within given ideological parameters defined through values.

We will show in our analysis of the two bottom-up governance initiatives a criticism of the argument of the neutrality policies, since sometimes it may not be so much a matter of ideology but of policy style. That is to say, the "colour" of local government may not be as important as the policy style those administrations develop (Walliser, 2002). This brief theoretical overview on governance needs to be complemented by some elements of the literature on social movements in order to understand the differences between both cases and the governance models that lay behind.

In recent years three main elements have been present in most explanations of the emergence and development of social movements: the structure of political opportunities, the framing processes and the structures of mobilisation (McAdam et al., 1996). Within Kriesi’s concept of political opportunity, there are three main elements to it: the formal institutional structure, the informal procedures in relation to a given challenge and the configuration of power as regards a given challenger (op. cit. 1992).

Framing processes is a rather complex concept that often overlaps the other two (McAdam, 1994). The concept, broad and loose as it is, is linked to the notions of culture and ideology (Zald, 1996) and is especially useful to explain the case of Barcelona from a bottom-up perspective. Snow and Benford (1988), have developed the concept of frame alignment processes, that are described "as the efforts by which organisers seek to join the cognitive orientations of individuals with those of social movements organisations". If we link these ideas to some concepts mentioned before, about the influence of public policy acting over and through social groups, we can say that public policies aimed at promoting participation might contribute to generate a participatory political and associative culture among social networks, closer to the policy arena. Then, these actors transmit through a frame alignment process to the citizens a certain common cognitive orientation.
2 Two Bottom-up Cases in Madrid and Barcelona

Spain has a highly decentralized political and administrative structure. Its main element is the Estado de las Autonomías, this is the State of the Autonomies. The country is divided into 17 regions which have their own Parliaments. Over the last twenty years most of these regions have assumed jurisdictions from the central government including health, education, social services, transports, etc. Two of them, Catalonia and the Basque Country, followed a quicker process since they are the so called "historical communities" and had also access to the jurisdiction of security, through their own autonomous police force, and tax collecting. Urban planning in big cities relies mainly on the municipalities although they are tightly controlled by the Regional Government: any municipal master plans have to be approved by regional government. Often big public works (road belts, underground, etc.) are financed by both institutional levels but always with a predominant position for the region. In the case of small towns and villages the planning responsibility relies fully on the regional government. Cities in Spain are divided into districts, and these in turn into neighbourhoods. Districts have some administrative autonomy, but they depend politically on the municipality, except in Barcelona where they have some more political autonomy.

Local democracy in Spain dates from 1979, when the first local democratic elections took place. Then the social-democrat party won in the main cities, including both Madrid and Barcelona, with large majorities. But while in Barcelona the PSC remained in power until today in coalition with the ex-communists (IC), in Madrid the conservative party (PP) took over the control of the municipality in 1991. Other aspects differentiate these two cities. While in Barcelona citizen participation and political and administrative de-centralization were a priority for the new democratic governments, such initiatives were not launched in Madrid despite the fact that it was supposed to be a priority for the social-democrats when they won the first local elections. Instead of decentralising, Madrid applied a policy of de-concentration, in which the districts gained some administrative jurisdictions, while relying on a centralised political power. The outcome of this process was a low participatory and rather inefficient set of rules to regulate citizen participation in Madrid, while in Barcelona the normative frameworks for participation both in the districts and at the city level are amongst the most advanced in Europe.

Urban social movements in Spain during the 1970s and 80s generated the most important mobilisation in Europe after WWII (Castells, 1986). Urban crisis and poor living conditions merged with the claim for democracy in the large demonstrations of the last years of the Francoist dictatorship, and the first period of the process of democratic transition. When cities like Madrid or Barcelona started improving infrastructures and the quality of life of their inhabitants, demobilization threatened the grassroots movements. The Asociaciones de Vecinos (neighbourhood associations) remained as relevant actors in most working class neighbourhoods, among others groups.
In general terms we could classify contemporary neighborhoods associations into two main categories. On the one hand there are those that maintained a similar organizational structure and political agenda to the one they had in the 70s, based on collective consumption claims (transport, education and health), and considering mobilization (and eventually confrontation) as the main means to achieve their objectives. Their mechanisms of accountability tend to be opaque, so very often they are led by the same people who founded them nearly 30 years ago. The second category includes organisations that have been able to adapt their agendas to a more complex scenario where urban quality of life has improved, and the needs and problems of the population have radically evolved. These associations have extended their interests and created networks with other kinds of organisations working in different issues (culture, gender, community service, etc) in order to share their resources and experience, therefore turning into "umbrella" organisations (Walliser, 1999). While the first type of organization is the main one in Madrid, the second and more complex model tends to be more common in Barcelona.

Partly as a consequence of this evolution of the grass-roots organisations, and partly because of the mechanisms of participation implemented in both cities, the relationships between local governments and civil society in both cities vary considerably. In Barcelona there were of course situations of urban conflict and mobilisation, but in general that relationship was much more fluent as there was a wider space for the development of a culture of consensus. Meanwhile in Madrid, however, conflict ended up generally in confrontation, no matter the "colour" of the local government.

### 2.1 Villaverde-Usera Investment Plan

Villaverde and Usera are two districts in Madrid that have more than 260,000 inhabitants. There was farming land until the 40s which was gradually populated by the waves of immigrants from the impoverished Spanish country side and turned into Madrid's main industrial district. Still today these two districts are the southern limits of the municipality of Madrid and have large amounts of empty land. From the mid sixties to the mid 'eighties there was a very active associative life which decayed with the consolidation of democracy and the improvement of living conditions including the massive building of social housing to substitute the substandard housing units built when they arrived. During the late 'eighties and 'nineties most industries in the area were closed and the rates of unemployment boosted. Villaverde and Usera turned into the most deprived areas of the city.

The initiation of the governance coalition followed a bottom-up direction and had two stages. Firstly through mobilisation and the articulation of the local associative networks after a two year cycle of protest. The outcome was a solid network of local actors that ranged from neighbourhood associations to non profit organisations focussed on social exclusion. This was called the Movement for the Dignity of the South (Movimiento por la Dignidad del Sur -MDS-). In
a second stage, a governance coalition as such was built between the MDS and the regional
government, the Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid (CAM).

The starting point was the design of a community diagnosis, a work document prepared
by the 63 organizations, which took into account every problem addressed in each of the
neighbourhoods. This document reflects the complexity of the situation, characterised by a
number of interconnected problems, and concludes with the need for an integrated intervention
guided by a plan to tackle the problems in an integral manner. The articulation of all those
organisations, putting them to work together and approving by consensus aims and means
took several months of assemblies and technical meetings. The co-ordination was assigned by
the FAVM (Federation of Neighbors Association of Madrid), a somehow exogenous actor with
prestige in civil society, good political connections and a voice at the local and regional level.

Along the whole process the cycle of protests went on with broad and specific claims. The leit-
motiv of the MDS was that there was a "historical debt" with the south of the city. This debt was
quantified by the MDS, and somehow became the axis of the mobilisations that were obviously
aimed at more tangible targets. The demands were both addressed to the municipality and to
the CAM. The local government did not react, while the CAM initiated conversations that had
as outcome the Villaverde-Usera Investment Plan. As mentioned before the governance coalition
between the MDS and the CAM has a high political content. The contacts with the regional govern-
ment take place at the highest political level: the president, councillors and vice councillors of the
departments of Economy, Employment, and Presidency with some of their technical staff.

The financial resources allocated to this plan are 108.433 million Euro (18.000 million pesetas),
to be invested in the districts of Villaverde and Usera over a period of six years, at an average of
36 million Euro per year. Every year the goals to be achieved and the investments to be made
are defined by the MDS, and negotiated with the CAM.

The main actors in this case is a network formed by a variety of actors, from neighbour
associations to the Regional Government, including ecologist associations, and social development
non-profits. The 63 social organisations participating belong to different neighbourhoods of
the two districts covered by the plan\textsuperscript{9}. Besides them, and somehow over them, FAVM plays
a co-ordination role between the associative network, and as a link with the institutional
actors, the municipality (through the District Council), and the CAM. The participation of the
municipality is merely symbolic and is rather reluctant towards the idea of any participatory
plan\textsuperscript{10}. The political weight of the regional government interaction in this governance coalition
is placed at the highest level, involving personally the president of the regional government, and
some of his councillors and vice councillors\textsuperscript{11}.

The political dimension of the coalition is evidenced by two facts. First, a majority of the neigh-
bourhood associations are close to IU (former communist), including the FAVM, while the few
associations close to the PSOE (social-democrats) decided not to join the coalition and remained
apart. Second, the representatives of the MDS, negotiated at the highest regional political level.
The investment plan was designed as an integral plan: this is, it seeks development from a three-sided perspective: social development, economic development and physical intervention—this means public works, facilities and infrastructures. The social dimension was aimed at fighting unemployment and social exclusion through training and prevention programs. This was the main target for the MDS. As a matter of fact one of the conditions imposed on the CAM was that from the total amount to be invested only one third could be expended on infrastructures or facilities, and the rest should be aimed at social and economic development.

From a political and governance point of view, several issues contributed to place the needs of these districts in the political and media agenda, therefore opening windows of opportunities for the social organizations to lobby for their objective. The arrival of the president of the CAM, a "young promise" of the conservative party willing to increase his profile, facilitated the involvement of the CAM in the governance coalition, to the point that he began to follow personally the evolution of the plan without delegating much political power on his councillors or technical staff. This issue is intimately related to the close competition for competencies between the CAM and the local government\(^\text{12}\), a situation in which the regional government tries to gain "clients" among the populated areas of the south of Madrid. In fact, one way for the CAM to differentiate itself from the municipality has been to deploy a radically different policy style, showing in this case in the form of a positive attitude towards the participatory process promoted by the grass-roots organisations. The south of Madrid is also the last reservoir of votes for the left in local and regional elections and this could be an attempt to change that balance towards the PP, as well of course as a legitimate policy to prevent and fight against social exclusion.

### 2.2 The Community Development Plan of Trinitat Nova

Trinitat Nova shares somehow some features with the previous case. It is also in the physical limits of the city and experiences high rates of social deprivation. However, it is a neighbourhood, belonging to a district in the municipality of Barcelona, and its size is much more reduced than Villaverde and Usera. Social exclusion of impoverished retired workers, spatial segregation and building pathologies due to poor materials are the main problems of Trinitat Nova. As in the cases in Madrid there used to be very active social movements up to the mid 'eighties, but lately they have been mostly de-mobilised.

In 1996 the Trinitat Nova neighbours association decided to promote a process of dynamisation, of both the community and their own internal structure, through a community development plan. In order to achieve both objectives they hired a team of professionals (sociologists, psychologists, architects, etc), with the aim of shaking the community from its stalemate. In 1997 a agreement was signed between the neighbours association, the local government, and the Social Policy Department of the Regional Government, the Generalitat de Catalunya (GC), to finance
the community development plan. The funds that facilitated the promotion of the plan are managed by the neighbours association with absolute autonomy.

During the first three years the community development team worked in two directions: the elaboration of a diagnosis of the neighbourhood and its needs, and the development of a dynamic of participation among the neighbours. In the second phase of the plan, they started to address the housing problems of the area, applying the participatory dynamics they had initiated with the neighbours to this issue. At the moment, the process of building the new houses has already started, and the community development team has started to work in the third and final phase of the plan - having to do with the socio-economic development of the area. In this sense they have already initiated a programme to introduce information technologies among the youngest neighbours, and are lobbying to create a "Museum of Water" in the area, taking advantage of the historic water supply infrastructures of the city of Barcelona located in the neighbourhood.

The plan is designed to work with four different kinds of actors: the neighbours association, the citizens living in the area, the technicians of the administrations including both the Catalan regional government (Generalitat de Catalunya -GC-) and the municipality of Barcelona, and finally the elected officials of those very same administrations.

The leading role within the coalition is held by the neighbours association that initiated the process, although in practice it delegates most of its day to day activities to the community development team. This is a group of professionals that assumes the responsibility for the dynamisation of the community, and the incorporation of the neighbours into the participatory plan, while simultaneously co-ordinating the running of the whole process.

Whenever there is a lack of political will on the part of the administrations to increase the scope of the plan, the neighbours association initiates the process in that particular area without institutional support. When (if) the administrations finally decide to get involved in that particular issue, they are included in the process as an equal partner but without giving the lead or the whole responsibility for the achievement of the objectives. Since the beginning of the plan the neighbours association have tried to implicate the private for profit sector in the process, but given the low economic profile of the area their efforts have not been successful.

The participatory method with the neighbours is implemented in four stages: information and consultation, drafting of proposals, decision making, and implementation. The emphasis is placed on the procedural, dynamic, and open character of the process, in the words of one of the members of the team, "what must be respected is not the planning, but the social dynamics". The community development team is highly motivated and deeply involved with the project, in permanent contact with the neighbours, and achieving a high degree of flexibility. The different institutions negotiation is divided into two separated spheres, politician and technical. A technical committee has been arranged with all the agencies and departments that supply public services (police, social services, education, health) in order to plan and implement an integrated intervention over the territory.
The philosophy of the plan is aimed at promoting an integral model of development in which all the different aspects of the problems that exist in the area can be treated simultaneously and in a co-ordinated manner. The intervention is co-ordinated through the association and the community development team, but the whole aim of the process is the empowerment of the people. At the same time, the associations are hoping to become reinvigorated by the new voices of the neighbours, in a search for a higher level of development of grass-roots politics; "we are working to introduce democracy and participation in the neighbours association to provide the community with resources, self-esteem, organisation and conscience. We defend integral and integrative approaches to the social problems instead of the fragmented actions that characterise the daily practices of the administrations and the public services. We also work, although this is quite a difficult task, into what we could call the "dignify of politics".

The neighbours have been quite active in trying to attract media attention to their problems with varying degrees of success. By introducing the issue of sustainability in the building process of the new houses they managed to gain the interest of the GC, willing to present an image of modern administration concerned with the issues discussed in the international forums and agreed by in international conferences. A similar dynamic is searched with the project of creation of an interactive museum in the neighbourhood.

The plan has enjoyed a wide international recognition and support, and they have been very active in international, Latin American, and European networks of groups promoting grass-roots and participatory interventions in different urban settings. The relations with the administrations, in particular with the local government ruled by a coalition of social-democrats and former communists, have been relatively good, and they were able to gain political support from some leaders and officials. Finally, the contacts with the academic sphere have also been extremely fluent, and this has greatly benefited the project, by providing it with new ideas and methodologies.
3 Conclusions

In De Decker & Vranken (2001) several hypothesis or types of governance are discussed. Our cases show some coincidences with some of them and contradict others. Initially we assume their conclusions based on Esping-Anderson's proposal about a certain regime relativism. Governance models depend on so many variables endogenous to each case that it is difficult to elaborate a detailed typology, nevertheless it can be attempted to give some general trends of governance patterns. Most of these hypotheses on governance focus on the implementation part of policies - service providing - rather than in their design which is what we focus in our two cases. The Madrid case, and to a lesser degree Barcelona, are examples of local authority enabling actors, although around the notion of co-production rather than that of decentralised implementation. In relation to the thesis of the de-democratisation of local politics through governance, our two cases are strictly the opposite. From a critical perspective with governance theories it can be said that urban governance can be democratic if it includes active participatory elements in policy design and implementation, and not just information.

From a theoretical point we can conclude two things about these two cases: firstly, the ideological variable, this is, the "colour" of the local government is not relevant when a governance coalition is arranged. It is rather policy style and the dynamics with which the actors interact that is going to explain the outcomes of the governance pattern. This is clearly shown in Villaverde-Usera, where a governance coalition is built between the grassroots and the regional government, while the municipality, that should be more sensitive to grassroots demands just has a passive secondary role. Although both administrations, regional and municipal, are ruled by the same party, the conservative Popular Party, the respective regional and local leaders have completely different policy and political styles.

Secondly, assuming that policies have an impact on citizens behaviour and even values, we can relate the fact that participatory issues are on the policy agenda and that policies are launched in that direction, with the existence of a strong associative culture, that to some extend, has been moulded by those policies. This is not the whole explanation of the case, an associative tradition might exist as well, but the fact that it is supported and reinforced by policies gives grounds to think in a feed-back loop of participatory policies when framing processes are defined by grassroots organizations.

In both cases it seems to be a relation between the kind of policy style and the attitude towards participation of the institutions and the outputs of the projects. In the case of Barcelona, there is a supportive municipal policy towards grassroots and the enhancement of participation. In Trinitat Nova participation is an aim not just a means. The ideal outcome of the project is not only urban renewal (streets, accessibility, housing stock), but also to revive and consolidate
community life and participatory dynamics among the citizens and the grassroots organisations. In the building of the framing processes a supportive policy style contributes to enhance participation and associative life as a positive value. Therefore the process has taken more than two years during which, literally, every local actor has been involved in workshops, activities etc, to generate an identification with the project among not only dwellers but also among workers (police, education, social workers, health, etc).

In the case of Villaverde-Usera, in Madrid, participation is just a mean to achieve certain goals, namely the development of an extensive urban area through a massive investment. The genesis and design of the process came out from mobilizations and some of the initial steps were taken in assemblies, but afterwards it was the grassroots (the MDS and the FAVM) that negotiated with the regional top political officers. There aim is not to establish a solid long term participatory dynamic in those districts, but just a way of achieving it and legitimizing the leading informal role of grassroots organizations in policy making. The local political culture is based in confrontation as a mean to tackle conflict. This is an outcome of the local political cultures. As mentioned before, "colour" does not matter so much since in Madrid the same conflictive relation has existed both with the left and the right in office (Walliser, 2003).

Our cases also show a number of coincident features that are going to be summarised in order to concisely compare them. Both cases are defined as bottom-up initiatives: some associative actors have developed a governance coalition in a two-step process. Firstly they have created a solid associative network to define goals and lines of action. After mobilisation they both managed to establish a governance coalition with the institutional actors managing a quite leading role in the process. These two cases have as an outcome a midterm policy in which the role of the citizen actors is present at both planning and implementation levels. Both cases come out too in very similar urban scenarios: deprived neighbourhoods of the outskirts of a big city.

The differences between both cases are also relevant. From the institutional point of view the actors involved show a different pattern. In Barcelona, both the regional government and the municipality, while in Madrid, the municipality just ignore the process and the regional government develops it. This reinforces our first theoretical conclusion. In Barcelona two institutions with different "colours" share some common views about the issue and negotiate with the grassroots. Despite the fact they have different views of the problem they share a consensual policy style that has enabled the governance process to go ahead.

In Madrid, two institutional levels of the same party have strong differences in the way they think the problem should be tackled. One is more progressive and the other is more conservative with a hard-line policy style towards participation and social movements. Dialogue and negotiation is not only absent from the relations between the municipality and the citizens, but also between it and the regional government.

It is important to look at citizens' aims. This comparison will reinforce our second conclusion. In Madrid, the common picture of the associative fabric is that of a fragmented one, except for a
few federations that group most of them and are relevant as representatives of the others. The fact that in Villaverde-Usera the first stage took place is due to a very favourable opportunity structure, mentioned already, that also enabled the negotiations with the CAM. The main goal for citizens was to achieve some policy initiatives oriented to improve a series of material aspects of life in those two districts: some of them related to collective consumption, others with quality of life, or prevention and fight of social exclusion.

The opportunity structure for the case of Trinitat is not so relevant. On the other hand the most relevant feature to support the previous conclusions is the fact that the goal of the project originally launched by the neighbourhood association is not only collective consumption oriented, but rather seeks to introduce a whole participatory culture among the people of the "Trini". Both goals are important for the grassroots, because they know that any social initiative will faint after the material goals are achieved if there is not a solid framing process behind, able to maintain it. This is, to our understanding, related with the policy style of the municipality in Barcelona and with the supportive policies with participation launched since 1979. The fact of an existing historical associative tradition common to Barcelona in general will not invalidate our hypothesis, since this all happens in a neighbourhood populated by immigrants of other places of Spain and with no such associative tradition.

To some extend we could add our own type or hypothesis to those analysed by De Decker and Vranken. We could talk about participatory governance as of a bottom-up demand process. These are its main features: there is generally a network of actors on one side sharing demands and one or two institutional actors on the other; locality is likely to be a fact to define this type, for it is the context wherein closer interaction between the actors is possible and by both sides the capacity to manoeuvre is bigger.

These patterns in opposition to others, take place in the short or mid term. Two features explain this:

a- the need to have a previous coalition or network of actors before bargaining with the authorities;

b- these governance coalitions have as goals specific policies limited in time, aimed at tackling specific or structural problems in a given area; otherwise we will have a more conventional pattern of the enabling kind for service provision.

Both cases fit our suggestion of a participatory governance type, while some important differences are found in both cases that can be explained by the importance of different explanatory tools such as framing processes, different political cultures and opportunity structures, for the cases of Madrid and Barcelona.
Notes

1 These cases were evaluated and compared with more than forty other integral urban development projects in nine European countries by the EU Commission’s Fifth Framework research program UGIS (Urban Governance, social Integration and Sustainability).

2 We should not forget that the goals of the actors in a governance coalition should be as close as possible to the public interest.

3 The same year saw the first regional autonomous governments elected, and the year before the Constitution had been passed in a referendum.

4 In Spain the electoral system at local, regional, national and EU level is based on a closed list system which allows the electorate to vote to a party rather than to a particular candidate. In local elections people vote for a party that will then name both the area (health, environment, urban issues, etc) and district councillors. While this is the system in most Spanish municipalities, including Madrid, Barcelona operates under a different system based on agreements between the political parties. The closed list system is enforced, but the Mayor appoints a representative of the most voted party as district councillor in that area, applying in this manner a de facto system of political decentralisation at the district level.

5 The PSOE has a federal structure with strong regional sections like the PSC in Catalonia.

6 During the first term (1979-83) the PSOE governed in coalition with the communist party. Participatory democracy was meant to be in the agenda of the time, but conflict arose soon between urban social movements and the local government. The rules designed to allow grassroots organisations to participate at the district level did not work at all, as can be appreciated in the fact that the same rules are still in place with a conservative local government in power deeply suspicious of any kind of citizen participation. The model of formal participation established in Madrid in the early 80’s was thought to work only with the local government consent, therefore reducing the participatory strategies to the sphere of confrontation (in a scenery of low consensus tradition), and to the politization of the relation between social movements and local authorities.

8 In early 60s around 400,000 people lived in slums or poor quality housing in Madrid.

9 Those two districts have more than 230,000 inhabitants, and are divided into 12 neighbourhoods. San Fermín belongs to the Usera district, and had some 13,000 inhabitants in 1996. Madrid holds a population of about 2.8 million.

10 As mentioned before citizen participation through non-electoral means is not issued in the local government agenda. The paradox of this case is that the two institutional levels involved, the municipality and the regional government, are ruled by the same political party, the PP. It is striking that in such a centralised and presidentialist party, so different policy strategies are followed. Needless to say this takes place in a scenario of rivalry between both administrations. As a matter of fact the Mayor of Madrid, when interviewed, did not even know the existence of this investment launched by the CAM in the southern districts of the capital.

11 These would have a rank similar to ministers and vice-ministers.

12 The autonomous community of Madrid occupies a relatively small area, and is strongly marked by the presence of the capital city in its centre. The conflicts for the distribution of competencies among the CAM and the municipality of Madrid have become quite clear in recent years.

13 For more detail see De Decker and Vranken (2001), Urban Governance: a first assessment. Draft

14 The municipality is PSC, social-democrats, while the regional government is CiU, a coalition of Christian-democrats. Madrid municipality and regional government is ruled by the Partido Popular, a conservative party, recently moved to the centre.
GOVERNANCE AND URBAN OUTSKIRTS

Case Studies based on the Regional Development Strategy for Northern Ireland and the Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan

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Abstract

This paper is based on the personal experience of the three authors as the organisers and facilitators of formal public consultation exercises into two major spatial planning initiatives in Northern Ireland over the past four years. These exercises were part of a process of governance designed to overcome perceived problems of "democratic deficit", and were conducted during a period of governmental transition from remote "direct rule" to a locally – elected power-sharing Assembly. Many of the dominant issues in the consultation discourse were related to "urban outskirts" – greenfield versus brownfield development, compact city versus dispersed settlement concepts, for example – so the planning of aspects of the "urban outskirts" is considered through a process of governance and within a context of governmental change. Emerging and future outcomes from the consultation initiatives are considered within theoretical and contextual frameworks such as regime theory in relation to stakeholder structures, collaborative planning theory in relation to participation process and urban sustainability concepts in relation to the urban outskirts issues.

Keywords

Urban outskirts, strategic planning, metropolitan planning, European spatial planning, governance, public consultation, collaborative planning, Northern Ireland, Belfast.
1 Context

1.1 Governance - Current Developments in UK and Northern Ireland

Consideration of the issue of contemporary governance and its relevance for urban outskirts in WG1 has already produced a series of interesting issues for debate: the relationship between governance and government at various levels (Walliser, Saglie and Vabo); outskirts as a territorial manifestation of modernity (Ruegg); the counter-intuitive territorial effect of national policies on localities and the limitations of urban planning (Estebe); the need for and limitations of communicative planning practice (Nylund). All of these issues find expression in current debates in the United Kingdom, within which the Northern Ireland experience provides a very particular illustration of governance and planning in a recently-troubled and rapidly-changing political context.

In the UK context Byrne's (Byrne 2001) definition reflects many of the above considerations:

*Governance is a term used to describe the set of processes undertaken by both the state at every spatial level, and the institutions, agencies and interests with which it operates in partnership in maintaining an existing social order whilst at the same time accommodating the logic of capitalism as a system...under constant development.*

This usefully captures the relationship between layers of government and partnership bodies within a dynamic social and economic context. In attempting to understand these relationships the author suggests some bodies of theory to be particularly useful amongst which is "regime theory" which focuses on the actions of "urban elites" in relation to the politics of production. The theory seeks to transcend the long-standing discourse between pluralist and elite perspectives on power by attempting to accomodate the legitimation imperatives of government and the accumulation drives of private capital (Elkin 1987). Although its theoretical application may be less appropriate in the context of Europe than that of the United States, where financially weaker city governments need coalition partners to strengthen their resource base, it has some resonance with the situation described in the case studies (below) and provides useful categorisations of stakeholder agencies.

Taylor (1998) links the emergence of urban "regimes" to the shift in style in urban governance in the USA which Harvey (1989) categorised as the transition from the "managerialism" of the '60s to the "entrepreneurialism" of the '90s (leading, in his view, to "zero-sum game", counterproductive and superficial inter-urban competition). Taylor, following Stone (1993) identifies four governing coalition "regimes" (informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together): *maintenance* regimes which seek to maintain traditional urban form and established services, *development* regimes which deploy public incentives
and subsidies to leverage private investment in order to promote economic growth, (middle class) **progressive** regimes which attempt to maximise the social dividend from development, in terms of design quality or environmental protection, and (working class) **opportunity expansion** regimes which are concerned to harness the capacity of development to benefit disadvantaged groups in relation to, for example, access to education, training and job opportunities. Stoker and Mossberger (1994) attempt to simplify this categorisation into three overarching "regimes" - "organic regimes", which are traditional in outlook and equate roughly to "maintenance" regimes (above), "instrumental" regimes, which are similar to "development" ones (above) and "symbolic" regimes which incorporate the last two (above) and are essentially community-based. Imbroscio (1998), in a more recent categorisation, focuses on the primary agent within regimes and distinguishes between "local/statist", "community-based" and "petty-bourgois" regimes in which the dominant force is respectively local government, the community, and small-scale private enterprise, but all work within private/public coalitions of some description.

Healey (1997) provides a more homely definition of governance and links it directly to emerging communicative forms of planning in the UK:

> ...governance is not the sole preserve of governments....we are all involved in some way, and have experience of managing collective affairs.. this experience, though largely neglected by those writing on politics and planning, provides a resource through which new forms of governance can be invented.

The same author (Healey 2001) in a paper specifically addressing strategic planning in Northern Ireland, represents current tendencies in urban governance in the UK as a series of processes from traditional practices to current approaches: from providing to enabling; from representing to empowering; from producer-driven to consumer-driven; from functional separation to integrated collaboration. These processes can be summarised in three models of urban governance-the traditional **service-delivery model** which was bureaucratic, hierarchical and professional; the 1980's **multiple-initiative model** which was characterised by contracting-out, partnership arrangements and multiple voices; the current **strategic capacity-building model** which involves strategic collaboration, shared visions, local as well as technical knowledge and innovative learning.

In translating the application of these models to the Northern Ireland situation, it has been suggested (McEldowney 1999) that local governance in the region has moved very rapidly from limited experience of the first two to become firmly established in the third. Three decades of "direct rule" from Westminster in the midst of a changing and volatile local political mileau had led to serious problems of accountability in relation to public service administration (Hughes et al. 1998). Official local government had a severely diminished role with a heavy reliance on a range of intermediate bodies to provide a wide range of public goods and services (O'Leary et al.1988), a situation in which the establishment of a new Regional Assembly in 1998 was seen as an opportunity by one commentator (Knox 1999) for local politicians to recapture power from "a plethora of boards, trusts, quangos and civil service departments characterised by
administrative indifference”. He advised the new Assembly to promote the role of the relatively impotent local authorities, to invest in the established "partnership" model and to build on the success of the burgeoning voluntary/community sector.

This sector is now well established in the region - voluntary and community organisations are estimated to have grown in number from 500 to 5000 between 1975-2000 (Murray and Greer, 1999). In the rural arena this dynamic has been fuelled by the emergence of area-based partnerships under local economic development measures of the EU structural funds programme and, more recently and specific to Northern Ireland, the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. In the urban arena it manifests itself in a complex system of community and voluntary organisations under the coordination of the Greater Belfast Community Network, and a three-tier hierarchy of partnership bodies - strategic, area-based and single-focus (Hanna, 1999): the strategic Belfast City Partnership Board producing its influential City Vision in 1999 and the Area Partnership Boards producing Area Strategies to cover issues such as economic development, health and social well-being from the community's point of view.

1.2 Governance, Planning and Participation

The "institutional thickness" of organised civil society in Northern Ireland, developed by default to overcome the perceived "democratic deficit" resulting from remote and sometimes insensitive direct rule by central government from Westminster, is a key element of governance in the region and is regarded as a real strength in relation to emerging, progressive, approaches to planning. The region is blessed with a dense and sophisticated network of social organisations outside government...compelling evidence from successful regions elsewhere shows that institutional richness, if properly tapped, can be a pivotal development resource. (Gaffikin et al. 1998).

The link between governance and planning is the basis of Healey’s (Healey 1997) argument for a democratic pluralist form of governance and a collaborative style of planning in realising it... a normative concern with more people-sensitive modes of governance and a practical concern with the management of local environmental change in a situation of multiple and often conflictual stakeholders. The process of public participation in planning, a long-established and much criticised feature of the British local governmental system, is therefore central to the exploitation of the institutional capital resource and the implementation of the strategic capacity-building model. But it demands new and better forms of public participation, and a genuine partnership between government and civil society. Interestingly, in the Northern Ireland context... the process of regional planning has been called Shaping our Future - to evoke the sense that the future belongs to those with the inventiveness to create it, and that a high level of civic involvement is a critical asset in creating sustainable development (Morrissey et al. 2001)
The form of **collaborative planning** referred to is associated in the British context with Healey (1997) and in the American context with Forester (1989), both of whom draw extensively on the work of Habermas (1979) and his theory of "communicative action" which stresses the link between genuine communication and practical collective action and establishes the preconditions of comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and legitimacy for valid communication. Healey relates this theory to planning - as a vehicle for beneficially transforming abstract systems of bureaucracy and the market and challenging the traditionally dominant position of instrumental/technical reasoning by emotive/aesthetic reasoning or moral reasoning - all of which are of equal validity.

Healey was in fact a contributor to the debate initiated by the Northern Ireland Government in relation to the establishment of a public consultation process for the Regional Development Strategy and its character reflects some of her thinking. It can be argued (McEldowney et al. 2002) that an approach which concerns itself with underlying systems of meaning among different discourse communities is particularly appropriate in a society where signs, symbols and coded language often communicate more than public utterances, and whose leading poet has famously exhorted his community *…whatever you say, say nothing…* More significantly, a project committed to the democratic project of making sense together while living differently has particular resonance for a divided society with recently-established and fragile power-sharing governmental structures.

While collaborative planning concepts provide a useful theoretical frame work for assessing the case study in question, it is important to be aware the many current critiques of its practical relevance. Particularly appropriate in the context described above is Thornley's warning (quoted in Sharp and Connelly 2002) that *…participation processes will reflect the view of society held by their designers...hence, consensus designers will mould participation to develop support for existing elite plans, conflict designers will organise participation so decision-making is taken over by the powerless group, and bargaining designers will seek to bring about compromise through negotiation…* Another critique, by Tewdwr-Jones and Allmeninger (2001) questions the feasibility and indeed, the desirability of achieving consensus and the implicit underlying assumption that representative democracy is in some way inferior to participatory democracy. Sharp and Connelly (2002) also question consensus achievement, suggesting that all participation exercises should be assessed in relation to the "degree of danger" involved - the degree to which the participation process has the genuine potential to challenge and change existing governmental practices. All of these points are relevant to the case studies.
1.3 Urban Outskirts

In the UK system there is no specific definition of "outskirts" although the term "urban fringe" is commonly, and pejoratively, used to describe the area beyond the built-up city which is subject to pressure for (mainly housing) development and is consequently often the subject of "green belt " policy (McEldowney 2001). The term "rurban fringe" was first adopted by Coleman (1977) as a derogatory description of the ill-defined, mixed-use development at the edge of built-up cities that was, in her eyes, a symptom of the failure of land-use planning to protect agricultural land from creeping urbanisation. Subsequent analyses (Best 1981) showed these fears to be exaggerated, as urban sprawl declined with falling population levels, declining manufacturing activity and, most significantly, the growing effectiveness of green belt containment policies in the '70s and '80s. Green belt policy continues to be a cornerstone of British planning policy, under some reconsideration because of burgeoning housing demand and price inflation in the south-east of England (Elson 1993), but popular with the general public (Jenkins 2000) and now reinforced by strong sustainability arguments in favour of the compact city (Jencks et al. 1996).

The UK preoccupation with a geographical, as opposed to functional, conception of "outskirts" differs slightly from the American perspective. Garreau (1991), the originator of the "edge city" concept, stresses the functionality of the phenomenon, although in the United States its location is generally peripheral: he attributes the emergence of this "concentrated peripheral development" to transport infrastructure (major highway intersections), social aspirations and the feminisation of the workforce. Suburban -type housing (as well as retail malls, offices and leisure/recreational outlets) is an essential component of the US edge city as it provides the opportunity for the dual - earner family to have convenient home-work-recreation accessibility, as opposed to the traditional suburban lifestyle which separated male breadwinner from peripherally - located home and family.

Current UK commentators also challenge the geographical perspective. Byrne (2001) for example, classifies urban space under three headings - the core, the suburb and the edge city - but emphasises function rather than geography in the designation, as his core represents the central business function, his "suburb" includes all residential activities, and his "edge city" encapsulates everything else - it is a sign of the character of post-industrial capitalism that it is not necessary to designate a fourth category of industrial space …we can subsume this into our discussion of edge city. Edge city is a "placeless place", its development contingent on subsidy regimes (enterprise zone finance for Metrocentre in Gateshead, for example), motorway junction access, local topography or the availability of cheap development land (he makes the important point that in the UK most "edge city" development is in fact on "brownfield", a term often geographically associated with the "inner city"). The dichotomy between "brownfield" and "greenfield", therefore, is more complex than geographical location, an issue of relevance to the case studies (below).
These terms, and their definitions, are central to the current sustainability debate and the pressure, in the UK context, for urban densification (Rogers et al. 1999) to encourage medium-density British cities to match their mainland European counterparts in terms of high core-city densities with their consequent benefits of non-wasteful land utilisation, efficient and viable public transport services and the more indefinable rewards associated with urban lifestyle and townscape quality (what some of Rogers' critics dismiss as the "pavement-café school of urban design"). Here, as above, the arguments are not clear-cut, and an acceptance of complexity and diversity is necessary, as Jenks et al. (1996) conclude after an exhaustive consideration of argument and counter-argument between "centrists, decentrists and compromisers" (Breheny 1996).

...The possibility of the intensification of urban areas begins to fulfil some of the aims for promoting high-density compact living. At the same time it is recognised that a policy of compaction would be unlikely to satisfy the demand for certain types of homes and that new development will be necessary in locations other than urban areas. Here the arguments for compromise, for decentralised concentration and more autonomous settlements, begin to provide answers. This requires a regional perspective beyond that of the city.

This last point is important in relation to the two tiers of strategic planning policy considered in the case studies (below).

In the Northern Ireland context, the urban sustainability debate, with its related issues of urban densification, greenfield/brownfield development, residential location and design, environmental conservation and sustainable transport, is arguably the key issue in strategic planning and hence the focus of the case study below. Belfast is a low-density city (McEldowney 2000) even by UK and Irish standards (with population density about half that of Liverpool and Dublin), not to mention European standards (its density about one fifth that of Barcelona). It is also a relatively compact city, thanks to its long-standing and relatively-effective green belt policy (Murray 1991) as well as being a "divided city" in social, economic and cultural terms (Gaffikin and Morrissey 1999). Its future development is bound up with the reconciliation of these social, economic and cultural divisions within a strategic spatial framework which addresses sustainability issues at regional and metropolitan levels, and within a governance system which accommodates diversity, complexity and, indeed, conflict. Using "outskirts" as a metaphor for the intensification/decentralisation debate (above) and "governance" as an umbrella term for governmental structures and processes in partnership with community interests (above), the case studies (below) highlights key issues in such a strategy.
2 Case Studies

2.1 The Regional Development Strategy Consultation Process

From a governance perspective, a key element of the approach to regional strategic planning in Northern Ireland has been the involvement of an independent "research consortium" in the extensive public participation exercise referred to above. The consortium comprised the School of Environmental Planning from Queen's University Belfast, the Urban Institute from the University of Ulster, Community Technical Aid and the Rural Community Network (Northern Ireland) - a combination of academic with urban and rural community interests. The consortium produced several reports on the outcome of the process and participated in the Public Examination that preceded the final publication of the Regional Development Strategy (RDS) in 2001. A similar consortium has been involved in the public consultation for the Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (BMAP) (see below), the major statutory local plan within the strategic context of the RDS. As indicated under "governance" above there were strong political reasons for the Direct Rule Government, in the absence of a directly accountable regional assembly, to engage with local opinion and to make the process as transparent and "legitimate" as possible. A second imperative, obviously, was the need to tap into the aforementioned rich vein of local and lobby organisations, particularly place-based community groups, the numbers of which had mushroomed over the previous thirty years (McEldowney and Sterrett 2001).

The threefold objective of the process of consultation (better described as public participation, but referred to here by its official name) was dissemination (providing scene-setting information, basic statistics and translations of technical language for community discussion), engagement (helping identify and facilitate community organisations to participate) and innovation (facilitating cross-sectoral debate and the promotion of fresh ideas) (McEldowney et al. 2002). This required a deliberate diversity of modes - visioning exercises in the planning workshops, exhibition-based discussion and debate with local councils, formal presentations and workshop analysis at sub-regional conferences, structured interviews with statutory agencies and professional interest groups. To attempt to achieve "consensus-building" across "diverse cultures" all discussions were structured under integrative themes (like "valuing people", "building prosperity", "caring for the environment") and a series of regularly - recurring integrative specialist forums under the themes outlined above were held at a central venue, with a consistent membership of cross-sectoral representatives. Over the consultation period more than 500 organisations - from community, voluntary, professional and environmental constituencies - were actively involved.

The draft RDS was published at the end of 1998 and the Public Examination was held in 1999, with the consortium appearing to represent the issues raised during the consultation period. The Public Examination Panel reported in early 2000 and, following extensive discussions with the now-established Regional Assembly, the RDS was published in Spring 2001 by the new (local)
Minister for Regional Development of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Thus a process initiated under (and arguably providing legitimisation for) a remote form of government (direct rule from London) was completed and ratified under an accountable, locally-elected regional assembly. In the process of ratification important changes were made and, before this, the consultation process had other significant impacts on the evolving strategy. How some of these relate to the sustainability/outskirts debate is considered below.

At the regional level a key area of contestation was that between the countryside conservationist and rural development lobbies - between the "urbanite" view of the countryside as a recreational and amenity resource to be conserved and the "ruralist" view of it as a "living and working countryside" to be exploited and developed. The original draft RDS subscribed to the former ethos - it proposed a protectionist policy which included the conservation of agricultural land, the designation of extensive protected areas, the application of strict environmental capacity tests to new residential development proposals and, in general, a nucleated rather than dispersed settlement pattern. A strong counter-argument from the rural constituency (West Rural Region 1999) advocated a diverse rural environment that included dispersed settlement patterns as part of a settlement hierarchy and the dominance of social and economic considerations over established spatial planning prescriptions.
This argument was substantially accepted by DoE(NI), the planning authority, and appropriate changes made to the draft policy - a reflection of the "power of the better argument" (Healey 1997) perhaps, or a recognition of the strength of the "institutional thickness" of the rural constituency. (It should be noted that there are wider political undercurrents here - the rural west of Northern Ireland has a predominantly Catholic/Irish culture which relates to the tradition of dispersed rural settlement, while the urbanised east - the locus hitherto of governmental planning decision-making - has a predominantly Protestant/British culture which had previously favoured urban containment and nucleated rural settlement patterns.)

A second area of contestation of relevance to urban outskirts - in many ways a microcosm of the first - was the vexed question of greenfield/brownfield development land, and the allocated proportion of one to the other. In Great Britain, following the analysis of the Urban Renaissance Report (Rogers 1999), a national target of 60% of all future housing land on "brownfield" (previously developed for urban functions) sites was proposed. This is a cornerstone of the Urban Renaissance strategy of densification as a contribution to sustainability - its analysis showed almost 50% of existing housing land allocations on brownfield sites (having risen from 40% ten years before).

The draft RDS, in recognition of special circumstances in NI (many brownfield sites in Belfast could be more accurately be described as "scorched earth" as a result of inter-communal violence in the inner city) recommended lower brownfield development targets of 55% for the Belfast sub-region and 40% for other regional towns.

This already-low target was vigorously contested by the Northern Ireland Housebuilders Consortium during the consultation process but more specifically at the Public Examination, where, aided by professional consultants and skilled advocates, and the lack of a DoE "urban capacity study" to demonstrate the availability of brownfield land, they effectively undermined the feasibility of the brownfield percentage target. As a consequence, the Public Examination Panel reduced the target to 40% for the region as a whole, a figure lower than the existing GB ratio, never mind its ambitious target.

However, a very effective post-Examination lobbying campaign by the Belfast Metropolitan Residents Group (BMRG), a consortium of environmental and greenbelt-protection organisations, persuaded the newly-elected Northern Ireland Assembly to overrule this decision and set a region-wide 60% target, higher than the original RDS figure and similar to brownfield targets in other parts of the UK. This is a clear illustration of the determination of local politicians to "recapture power from the plethora of boards, trusts, quangos and civil service departments characterised by administrative indifference" referred to above. It is also an illustration of the difference that determined and well-organised stakeholder representation can make, if the governance structure is amenable to change.

The Northern Ireland Regional Development Strategy is now well-established and the planners' task is to produce effective local plans within its context - to give spatial expression to its princi-
ples, guidelines and targets. Its consultation process has been praised for its comprehensiveness and promoted as a model of good European practice (Armstrong 2000, Morrison 2000, Albrechts et al.2002, Healey 2004). It has also been predictably criticised (Neill and Gordon, 2001) for (amongst other things) evading issues of inter-communal conflict, providing no spatial options for public debate and "the over-selling of vision in what remains a housing-led plan". In particular, they argue that "the claims to inclusiveness in the dialogic process have been exaggerated" and that some voices, such as those of the housebuilding industry, have been stronger than others. This critique was published before the reversal of the housebuilding lobby’s temporary triumph in relation to brownfield targets, so it can be considered premature; in relation to political realities it is a "counsel of perfection" (inter-communal conflict was addressed directly in the process, but is not readily amenable to resolution by spatial planning or public participation). Some of these criticisms are also relevant to the BMAP case study below.

2.2 The Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan Consultation Process

The Department believes that everyone should be given the opportunity to influence decisions which will in turn influence the future of our urban and rural areas…it is seeking not merely to consult on its proposals but to promote inclusive, wide-ranging and meaningful participation in the preparation of the plan... (DoE 2001) The DoE Issues Paper, which initiated the above BMAP consultation process deliberately makes the distinction (referred to in relation to the RDS above) between consultation and participation: the official title, therefore, once again undersells the complexity of the process. The consortium selected to carry out this exercise also included the QUB School of Environmental Planning and the Urban Institute, this time in partnership with Price Waterhouse Coopers, the international management consultancy.

The consortium had the same general objectives as for the previous exercise, but the more localised scale and more physical orientation of an Area Plan, as compared with a Regional Strategy, demanded more formal, presentation-led public meetings, a deliberate separation of the "information-giving" function from the "public debate" function, a careful selection of venues to cover all local Council areas (the BMAP area encompasses Belfast plus five other Council areas) and to give balanced representation to "outskirts" and "inner-city" areas alike. The consortium’s legitimacy was underlined by its autonomy to shape the methodology, its transparency about the arbitration of consultation submissions and its independence in producing its final report. The DoE gave a commitment to respond publicly to all substantive issues raised during the consultation, regardless of whether or not it was able to resolve them.

In order to achieve the above objectives 10 information-giving meetings were held initially, followed by 27 public consultation meetings in carefully-selected and geographically-balanced
locations across the metropolitan area. Individuals and organisation representatives were invited either personally by letter or collectively by advertisement in the local press - the range of invitees included elected councillors, regional assembly members, chamber of commerce representatives, trade unionists, community/voluntary groups, environmental organisations and residential area agencies. In addition, a series of focus group discussions were held with representatives of often-marginalised constituencies (ethnic and sexual orientation minorities, people with learning or physical disabilities, carers, youth and older people) which are now specified under Northern Ireland's Equality legislation. Finally, to foster integrative debate and consensus building, a series of focus groups and workshops with disparate interest groups (developers, residents, environmentalists) were convened after the general public meetings had been completed.

Attendance at meetings was generally high and classification by age, gender and community background (religion) demonstrates a slight preponderance of white, male, protestants over 45 years of age, although most attendees refused to be categorised and all sections of the community were represented to some degree. It was obvious that attendance at some meetings was skewed in terms of social composition, and at others some pre-planned "swamping" by members of a particular pressure group attempted to dominate the discussion. To address such disparities, selected additional workshops were arranged in under-represented areas, half of them in "outskirts" areas and the other half in disadvantaged inner-Belfast wards. It has to be acknowledged that attendance at even these specially-arranged meetings was relatively low, particularly in the inner-city.

In relation to "outskirts" issues, the dominant argument from the outer-city meetings was one of "nimbyism" - the desire to protect existing residential amenity from the encroachment of new development, with the perceived pressure on existing services and congestion of existing transport routes associated with such encroachment. In the city-based meetings this attitude took on a specific complexion - antipathy towards the now-fashionable insertion of apartment blocks along waterfronts and within established suburban sites - a "densification" mechanism favoured by current planning policy on sustainability grounds, and by opportunistic developers on profitability grounds. The fact that there has been a recent down-turn in the apartment market - leaving many recently-developed properties unsold - provides some economic support for what was largely an environmental and emotional argument. This down-turn, however, has probably more to do with price-structures than with consumer rejection of the concept.

Counter-arguments to this protectionist attitude came from BMRG - the green-belt protection confederation which, rightly, sees inner-city densification as the best defence against housing pressures on the green belt - and "urbanist" architectural and planning professional groups who advocate brownfield development and subscribe to the European model of high-density urban vitality. All this must be seen against the background of a projected housing increase of 51,000 units in the BMAP area by 2015 - a RDS target which was seriously questioned during the consultation, but was effectively unchallengeable at this level, having previously been ratified in the
strategic plan. Allied to these was a strong argument from many quarters for a change in Belfast's car-focused transport culture, and the adoption of policies necessary to facilitate a decent public transport system, which the city demonstrably lacks. Densification and "compact city" policies are obviously fundamental to such culture change.

The counterpoint to protectionism at the outskirts of the city was an argument for economic development in inner-city areas, coupled with a frustration that this type of plan could not promise to deliver such development. Here the consultation exercise's commitment to "go beyond land-use planning" was a mixed blessing: it was possible to do this in discussion, but not necessarily in implementation - the responsibility for which lay with a wide variety of agencies which were not an integral part of this process. Additional frustrations in inner-city areas related to traffic congestion and inconsiderate parking, which the plan could address through its transport responsibilities, and the physical manifestations of inter-communal strife, particularly in "interface" areas, which is a problem well beyond land use planning. The relationship between Area Strategies, produced by the various Area Partnership as socio-economic "visions" for their localities and the Metropolitan Plan with its more-narrowly defined physical orientation, was also a source of some frustration. Attitudes to densification and its sustainability objectives were, however, generally positive, people seeing this as an opportunity for economic regeneration in some areas.

Conclusions

These case studies have been fairly comprehensive exercises in a process of governance within an emerging system of changing government; from these exercises key issues of relevance to the "outskirts" debate have been extracted and highlighted- rural and urban settlement patterns, greenfield and brownfield development options, greenbelt protectionism and inner city implications. All of these have relevance for wider debates around urban densification and environmental sustainability. They also relate to other key issues such as transport, economic and commercial activity, although the focus in these cases has been mainly on housing - its demand, supply, location, density, form - and on its impact on urban land, particularly at the outskirts.

The conclusions will therefore consider the lessons from the case studies in the light of the contextual and theoretical material in the first three sections - on governance generally, with particular reference to the interplay and contribution of urban "regimes"; on public participation as an element of governance, with particular reference to "collaborative planning"; and on aspects of "sustainability" related to "urban outskirts" as perceived and debated in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
In relation to governance in a general sense, urban regime theory helps to identify and explain the relative contribution of the many stakeholder involved in the four-year process, located as it was within a changing governmental system which was emerging from a paternalistic and slightly-remote Keynesian/welfarist model towards a more democratic and locally-accountable liberalized/market-driven one. Of the many categorisations identified in opening section, Stone's fourfold categorisation is the most useful in that it makes a distinction between maintenance and development which are key features of all planning debates, and between progressive and opportunity-enhancement regimes which have been loosely associated with urban middle-class and inner-city working-class interests-key features of this particular planning debate.

The maintenance/development debate is well illustrated in the urban outskirts by the greenfield/brownfield controversy, wherein the development regimes (Construction Employers Federation, housebuilders etc.) effectively used the mechanisms of public consultation to achieve a more development-friendly outcome (higher greenfield housing development targets) which would threaten traditional urban structures by encroaching into greenbelt land to obtain the sites necessary to meet increasing demand. The subsequent overturning of this "victory" by the alliance of "maintenance" and "progressive" regimes (greenbelt protection organisations, Friends of the Earth etc. allied to newly-empowered local politicians) is an interesting vindication of some aspects of "new governance", although in this situation strong individual leadership of a particular pressure group (Belfast Metropolitan Residents Group) was probably the most important factor.

Interestingly, in the rural arena the roles were reversed, in that the "maintenance" regimes were non-rural institutions - urban-based conservationists invoking traditional protectionist planning policy - while the "development" regimes were indigenous rural populations allied to local politicians who made a case for the "living and working countryside" which would accommodate economic development on the basis of a more "laissez-faire" planning regime. Again, there was an initial victory for the "maintenance" regime conservationists as the draft plan reflected their preferences, which was subsequently overturned by the "development" regime through an effective participation campaign involving rural partnerships and local district council politicians.

"Maintenance" versus "development" was also the focus of the densification debate in the BMAP context, although in this case the "maintenance" regime, while certainly middle-class and supported by conservation-focused planning policies, could hardly be described as "progressive" in that it was more self-interested than socially-concerned, and was impeding a sustainable policy direction. During the BMAP consultation, however, a largely middle-class "progressive" regime did emerge - a coalition of architects/urban design professionals allied to the Imagine Belfast promotional organisation and to Friends of the Earth - who made an effective case for densification allied to design quality in a series of interventions at several public meetings. The outcome of this confrontation is still awaited.

In the inner city, the rhetoric of the Regional Development Strategy - with its ambition to go "beyond land use planning", to counter inequalities and promote social and economic
development - encouraged the participation of "opportunity-enhancement" regimes already well-established under Belfast's comprehensive community partnership programme. Raised expectations, however, about the capacity of planning to deliver on these fronts gave way to some frustration in relation to the more traditional physical orientation of the BMAP Issues Paper. Much of the reaction from inner-city areas to this consultation process therefore, focused on the perceived inadequacies of the planning process rather than on substantive planning issues - how the BMAP planners react to this will be an interesting test of the strength of this regime as compared with the burgeoning power of the development lobby.

In relation to public participation as a process of governance, Healey (2004) herself has recognised the significance of the Northern Ireland RDS as a positive example of collaborative planning:

...By late 2002, and despite the political difficulties that resulted in the suspension of devolved government, there were many signs that the new policy discourse of regional spatial development was being used by other government departments and had the support of influential devolved government politicians. Local authorities and partnerships across the province were also increasingly interested in seeing the strategy translated into delivery mechanisms. Whatever the outcome, the Northern Ireland RDS is a brave effort, both in the specific governance context of Northern Ireland and as a contribution to the development of a stronger spatiality to planning thought in the UK. It is also seen within the European Commission as an exemplar of the local development of ESDP concepts.

Since the methodology of the participation process was based essentially on Healey's prescriptions it is useful to be reminded of her fundamental argument (Healey 1992) - the necessity to involve different "discourse communities" in a process of "mutual learning" and "consensus-building" as part of the "democratic project of "making sense together while living differently." While acknowledging the validity of some of the critiques (above) of the more utopian aspects of collaborative planning theory, it can certainly be argued that some of its objectives have been achieved in this case.

...the public participation initiatives were successful in drawing in under-represented groups, facilitating a degree of mutual learning, and, importantly, generating some sense of ownership of a previously-unfamiliar process - now evidenced by the self-organisation of conferences by coalitions of interest. (McEldowney et al. 2002)

Some of the examples outlined above - in relation to the amendment of greenfield/brownfield housing targets, the reversal of the rural conservation/development balance and the as yet undecided outcome of the densification/nimbyism argument - provide clear evidence of the effectiveness of the consultation approach not only in generating debate but also in overturning initial policy positions. On the wider benefit of "democratic renewal", Greer and Murray (2002) argue that:
...Shaping our Future has helped provoke a fresh enthusiasm in citizen planning at the strategic level when so rarely any involvement in planning matters rises above the entrenched parochialism of local territorial dispute...a regional planning process as full as that engaged in within Northern Ireland has the capacity to strengthen civil society as an expression of the popular desire for peace...

The role of civil society in governance in Northern Ireland has been recognised and to some extent institutionalised in the establishment of the Civic Forum as part of the Good Friday Agreement power-sharing governmental structure, and the resonance of the participatory, consensus-building planning approach with the spirit of the Agreement cannot be overstressed. Ironically, the power-sharing governmental structures are now in suspension (due to lack of consensus on key issues) but the RDS is firmly established as a model of European spatial strategy-building and a positive example of collaborative planning. However, the most important test of its efficacy has still to be carried out - the relationship between strategic and local planning, of which the BMAP exercise (above) is the first test-case and is as yet unfinished.

This relationship - between the strategic and the local, between the principle and the practice, between the rhetoric and the reality - will highlight the differential power structures already identified under "regimes" above, and, specifically, between economic interests and social/community interests. Already, the RDS has been criticised (Neill and Gordon, 2002) for being insufficiently integrated with the region's economic strategy, and there was clear evidence of the major economic stakeholders not getting involved in the early stages of the consultation exercise, but "keeping their powder dry" for the formal Public Inquiry, when their well-financed and professionally-presented arguments had most effect. That their case in relation to greenfield housing was subsequently overturned is a tribute to the power of "new governance", but there is no doubt that power differentials will have increasingly obvious influence as the planning process moves towards implementation at the local level. As Albrechts (2002) puts it:

...it is unlikely that the force of the better argument always and everywhere persuades dominant interests.

Finally, in relation to the concept of urban outskirts, the discussion above highlights firstly the centrality of the concept to major planning debates and secondly the difficulty of separating the analysis of outskirts from that of the strategic planning entity as a whole. Outskirts issues are both surrogates for and symptoms of wider strategic planning concerns.

In the case of Belfast, the role of the "green belt" is obviously the dominant and, in a European context, distinctive, feature of the outskirts" policy context. As in most UK situations, the green belt is highly-valued and has been effectively-protected so far. However, as the rural/urban and greenfield/brownfield debates (above) have illustrated, Belfast is in a highly unusual position in having, beyond the green belt, a "living and working countryside" with a more laissez-faire planning control regime than other regions in the UK. It also has, within the green belt, one of the
lowest-density urban areas in Europe - about half the density of Dublin or Glasgow and one-fifth the density of Barcelona. Rural areas are therefore likely to be developed in a less-sustainable fashion, while urban areas are likely to be developed in more-sustainable fashion than hitherto. The consequence of this situation is the likely preservation of the green belt - with development pressure being relieved in less-restricted rural areas beyond it or in more-densified urban areas within it. In this sense it will be different to most other European examples and therefore a useful comparative model.

In another sense also it is a good comparative model - its strategic planning framework is now a prime example of the emerging concept of spatial planning in a European sense, as opposed to the traditional concept of land-use planning in a British sense. Albrechts, Kunzmann and Healey (2003) acknowledge this in relation to governmental practice and governance process as outlined above:

...Shaping our Future deserves the praise it has been given outside Northern Ireland...it has provided a basis for some degree of trans-departmental integration at governmental level...it has helped to change the governance culture towards more participatory practices...and it has provided a goal-focused, transparent argument about investment priorities in a highly-charged political environment.
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GOVERNING SUSTAINABILITY IN NORWEGIAN URBAN OUTSKIRTS

Discussing the new role of private actors

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Abstract

In accordance with international trends, Norwegian public policy for sustainable development is, and since the middle of the 1980s has been, focused on urban containment or the concept of the Compact City. During the same period of time, the responsibility for housing has increasingly been handed over to the market, and private actors’ role in municipal master planning to regulate urban outskirts has been strengthened in Norway. This can be described as a development from hierarchically based government to governance – where forces in public authorities and the market are combined to produce an actual result. The main issue discussed in the article is whether the strengthened role of private actors in governance is a threat for sustainability in the development of urban outskirts. Our theoretical discussion is illustrated by data from two middle range Norwegian cities, Stavanger and Tromsø, where actual governing in the outskirts is compared. By differentiating between the overall arena where the policy for urban development is laid down and the subordinated arena wherein local policies are implemented, our aim is to demonstrate that in the Norwegian case, governance does not have to represent a fundamental problem for sustainable development. This is partly due to lack of conflict between public and private interests in the matter of compact building. Partly, it is caused by the fact that national and local authorities – if the public interests are threatened – seems to be both able and willing to conduct political leadership by controlling the location of urban development.

Keywords

Urban outskirts, governance, planning, sustainable development, Norway.
1 Introduction

Since the Brundtland report was published in 1987 (WCED 1987), the discourse on how to continue to build and manage our cities has flourished. Sustainability has become one of the key elements in the discussion of urban development. Different models for the "sustainable city" have emerged, among them the concept of "Compact City" (Jenks, Burton and Williams (eds.), 1996). The idea behind the Compact City is to use less land resources for buildings, reduce the necessity for long travel distance and provide a basis for economically viable public transport. This kind of solution has been forwarded as policy both by the EU (CEC 1990) and by national governments, including Norway.¹ Thus, normatively speaking, a dispersed, low-density urban pattern is looked upon as something undesirable - a high density Compact City is definitively preferred.

Assuming that the compact city is a viable model for a sustainable city, focus in this article is on how pressure for further urban growth - that may result in an undesirable low-density urban pattern or urban sprawl² - is governed in Norway. Historically, due to the general assumption that environmental friendly development would not be possible through the use of market forces, public authorities have dominated in urban planning. This is in accordance with the very classic justification for hierarchical government, namely the need to meet market failure (Jessop, 2002a). Up until the 1990s, most work on local planning was carried out by public planners. The possibility for "private planning" given in the Planning Act was meant as an exception, as an extra democratic right for local stakeholders. Now, up to 90 per cent of all local plans are made by private property developers (Nordahl, 2000; NOU 2001:7, p. 129). From the end of the 1980s the market - that is, the property developers - has also got a stronger role in producing dwellings and other constructions in Norway. Public housing policy has been reduced from securing good housing as a general welfare goal, to market based provision of housing generally, with a special public responsibility for weaker groups, the elderly, disabled etc. on the housing market (Guttu and Hansen, 2000; Myrvold et al., 2002). Many local councils have made themselves highly dependent on private developers.

Thus, today's urban outskirts³ are not only a result of hierarchical government with land-use planning as the pivotal decision making system. We observe elements of governance - where the processes leading to the built form involve, and are even dominated by, private property developers. In contrast to hierarchically based government, the concept of governance may be understood as the combined forces in public authorities and the market to produce a certain result - in this case the physical form of the outskirts of Norwegian urban settlements. The concept of governance is viewed as a continuum from a strong to a weak role of government in governance (Pierre and Peters, 2000), rather than as a dichotomy to government. And the main issue to be discussed in this article is whether the strengthened role of private actors in governance is a threat to sustainability in developing urban outskirts.
In the following we will elaborate a theoretical framework for our understanding of governance in urban outskirts in Norway. Here, the notion of governance and the relationship between governance and planning in the Norwegian setting will be explored, as well as the complex relationship between governance and urban development. Our empirical illustrations are based mainly on a re-study of existing case studies of two middle range Norwegian cities - Stavanger and Tromsø. We would like to stress that the data presented will serve mainly as illustrations of the main point in our theoretical discussion. This is due to shortcomings in available data and the limited number of cities we have been able to compare. The article is concluded by a short summary.

2 Theoretical Framework, Hypotheses and Data

2.1 A governance perspective on urban planning - in Norway

Urban development has always been dependent on private actors in Norway, and their involvement is not a new phenomenon in municipal planning dealing with this issue. However, in this article the theoretical concept of governance will be used to discuss some traits in development, implying that private initiative plays a stronger and different role in urban planning and development over the last decade than earlier.

Historically, the housing shortage in Norway after WW2 led to institutional arrangements for production of dwellings where public policy had a central role. At the national level, the state-owned National Housing Bank provided subsidised housing loans for reasonably low-cost dwellings. Norway followed a policy of owner-occupier housing, unlike e.g. Sweden. Local governments produced and owned few dwellings, so there has always been a limited market for rented housing. In 1965 the municipalities were, however, given the competence to make decisions on land use for all land within the municipal border. Many local councils bought virgin land, developed infrastructure, and divided the land into housing sites. These were sold to private households, which received inexpensive loans to construct their own houses, usually detached houses (Saglie and Lyssand Sandberg, 1996a,b). The building co-operatives also played an important part, particularly in the cities (Guttu and Hansen, 2000). The aim was to make affordable housing available to a growing urban population. These co-operative housing projects were also funded by subsidised loans from the National Housing Bank. The element of government was obviously very strong in this system, where public land ownership was an important tool.
In the 1980s housing policy changed and the supply of housing was left to the market. This was partly due to the fact that housing shortage was not so noticeable any longer, partly to a change of ideology and partly to a difficult economic situation in the end of the 1980s. Public housing policy was changed from an overall public responsibility for the provision of housing, to a more restricted role of responsibility for those groups that had problems on a market, e.g. the elderly, low-income families and handicapped people. During the 1980s, there was also a crash in the housing market. At the same time, the loans in the National Housing Bank became less subsidised. Historically, the risk for the municipalities, the housing co-operations and the private developers of not being able to sell newly constructed houses had been very small. Suddenly these actors all suffered financial losses. For local governments this changed the land policy, and some chose to sell public owned land and leave the financial risk to the developers.

Such a development asks for a theoretical framework emphasising the interactive character of public policymaking - which is exactly what the notion of governance may aim at (Stoker, 1998). Within the concept of governance the main idea is to look beyond the formal structure of government through representative democracy in the public sector, and make use of a more complex perspective on decision making with more actors, concerns and interests involved (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Bogason, 2000; Pierre and Peter, 2000). Such a framework is particularly applicable in an urban context because of the multitude of political, social and economic actors involved here.

The governance perspective on collective action is that representative institutions cannot unilaterally solve problems by means of hegemonic power. These problems can only, or better, be solved by pooling the resources of public and private actors. As pointed out by Schmitter (2002), it is most likely that representative government prefers to deal with policy challenges through the use of hierarchical power procedure, and will only deviate from this strategy when dictated by necessity. As shown in the Norwegian case of urban development, mutual dependence between public and private actors has become increasingly prevalent over time. The consequence has been that governance as networks rivals markets and hierarchies as a means of allocating and co-ordinating resources. Stoker (1999) has identified some distinctive characteristics of these three different "governance structures".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of dependence</th>
<th>Markets</th>
<th>Hierarchies</th>
<th>Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis of relationship</td>
<td>Independent, contract and property rights</td>
<td>Employment relationships</td>
<td>Resource exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium of exchange</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of conflict resolution and co-ordination</td>
<td>Haggling and the courts</td>
<td>Rules and commands</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Markets, hierarchies and networks as alternative forms of co-ordination and allocation of resources (from Stoker, 1999: xviii).
The illustrated mechanisms guiding markets and hierarchies are well known. Networks are, however, listed as situations were private and public actors are dependent on each other to carry out their objectives. Networks are made up of organisations that need to exchange resources, e.g. money, information, expertise, to reach their goals. Both for local governments and for private actors primarily operating in the market networks challenge the traditional way of thinking and acting. Goss (2001) shows, for example, the complexity of changing authority with trust for local politicians.

The three categories represent, however, ideal models. In the case of urban development in Norwegian cities, elements from different ideal models are needed to describe the relationship between local councils and private actors. The relationship is, typically, characterised by interdependence and resource exchange. At the same time prices may be the medium for exchange, and contracts may formalise the relationship. Indeed, modern political leadership seems to require flexibility to be efficient, and in the face of market, state and network failure Jessop (2002b: 51-55) give two pieces of advice: first, to involve others in the process of policy-making, and place self-organisation in the heart of governance: that is, to allow also private actors in network governance; second, to be prepared to switch from market to hierarchies or networks or from hierarchies to market or networks, and back.

Theoretically, the traditional technical-instrumental view of planning is grounded in the logic of government or hierarchy. The goals were set by the politicians, while the planners (the experts) were given the task of finding the best means to achieve the goals (Banfield 1959). In accordance with the general development described above, the belief in planning as a tool of government has diminished over the last 10 - 15 years (NOU 2001: 7). Correspondingly, the theoretical concept of planning has been redefined. What is known as the argumentative or communicative turn in planning theory (Fisher and Forester, 1993; Healy, 1993) makes the notion of planning relevant also within the framework of governance. Planning then is understood as a process based on knowledge and interaction - with the aim of co-ordinating different actors, interests and arguments. As for the concept of governance, the main point is that the possibility of governing without including non-public actors is limited.

In the formal role of local and national government in Norway - given by the legislation - the logic of rational planning based on authority is still dominant. Local governments have the power to make decisions on land use, and the most important instrument with regard to urban expansion is the municipal master plan. This plan is legally binding both for public agencies and private landowners, and the local council can effectively control the location of development through this plan.

The local councils' decisions must, however, not be in conflict with national interests. The regional state authorities are requested to make their interest clear in the municipal planning processes. Often, national policies are made with little reference to policy goals outside the sector interests. "The national policy guidelines for integrated land use and transport planning" is a rare
example of co-ordination of interest at the national level. In order to create an effective transport system, agricultural interests are secondary to the construction of nodes in the public transport system in these guidelines (Ministry of the Environment 1993).

Furthermore, there is an exception within the Planning and Building Act, where municipal decisions contrary to national interests may be made invalid by formal objections by the affected authority. In addition, land use decisions are not only taken within the legal power of the Planning and Building Act. In this context, the Act of Agricultural Land is important. Any construction on farmland must receive consent from the agricultural authorities, which therefore is a powerful actor in decisions on urban expansion.

The master plans are legally binding, but the decisions made here on spatial distribution of land available for construction may be challenged by private initiatives to build in localities intended for other purposes. The amount of exemptions and deviations made decide the extent to which the actual built pattern can be traced back to decisions taken in the original plan. However, investigations have shown municipal master planning to be quite decisive with regard to the outcome (Amdam, 1991; 1998). This is also the case in more market-orientated planning styles. This is explained, partly, by the strict and often time-consuming processes required for making deviations from the master plan.

To concretise the municipal master plan, however, local plans will be necessary. Such plans may be looked upon as implementing the public policy inherent in the municipal master plan. Although the final decision on whether to approve of plans for developing a specific area is made by local governments, private actors may draw up the actual plans. As mentioned above, while public planners used to make these local plans, private property developers make nowadays almost all of them. The question is whether this dependence on private initiative and investment will affect the municipalities’ willingness to use their formal role to regulate development. Our two city cases will illustrate how actual interaction between the private and public sphere takes place in these two arenas for urban development - the process of overall master planning, and the subordinated process of implementation through specific local plans.

2.2 The complex relationship between governance and urban development

The research question posed - whether the increased role for private actors in housing, planning and land use policy is a threat to sustainable development - implies a traditional view of the relationship between governance and urban growth. That is, the assumption that urban containment is a result of public regulation and development control, and that sprawl, or development on the urban fringe, is a result of less public control over market-led development. However, the relationship between governance and urban development may not always be as straightforward as this. Thus, in the following we will discuss the complexity of the relationship between gover-
nance and urban development by introducing two intervening factors: the public demand or *pressure for investment* in developing areas and the involved actors' *interests in growth* in the urban outskirts.

Discussing *pressure for investment*, Brindley, Rydin and Stoker (1996: 176-181) point out that local development is dependent on capitalism, and that it is in the local governments' (as well as central government's) interest to be responsive to market interests. The main reason for this is that in most European countries public expenditure constraints have killed off public investment planning. The localities are, however, in different positions with regard to economic performance. This makes it necessary for local authorities to be flexible - and to go in to different forms of policy-making arrangement depending on the local situation. Based on experience from the UK, their hypothesis is that in prosperous areas, where there is a willingness to invest, the market forces will be given great freedom by the land-use planning system reorientated partly towards their needs. In less prosperous or depressed areas, development will be much more dependent on public investment and public-private partnerships. The local council will be just as dependent on the private actors as in prosperous areas, but, because public resources are invested, local government will be more involved in the planning process and may therefore have a greater impact on the result.

Addressing the question of *conflicting or corresponding interests*, the traditional assumption is that economic activity and a significant role for the market in governance will be in conflict with, and have a negative effect on, the environment. That is, implementation of a model like Compact City for sustainable development will be very much dependent on public land-use planning systems' ability and willingness to control the location of development, particularly when Compact City is a solution opposed to market preferences (Næss and Ellingsæther, 1992; Jenks, Burton and Williams (eds.), 1996).

Two objections to this general statement should, however, be made. First, public interest and planning praxis have not always been compatible with sustainable development and with the concept of a Compact City. Norwegian planning and indeed planners' ideal in the 1960s and 1970's was largely concentrated on providing enough dwellings. The notion of good dwellings often meant that they had to be located in the urban periphery. Not until the middle of the 1980s, has national policy been focused on integrated land use and transport policies, and on the Compact City concept.

Second, and most important here, it is possible to argue that market mechanisms, although not necessarily intentionally, may work in the direction of sustainable development. The discussion on ecological modernisation reflects this question (Hajer, 1995). Urban development will depend on public demand, which assumingly is reflected in the pressure for investment in locations inside as well as outside the existing built-up area. Over the last 10-15 years the demand for centrality and urban qualities - that is, the demand for a Compact City - has been rising. In such a win-win situation public and private interests are not in conflict, and governance based on
public-private partnerships is likely to be positive for sustainable development. In situations with conflict over interests, on the other hand, sustainability through control over location of development is more likely to be dependent on the public land-use planning system being at work.4 This is, however, not to say that people do not demand dwellings in low-density areas any more. The demand for such developments has definitively not disappeared, and private investors may still be interested in dispersed development - if possible and profitable. In general, the logic of private investors, as for the market in general, is that they are willing to invest where there are profits to make. Thus, the situation today is that public interest may have conflicting interests with private developers at the local level. However, the announced national policy does not necessarily strengthen local authorities' interest and willingness to control the development in order to implement stated environmental goals (Hovik 2001). Because Norwegian local councils are responsible for land-use planning, an increased role for private initiative and private funding in urban development may imply that urban development is negotiated in varying forms of private-public partnerships. In these negotiations, environmental goals for sustainable development may be an important element. The municipalities' increased dependence on private capital for realising their goals - e.g. boosting the local economy and securing housing - could, however, lead to a situation where environmental goals are traded off against more favourable solutions for the municipality in a short time economic perspective. In such situations, we would assume that economic interests are likely to damage the environment, if the market is not controlled. In most northern European countries and in the Nordic countries in particular, national authorities have the necessary reserve power to have the final word when it comes to land use. Therefore, in cases where national interests really are threatened, efficient political leadership at the national level is likely to stop an undesirable development - authoritative hierarchy will come into work, and we will see little evidence of private-public partnerships and governance.

The arguments put forward on the relationship between pressure for investment and conflicting or corresponding interests between public and private actors can be summarised as in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private investors' interests</th>
<th>Dispersion i.e. urban fringe development</th>
<th>Compact City i.e. urban containment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion i.e. urban fringe development</td>
<td>governance</td>
<td>hierarchy (government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compact City i.e. urban containment</td>
<td>hierarchy (government)</td>
<td>governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** The assumed relationship between public and private investors' interests in urban growth and hierarchy/government and governance
Counting on the political leaderships' ability to switch between government and governance, we assume that governance is more likely to occur in cases of shared interests between public authorities and private actors, than in situations where there are conflicting interests.

3 Empirical Illustrations

In the following, we will show how actual problems are solved - that is, how the development of residential areas is decided upon. Focus will firstly be on the overall development laid down in the municipal master planning. How different actors have been involved in the overall development will be demonstrated very well in the actual planning processes carried out in the two cities. Discussing the process of implementing the overall plans, some general views on the processes for private planning in the two municipalities are presented.

Because of their pivotal role in the question of land use in the Norwegian setting, the focus will be on local governments' role in the actual policy making. As shown above, however, national and regional authorities are obviously important as well. National environmental policies on integrated land-use and transport are formulated, and through their necessary consent for proposals for development, agricultural authorities have the power to protect their interest.

We will use two Norwegian cities as cases for illustrating the governance processes: Stavanger and Tromsø. These are among the larger urban areas in Norway, and they are typical in the sense that Norwegian urban areas area still increasing in population, and Tromsø and Stavanger are among them. The cities face the same problem: how to accommodate further urban development for a growing population.

Stavanger is the fourth largest urban area in Norway, with 108,000 inhabitants. Stavanger has - unlike other urban areas in Norway - very little of the post-war high-rise functionalist planning. Low density and small dwelling areas dominate the outskirts of the city. Houses are privately owned, with little public housing, and the middle class dominates the outskirts. There are also some industrial areas in between, as well as some shopping centres. In Stavanger the urban pattern is particularly fragmented.

Stavanger has for a long time been an expanding city, and over the last 30 or 40 years the local council has repeatedly been instructed by national authorities to initiate and participate in inter-authority co-operation for developing residential areas within the larger region of North Jæren;
that is, mainly in the local council area of Sandes, south east of Stavanger (the so called "city belt" of Stavanger - Sandnes), but also in Randaberg and Sola municipalities. In this way residential areas may be expanded, without making scarce agricultural land biologically unproductive. For various reasons the Stavanger local council has not complied with this request. On the contrary, the conflict between developing residential areas and protecting agricultural land has become more and more prevalent over the years because of an increasing growth in the population in the whole region of North Jæren. Especially after Stavanger became the "oil-capital" in the 1970s, the pressure on land use to meet the need for residential areas has been severe (Strand and Moen, 2000: 96, 119). Thus, the outskirts of Stavanger are regarded as prosperous areas, with considerable interest from private actors in making investments.

Tromsø, with 38,000 inhabitants, is an administrative capital of North-Norway, and has many service functions such as main regional hospital, university, culture etc. The outskirts of Tromsø consist to a large extent of small housing, both as detached dwellings but also in denser types of small units. Some construction in the late 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s were functionalist blocks of flats. The urban pattern is partly determined by topography, including the situation by the sea, but also mountain areas. The airport has hindered the "natural" expansion on the main island - a noise restriction zone has led to a "jump" in the urban pattern to an outer island. In many ways Tromsø is typical of settlements in a coastal situation.

There has been a steady increase in the population since the 1960s, but the pressure on land use has not been as strong as in Stavanger. Neither is the city surrounded by productive land for agriculture. Historically, the city of Tromsø has been orientated towards the ocean - both with respect to economic activities and transportation. The city centre was therefore originally situated on the island Tromsøya. This centre became connected to the mainland in 1960, and expanded further to the neighbouring island Kvaløya in 1973. Due to geographical circumstances and the amalgamation of municipalities in the 1960s, Tromsø is not dependent on neighbouring municipalities and on co-ordinated regional planning to the same extent as the city of Stavanger (Strand and Moen, 2000: 100, 101). Thus, in Tromsø, the pressure on investment is lesser then in Stavanger.

In the Norwegian context, the focus on governance chosen in this article is relatively new. Therefore, the question of how residential areas are developed in cities should refer to the situation in the 1990s. Thus, the main part of our re-study is based on detailed reports from Stavanger and Tromsø covering this period of time, and reported by Strand and Moen (2000). In addition, data from a case study of Stavanger carried out by Inger-Lise Saglie and Inger Marie Stigen in 2000 is utilised (partly published in Stigen, 2001). As regards the municipal master planning in our two cities, although these case studies were conducted for other purposes, they contain sufficient detailed information to allow a re-interpretation of the governance perspective chosen here. To describe the more detailed local planning processes of implementation, however, we have carried out some additional interviews with municipal planners and administrative officers involved in actual policy making in the two cities.
3.1 The process of overall master planning

The Stavanger case

The history of land use planning in Stavanger is primarily a history of conflicting interests, the main conflict being between the local council and actors interested in protection of farmland (that is, local farmers), regional authorities and the Ministry of Environment. National authorities have for a long time insisted that the growth in residential areas - and thereby the number of inhabitants - should be significantly lower than the growth rate preferred by the local council of Stavanger. In the last land use plan the local council planned to accomodate a one per cent growth in the number of inhabitants. The Ministry for the Environment pointed to the fact that this was a larger growth than "natural" growth (caused by births and deaths), and claimed that the need for dwellings estimated by local government was too high.\textsuperscript{5}

What most of all characterises the participants in the development of housing areas in Stavanger in the late 1990s is the extensive involvement of actors at the national level. This is very well illustrated in figure 1 below.

\textbf{Figure 1:} Actors involved in the process of planning extended residential areas in the Stavanger Land Use Plan for the period 1998 - 2009.
The local politicians want to expand residential areas within the border of the municipality in order to attract taxpayers. Population growth has been stronger in the surrounding municipalities and the majority in the local council has therefore agreed to make a priority of the need for residential areas over agricultural areas.

The business sector in Stavanger, except for the farmers, agrees with the priorities made by the local council. The plan secures both residential and industrial areas available within the border of the municipality, that is, close to the city centre.

The regional actors - Rogaland County Council (an independent directly elected body) and Rogaland County Governor and Committee for Agriculture (national government bodies at the regional level) are bodies entitled to comment on the land use plans made by the local councils within the county. Their comments show that they do not support all the details in the local land use plan. The actors wanted to reach agreement locally without involving the national level. The parties bargained locally on possible locations for new residential land, and reached an acceptable compromise. Because the local and regional actors with formal authority agreed, the local council should normally have been in the position to validate the land use plan.

However, many and different actors were and still are interested in the protection of farmland, and therefore are against the municipal plan. They argued that the regional farmland authorities had "given" too much in the bargaining process. They successfully lobbied the central government. First of all, the Ministry of Agriculture speaks for the farmers, and has the aim at protecting as much farmland as possible.

Based on the statement made by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment used their formal right to reverse the land use plan decided upon locally. With reference to "national interests", five of the residential areas planned were not accepted. This implies not only that the national body at the national level (the Ministry of the Environment) overrules the national body at the regional level (Rogaland County Governor and Committee for Agriculture), but also that the directly elected regional and local governments (Rogaland County Council and Stavanger Local Council) are made ineffective. Taking into account the relatively strong local autonomy held by Norwegian local governments, this is clearly a controversial and provocative action.

The issue is debated in local (Stavanger Aftenblad) and national (Nationen) newspapers. The mayor and other representatives of the local council hold that the decision made by the Ministry of the Environment makes the situation for further development in Stavanger difficult. It is also claimed that this interference in local matters exemplifies how fragile local autonomy is. The local special interest organisations (Stavanger Bondelag and Jordvernforeningen) shout for joy. They claim that the decision made by the Ministry of the Environment is historically sensational, in the sense that protection of farmland takes precedence over other environmental considerations - as for example reduced transportation.
The debate continues - in the local and regional (Rogalands Avis) paper as well as between national and local actors. Even the representatives representing Stavanger in the National Assembly get engaged, and propose a motion ("Document 8" and interpretation) suggesting that the Assembly ask the Ministry of the Environment to approve Stavanger’s initial plan for land use. The mayor of Stavanger also appeals to the Prime Minister for help, writing him a letter pointing out the negative consequences if the land use plan is not accepted. The result is that two of the five areas planned by the local council are accepted as residential areas after all - which must be looked upon as a partial victory for Stavanger local council.

The Stavanger case shows an extensive involvement of actors at the national level. This is clearly due to the national interests in protecting highly productive land for agriculture which is claimed to be involved. It is not unusual that the national level is involved in municipal planning when master plans are prepared. The national authorities will often safeguard their interest by using their formal power to object to the local plan. Mostly, these differences are solved in negotiations between the local municipality and the governmental bodies. It is highly unusual that all national reserve powers are used as in the Stavanger case - involving Parliament, the Government and the Prime Minister.

All actors used the legal powers delegated to them, and these formal hierarchical structures explain the outcome. We are, in other words, talking about government. Although the farmland protectors are private actors influencing the outcome, the relationship between them and the local and national authorities can hardly be looked upon as any form of co-operation and partnership, which characterises governance.

The Tromsø case

The first land use plan in Tromsø, from 1971 (approved by the Ministry of Environment in 1979), planned for a much higher population growth in the period 1971 - 2000 than the actual growth which occurred. Compared to the planned 90,000 inhabitants, the actual population size in 2000 was 58,000. This first land use plan was, moreover, built on what today are looked upon as sustainable principles for the use of land (Strand and Moen 2000:148). Thus, the limited increase in population implies that sufficient development of residential areas has been possible within the planned areas. Therefore, the degree of urban expansion is minor in Tromsø (Strand and Moen, 2000: 148,155).

Actually, a particular focus on expansion was absent from the land use plans until the 1990s. In the late 1980s, it became clear that the consumption of urban land per capita were increasing. Among local actors the focus in the 1990s has therefore been on concentrating housing development in already existing residential areas. Taking this change in policy into consideration, Tromsø has actually sufficient areas to meet the expected need for house-building in the planning period from 1999 to 2011, even without reducing the recreational areas on the main island (Tromsøya).
As illustrated in figure 2 below, the process of planning residential areas in the city of Tromsø seems to be very much in the hands of the local council. Compared to Stavanger, what characterises the Tromsø case is the limited number of actors involved. Here, the Ministry of Environment did not look upon the issue as one of national "interest" and the local council was left to make its own decision on the plan. In addition, lack of conflict in the Tromsø case led to high degree of consensus both between the different levels of authorities and among the local actors involved - who therefore did not have to fight to defend their interests. Here, the need for formal acceptance causes the interaction, and not the need for bargaining and persuasion as assumed in the governance perspective.

![Diagram of actors involved in the process of planning extended residential areas in Tromsø, Land use plan for the period 1999 - 2011.]

From the perspective of sustainable development, which according to general national policy should be the leading principle for local development, the dilemmas inherent in the Tromsø case can be summarised as follows (Strand and Moen, 2000: 101):
- by concentrating further development at Tromsøya (the main island in the city), the recreation areas may be reduced. At the same time this solution limits the need for transportation;
- by building on the main land, on the contrary, motoring is encouraged;
- and, the city area at Kvaløya is not big enough for a profitable and efficient public transports system- developing this area implies that the bridge would have to be expanded to increase the capacity for private motoring.
The city of Tromsø is not as heavily dependent on neighbouring municipalities and co-ordinated regional planning as Stavanger, and agricultural land has not been made biologically unproductive through housing development. Neither local farmers nor national interests have therefore been threatened, and the regulations in the Act of Agricultural Land have been sleeping. Thus, until now there has been little conflict between local priorities and regional and national interests. The popular meetings required in the Planning and Building Act have involved local participators in the process of planning land use in 1999 - 2011, as in former processes. The opposition from local actors to the plans projected by the local council has, however, been insignificant. Indeed, in Tromsø, land allocation for residential areas is planned according to the Planning and Building Act - by the local council.

Despite the fact that the pressure for construction of dwellings in the outskirts is not among the highest, there is little to indicate that the local council has invited the public into governance processes when deciding on allocation of land resources for construction. In the development of residential areas in the outskirts of Stavanger, the dominating hierarchical element is due to the economic and ecological value ascribed to the potential land for development. From the 1970s and onwards, protection of land for agricultural purposes has been a major national policy issue. Indeed, the Stavanger case very well illustrates the practical implications of the fact that major urbanised areas in Norway are also the most valuable areas for agriculture (Stigen, 2001). In Tromsø, however, the explanation for the strong role for local government - or hierarchy - must be another. Here the potential for agriculture is low and the nature is not particularly valuable. There has not been conflict on the use of land, simply because there has not been any interest neither from the local council or from private developers to invest in the outskirts. Therefore, there exists no mutual dependence between the local council and the market - and the municipality has not had any reason to develop governance processes. In Tromsø, though, we may talk of non-interest in development in the outskirts, because of superfluous areas available for construction in the urban settlement.

### 3.2 The process of implementation - negotiating specific local plans

#### The Stavanger case

In Stavanger, the municipality is dealing with and making decisions on about 100 private proposals for development each year. In comparison, the town planning office produce about 50 plans a year, the so-called "own plans". In most private plans, the municipality has no role other that of receiving the proposals and dealing with them in order to prepare the business for political decision making. The most significant aspect for the town planning office is that the development project has satisfactory housing quality.
Some of the "own plans" however, are made as frameworks for larger areas to be developed. Within this municipal framework, private developers make their own proposals for their site. The administrative officers are well satisfied with this model, as they feel that this give local government an appropriate "steering tool". The model is used for developing a formerly industrial area in the Stavanger-Sandnes axis, which serves as an example of development in the outskirts acceptable also from a sustainability perspective.

This is one of many models of private-public partnerships for developing residential areas within existing built up areas in Stavanger. Other models for the development of larger urban areas have been tried in situations where the land is in private ownership. One example is a project where the municipality participated by funding the project leader. Representatives from the municipality participated both in a co-ordinating board and in the project group. The private plan for the area was, however, submitted as a proposal with several elements that contradicted the views held, and signalised by, the municipality. From the local government's point of view, they were "hostages". The administrative officers took part in decisions that were made during the preparation of the project, but they disagreed with the final version that was submitted for formal scrutiny and public inspection by the municipality.9

In the Stavanger case, we see that in prosperous areas, and when there is now conflict on the ambition to achieve densification, much is left to the market. But still, the municipality has the ambition to influence the quality of the development, and tries to use other means to enter into a more powerful position in the negotiation, such as being landowner or by contributing in the actual preparation of the planning proposal.

The Tromsø case

Tromsø is in a situation with huge municipal budget deficit and a small stock of municipally owned land. The role and scope of the planning administration is to negotiate with the private developers in order to moderate the planning proposal, as to present it for political decision making. The formal bargaining position for the local council is in many ways strong, as the development needs municipal consent. On the other hand, the political dependence on having proposals accepted and actual construction carried out is huge in Tromsø. This results in a pressure on the local government to let the proposals (too) easily through their scrutiny in order to meet the demand for new dwellings in the city.10

In the outskirts there is neither any interest in investing in, nor any public interest in facilitating or contributing to, urban development. The areas designated for urban development are, for the present, land reserves for potential development.

The Tromsø case clearly shows that increased urban density in central locations can be obtained by a very limited role by public actors. In this case sustainability goals are obtained through governance.
4 Conclusion

The question raised in the article is whether the strengthened role of private actors in governance is a threat for sustainability in urban outskirts. We have discussed a policy area looked upon as pivotal for sustainable development and for the governance of cities: developing residential areas in city outskirts. In the theoretical discussion we have argued that given the political leadership's ability to switch between government and governance, governance is more likely to occur in cases of shared interests between public authorities and private actors, than in situations where there are conflicting interests. Our empirical illustrations are primarily based on existing case studies of two middle range Norwegian cities - Stavanger and Tromsø.

The Norwegian public policy for sustainable development is, and have since the middle of the 1980s has been, focused on urban containment or the concept of Compact City. This has partly converged with the private investors' interests. In such cases of common interests, the kind of governance illustrated in our two city cases can hardly be said to have made any problems for sustainable development. In situations where private and public actors' interests correspond, governance is likely to characterise the situation (Stavanger and Tromsø - the process of specifying local plans). Where the pressure on investments in urban outskirts is modest, the conflict will not be activated (the process of master planning in Tromsø).

At present there are, however, many examples of private investors' interests - and willingness to invest - also in the development of urban outskirts. This is, in principle, in conflict with present public policy for sustainable development. Thus, we have shown that public actors are, through political leadership, likely to defend the more general goal of sustainable development by the use of hierarchical means in situations where there are conflict between these interests and private investors' interest in development (the process of master planning in Stavanger).

These lines of thought, and the empirical illustrations made in the article, are illustrated in Table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prosperous area, i.e. interest in making investments</th>
<th>Yes, conflict (assuming hierarchy)</th>
<th>No, agreement (assuming governance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Stavanger - process of master planning</td>
<td>Stavanger and Tromsø - specifying local plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Threat towards public interest in sustainable development and interest in making investments (i.e. public-private dependence): the municipal master planning, and specifying local plans in Stavanger and Tromsø.
We have seen a development from government to governance over the years, where housing policy increasingly has handed the responsibility for housing over to the market. Our main point is that this change may not be a threat to sustainable development. This is especially true in situations were private investors and the authorities, although unintended, share interest in a development that may be characterised as sustainable. When interests are in conflict, however, our empirical illustrations demonstrate that the planning system is designed so that both local and central authorities can intervene and introduce the use of formal authority based on hierarchical government. This ability for the authorities to switch between governance and government is most clearly illustrated in the Stavanger case. Indeed, the referred argument made by Jessop (2002b): that public authorities should be prepared to switch between use of the market, hierarchies and networks, is very well exemplified. However, a distinguishing feature of the presented case is that the switch is taken care of by the system of multilevel-governance - where mechanisms for checks and balances are formalised.

Furthermore, the Tromsø case may illustrate the point made by Schmitter (2002), referred to above, that representative governments prefer to deal with policy challenges through the use of hierarchical power procedures, and will only deviate form this strategy when dictated by necessity. We have seen that in Tromsø, the local council did not deviate from the government procedure when planning the outskirts. Because the market actors preferred development in available areas close to the city centre, no interests was challenged, and the planning process proceeded according to the formal hierarchical structure described in the Planning and Building Act.
Notes


2 In everyday use, the term "sprawl" is used as a synonym to "spread out", or in the context of urban development – "urban growth". As a technical term, however, urban sprawl denotes uncontrolled urban growth. Thus, in this article the term "sprawl" will be used when urban growth obviously is uncontrolled, while the term "urban growth" will be used elsewhere (as the general term).

3 In this article, urban outskirts refer to new developments on earlier non-built land.

4 Whether, or how, private and public interests are causally linked will not be discussed.

5 Data source: Inger-Lise Saglie and Inger Marie Stigen, Research project for the Norwegian Research Council: "Desegmentering og internasjonalisering."

6 Data source: Inger-Lise Saglie and Inger Marie Stigen, research project for the Norwegian Research Council: "Desegmentering og internasjonalisering."

7 What also happens in the Stavanger case, but independent of this, is that the local special interest organisations protecting the interest of the farmers submit a complaint to the county governor, claiming that the rule of procedure was not followed in the process of making the land use plan. The county governor rejects this.


9 This may look like a very contradictory and curious situation. It is important to remember that any private actor has the right to submit a planning proposal and to have it presented for the politicians for decision. The administration must present the proposal for the politicians although they cannot recommend the proposal. In this case the developer will gamble on a positive response from the politicians as opposed to the administration.

10 This pressure to get proposals more quickly through the decision making process, has led to a revision in the Planning and building act. Local governments are restricted to a certain period of time for dealing with the proposals.
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SEGREGATION AND GOVERNANCE
Transboundary planning initiatives in Swedish outskirts

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Abstract
The growing social polarisation in Swedish society has increased the differences between poor and rich districts in the larger cities. The situation is worst in the housing areas built in the 1960s. But although Swedish urban policy has aimed for several decades at controlling segregation through extraordinary efforts in vulnerable housing areas, there is nothing to indicate that the processes of segregation have been restrained.

In this article the question is raised as to whether district-based efforts to combat segregation have outlived themselves in the late modern society. Now might be the time to move along to a strategy where the focus shifts from the individual district to the relationship between different districts.

During the 1990s new growth centres have been established in the urban peripheries. In many cases these are situated in the immediate geographical proximity of the housing areas of the 1960s. The co-localisation of the housing areas of the 1960s and the business districts of the 1990s might open up new possibilities for promoting a spatial integration between different population groups and classes. Below, I take my point of departure from two case studies in the Stockholm region and, against this background, discuss what kinds of physical, social and cultural obstacles are counteracting increased integration as well as what kinds of planning initiatives have been taken to overcome these obstacles.

Keywords
Outskirts of Swedish cities, urban landscape, urbanism, segregation, integration, negotiational planning processes, communicative planning processes, governance.
In Sweden, segregation has come to be associated with the housing areas from what is known as the "Million Programme" era. Much of this housing consists of multifamily buildings in the urban peripheries. The concept of the "Million Programme" refers to a decision taken by the Swedish Government in the mid-1960s to build one million apartments over a period of 10 years. The aim was to counteract the housing shortage and the many overcrowded flats, by building new apartments for the large numbers of people who had been forced to leave the rural areas in order to find jobs in industry. The "Million Programme" areas are characterized by good public transportation and many of them are situated in very attractive landscapes - in Stockholm, for example they form a string of pearls along the radial subway network. Generally the flats are well designed and the housing standard is high.

The reasons the "Million Programme" housing developments came to be regarded as problem areas are first and foremost structural. Due to the crises in the mass-production industries in the 1970s, unemployment among citizens in these districts increased, and the consequences were growing social problems. The housing estates developed a bad reputation, not least because of negative coverage in the media, and those residents who had a choice searched for alternative housing forms - some of them being able to realize their dreams of homes of their own in terraced houses or single family dwellings. It became more and more difficult to find tenants for the flats, and there were empty flats in many areas. When the municipal housing companies were operating at huge economic losses, several municipalities tried to change the course of development by accepting tenants from the growing refugee stream. The refugees were moved into the empty flats, where the rent was subsidized by the state during the first years of the refugees' stay in the country. As many of these people had difficulties in gaining a foothold on the Swedish labour market, the process of social and ethnic segregation accelerated. Some of the buildings became transient areas, where the inhabitants often changed, thereby speeding up the process of social instability.

In recent years urban growth in the largest cities has again increased, and has led to a general housing shortage, which in turn has reduced both the number of empty flats and the turnover in the housing estates from the 1960s. Thus the population in these areas is again more stable.

The greatest change, however, has occurred in the surroundings of the "Million Programme" housing developments. While the housing areas were initially spread out in the landscape, enclosed by main arterial roads that made them appear to be isolated enclaves, the localisation of growth industries to the urban peripheries has radically changed the peripheral urban landscape. Today many of the housing areas are surrounded by commercial enterprises, high-tech industries and huge shopping centres. The reasons for the establishment of the new growth centres in the urban periphery are to be found in the structural economic changes of the 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, the transition from mass-production to flexible accumulation implied an increase
in just-in-time production, thereby favouring localisations close to the main roads in the city outskirts. Secondly, many commercial firms and shopping centres have moved out of the city centres in order to avoid increasing price levels and congestion. Thirdly, private car ownership has increased and as a result many potential customers with cars now see the new peripheral shopping malls as time and money saving alternatives to the local shops.

With the establishment of the new growth centres in the urban periphery, new possibilities have been created that can enable different types of districts to be connected into a coherent urban landscape. This opens new possibilities to counteract spatial segregation and create new meeting places for different population groups and classes.

Below I examine to what extent the local planning authorities have made use of these possibilities as well as to what extent they have been able to establish new arenas and public spaces where the inhabitants of the "Million Programme" housing estates and the employees in the growth areas can meet. I take my point of departure from two of the growth centres that were established in the Stockholm region during the 1990s: Kista and Flemingsberg. Both districts are case studies in a three-year research project on *The Potential of Public Space to Transgress the Boundaries of the Segregated City*. This project began in autumn 2002 and in this paper I present preliminary considerations and discussions against the background of the initial pilot study1.

## 1 Characterisation of the Selected Areas

### 1.1 Flemingsberg and Kista Science Park

There are many similarities between the institutional district in Flemingsberg and Kista Science Park. Both have been defined as regional growth centres in the regional plan for the Stockholm region. Both accommodate high-tech industries, research centres and universities. While Flemingsberg specialises in biomedical industries and research, Kista Science Park specialises in information technology. Both centres are internationally well reputed and are considered to be spearheads in the new economy.

The institutional district in Flemingsberg is situated in Huddinge municipality about 15 km southwest of Stockholm city and has good intra - and interregional communications. All southbound intercity trains stop at the railway station in Flemingsberg. The district has more than 12,000 employees, of whom about 6,500 work at Huddinge University Hospital. The medical
university Karolinska Institute, with more than 1,500 students is also situated in the area. In 1985, Novum Research Park was established in order to strengthen the research resources at the University hospital and Karolinska Institute. The research park includes several international companies within biotechnology, among them AstraZeneca, Karo Bio and CyberGene, and together they have about 1000 employees. In the late 1990s the University of Södertörn was established and in 2003 the University had about 10,000 students and 700 employees.

Kista Science Park is situated in Stockholm municipality about 5 km northwest of Stockholm city, close to the northbound highway and has good public communications to Arlanda airport as well as to Stockholm city. The business district has more than 27,000 employees who work in 700 companies, among them Ericsson, Nokia, IBM and Microsoft. An IT university with about 3,500 students is also situated in Kista. In 1988, the Electrum foundation was established in order to promote active cooperation among education, research and private companies in the area of information technology.

The buildings in the business districts consist of huge blocks often not facing the surrounding roads. There is no traditional street network and no comprehensible structure of city blocks. Inside the buildings there are cafés, restaurants and shops. Sometimes they are situated in closed arcades, sort of semi private areas for the employees. Huddinge University Hospital in Flemingsberg is an illustrative example, but the tendency is also clear in Kista, where Ericsson, for instance, has invested in many service facilities inside the buildings. Since these are not accessible to the public at large, the inhabitants of the nearby housing estates seldom have any reason to go to the business districts.

Both Kista Science Park and the Flemingsberg institutional district are situated in close proximity to some of the most "vulnerable" of the "Million Programme" housing developments. There are, however, many physical barriers that counteract contact between the new business districts and the surrounding residential areas. In Flemingsberg, an 80-metre broad road with feeder roads cuts off the institutional district from the housing estate, and in Kista the underground - here running above ground - functions as a clear border separating the two districts.

The physical structure shows that integration between districts has not had high priority when the new business districts were established. Other factors such as proximity to well developed infrastructure - highways, airports and public transportation routes - seem to have been more important in the choice of location than considerations about how the new business districts could contribute to improving living conditions and increasing the urban qualities in the nearby residential areas. In Kista the Science Park was established as a joint venture between public and private interests, where the purpose was to foster IT business development in the capital city. The functional division between work, housing and commercial centres was built in as a precondition as early as the planning stage. The institutional district in Flemingsberg was, by contrast, established primarily with public resources, as a regional policy measure to strengthen the economic and social development in the southern part of the Stockholm region.
1.2 The surrounding housing areas

The number of inhabitants in the various "Million Programme" housing developments that surround these regional centres varies from about 8,000 to about 17,000. All these areas consist of multifamily dwellings with several storeys, with the road net separated. This means that motor, pedestrian and cycle traffic are on different levels. However, the differences in urban and architectural design are greater than the similarities. Some of the developments have generous unbuilt spaces that provide room for various kinds of public areas and greens; others have high building and population density, where the few unbuilt spaces are exposed to heavy wear. The housing development of Grantorp, situated close to the institutional district in Flemingsberg, consists of high slab blocks. Among the housing developments situated at the northern end of the green zone known as the Järva field ("Järvafältet"), near the business district in Kista, Husby consists of buildings with external walkways and has a high proportion of small flats, while star-shapes dominate Kista. At the southern end of Järva field is Tensta, with buildings of four to six floors and Rinkeby, with comparatively varied buildings. A green zone separates the areas at the southern end of Järva field from those at the northern end.

Several of these housing areas have serious social problems - related to high unemployment, many single mothers, a high proportion of inhabitants without higher education, etc. Many of the inhabitants are dependent on welfare state benefits. The proportion of inhabitants with foreign backgrounds\(^4\) varies from about 35 % to about 70 %\(^5\), which means that the poverty problems have an ethnic dimension.

In recent decades, many physical and social renewal projects - financed by the Swedish Government and/or by the municipalities - have been carried out in these districts in order to counteract the social, ethnic and otherwise discriminating segregation. All the projects are district-based, but while the earlier projects primarily focussed on places, and on the possibilities of improving the physical and social environment in the vulnerable areas, the later have primarily focussed on the possibility of compensating the individuals now living in the vulnerable areas, for instance through labour market policies and social policy measures. The shift from place-orientated to individual-orientated measures is in accord with changes in the way segregation is perceived. While environmental aspects were previously seen as the most significant factors, socio-economic factors are now being stressed as the decisive reasons for segregation. The ability to support oneself is perceived today as the most important single factor behind housing segregation (Integrationsverket 2002:77ff).

In an evaluation carried out by the National Board of Integration, the choice of a district-based strategy focussing on individuals is described as contradictory (ibid: p 87ff). Certainly labour market policy and social policy initiatives have contributed to improving living conditions for many of the inhabitants. But at the same time all statistics from the vulnerable areas show that individuals with higher income levels more often choose to move out of these districts than
people with lower income levels. And since the newcomers have relatively lower income levels, there is nothing to indicate that the measures focussed on individuals are able in the long run to counteract the processes of segregation.

Since the "Million Programme" areas are among the most poverty stricken, there can hardly be any doubt that measures are needed to improve the living conditions in these areas. But even if research results show that there are positive effects of the district-based strategies for the individual districts, in terms of compensating for existing structural disadvantages, the tangible results in relation to the overriding objective of increasing integration are so minimal - both in the place-orientated and in the individual-orientated measures - that it appears reasonable to support Helena Lahti Edmark's suggestion that such efforts be renamed:

*Why call this working for integration? In fact, is it not more like a kind of general aid or welfare work? The importance of calling a spade a spade stands out clearly when we examine constructive activities that are being threatened with phasing out because their objectives were unrealistic and the activities themselves unable to contribute to fulfilling them* (Lahti Edmark 2002:124).

Several researchers have also criticized the district-based projects for having a stigmatising effect. When a district is pointed out as a problem area, this gives negative publicity, which tends to further worsen the situation (see, for instance, Ristilammi 1994, Molina 1997, Ericsson, Molina, Ristilammi 2002). Therefore it is often claimed that the only sustainable solution is to replace the current time-limited initiatives - that run the risk of turning not only individuals but also whole districts into clients - with a general urban policy, which guarantees that the inhabitants of all districts can obtain good living conditions. A first step in this direction would be to change the rules for allocating resources to the individual districts in order to bring them in to better accordance with the real needs. What is inhibiting such a reform is more the lack of political will than of money. During the last thirty years there has been a series of projects in the vulnerable areas, and many have been prolonged after their formal ending date. There is nothing to indicate that repeated time-limited projects are more cost effective. However, it is probably easier to obtain political consensus for this kind of "non-recurrent expenses" than for more long-term reforms (for a discussion of the district-based efforts to counteract segregation see for example: Nylund 1998, Nylund 2004).
2 Transboundary Planning Initiatives

Simultaneously with the implementation of the district-based physical and social renewal projects, long-term planning initiatives are being taken in Kista and Flemingsberg that seem to offer an alternative to the neighbourhood ideology that has long dominated Swedish planning and urban renewal. These new planning initiatives are ambitious ones, encompassing visions of integrating the industrial and commercial districts with the "Million Programme" areas into a coherent urban landscape. The overall strategy aims to reinforce the urban qualities of these areas. It rests on expectations that developments in the high-tech business parks will serve as a lever to raise the living conditions in the surrounding residential areas.

The planning strategy used in both Kista and Flemingsberg is a kind of negotiational planning process, aiming at the creation of strong networks between private and public sector stakeholders. In Kista, the Electrum Foundation, owned by the City of Stockholm, Ericsson and ABB, was established as early as 1988 in order to strengthen co-operation between education, research, business and commerce in the fields of electronics and information technology. Electrum has made massive and extremely successful efforts to put the name of Kista on the map. This is one of the reasons that, in spite of corporate cutbacks in the Ericsson Group in recent years, Kista has retained its unthreatened position as the Silicon Valley of the Nordic region. In Flemingsberg, the co-operation between public and private interests was not institutionalised until 2000 with the setting up of the "Strategiforum", a strategic network for actors committed to the development of Flemingsberg. The Forum describes its main aim as "giving the trademark of Flemingsberg content, identity and value".

The interest displayed by business and industry from both these areas in urban planning issues can be explained mainly by their needs to attract well-qualified and trained manpower. Since its establishment, Flemingsberg has consistently had difficulty in recruitment of individuals possessing spearhead competence. In Kista this problem did not appear until the late 1990s, when the economy became so overheated that IT specialists were able to pick and choose among workplace opportunities - and often found the workplaces in the city centre more attractive than those in the periphery. In both Kista and Flemingsberg, the negotiational planning process has been adapted to the specific prerequisites of each locality. Thus there are major differences between the strategies chosen and the results achieved. Within each area, there are also many contradictory interests. Although all parties are in principle in agreement about wanting to promote developments in their local areas, there are many different expectations. Therefore, the process is not without its conflicts and there is a tendency toward oppositions deepening as the planning process progresses.
2.1 Kista

The long-term plans for Kista were presented in a report published by the executive office of the city of Stockholm in 2000. It was entitled Kista Science City - from Vision to Reality, henceforth referred to as "the Vision". The Vision was drawn up in collaboration between the City, the business sector and academia. It stresses that the ambition in transforming Kista Science Park into Kista Science City is that "all of Järva will come to be seen as one giant Science City" (Stockholm city 2000:3). In other words, the aim was not simply to invigorate the business district, but also to achieve "a revitalization of the residential area" in order to "create new meeting places that can draw visitors from the entire region to Järvafältet" (ibid: p 4).

The realization of Kista Science City is an essential element in the strengthening of Kista's position as a world leading IT cluster. Correctly managed, the diverse, international population found in Järva, could well play an important role in the development of business and industry. A large number of Stockholm's young people, many of whom will become tomorrow's researchers and workforce, are growing up in the Järva area. The development of industry in Kista not only represents a unique opportunity for the residents of this area in terms of employment, but also personal development (ibid: p 3).

The Vision contains many concrete proposals for the future, such as new buildings and infrastructure investments. In the business district a new IT university for 12,000 students will be designed and constructed. The Kista Shopping Mall will be expanded, and a new, 32-storey office building, Kista Science Tower, will be built. In order to strengthen the urban environment, the existing huge building blocks in the business district will be broken up to form a grid matrix network, where the cafés and restaurants previously located inside the separate building complexes will be relocated to street level and opened to the public. 3,000 flats for students will be built at the southern and northern ends of Järva field. It is also envisioned that Kista Science City will offer a wide range of cultural activities and recreation facilities. In addition to plans for the construction of a Magna Kista Auditorium in the business area, there are also concrete proposals for the establishment of cultural institutions in the various residential areas. A new, futuristic, building that would be the home of the Royal College of Music, is proposed to be located at the core of the residential area in Akalla as a contribution to transforming Akalla into an international music centre (ibid: p. 14). The proposal for the residential area of Tensta, which already has an art museum, is for it to become a centre for both art and art education (ibid), while it is suggested that the residential area Rinkeby become a centre for linguistic research (ibid: p 7). The intention is that these new buildings should revitalize the local centres in each of the individual residential areas, thereby increasing their attractiveness (ibid: p 18). In order to create more varied housing opportunities, possibilities to improve the housing quality by densification will be investigated; the intention is to construct additional buildings with larger apartments and student housing in the existing residential areas. Where possible the current
separated traffic system will be transformed so that motor traffic, pedestrian and bicycle traffic will all be on the same street level (ibid: p. 17).

To ensure the integration of the whole Järvafält area into one coherent urban region, major alterations in the infrastructure are proposed, not least in relation to the public transport system. Concrete plans are developed for an extension of the cross-area rail-bound streetcar system so that it will pass through Rinkeby and continue to Kista (p. 13). Today there is no direct, rail-bound connection between southern and northern Järvafält. Each area has its own good underground route to central Stockholm, as part of the radial underground network. The establishment of a cross-area line would improve transport times considerably. For instance, where it takes approximately 30 minutes to get from Kista to Rinkeby today, the time would be reduced to approximately 5 minutes.

*Kista Science City - from Vision to Reality* is a report marked by its broad, sweeping formulations. This may be partly attributable to the fact that the document is the result of a planning process in negotiation among many different parties. In other words, the ambiguities it contains reflect the many, often contradictory, interests and expectations associated with the transformation of Kista Science Park into Kista Science City.

While what drives the commercial and industrial participants is continued economic growth and the potential for shaping an attractive work environment for employees, the visions of the *district council* are very different indeed. When asked to comment on a draft of the report on Kista Science City, the district council stressed the fact that Kista is at a decisive crossroads in development, in two senses. Firstly, there is the question of how to maintain and further develop the existing international cutting edge environment for new businesses and research. The other no less important issue is how to put Kista at the international forefront in counteracting and successfully reversing social and ethnic segregation (Kista district council administration 2000:6).

The district council was critical of what they considered the unilateral focus on technical and physical elements of the infrastructure, asserting that the draft of the Vision only contained a superficial awareness of the importance of integration for growth, instead of this awareness permeating the entire Vision, as it should. The council called for a humane, democratic vision that includes an analysis of the significance of culture to future growth. Since "human beings are our most important resource, development must take place under humane conditions" (ibid: p 7).

The council supported the idea of building a Magna Auditorium, but also wanted to examine how the existing, smaller meeting places "Husby Träff", "Akalla Träff" and "Kista Träff" could be further developed. The council also stressed the importance of the neighbourhood libraries for cultural activities (ibid: p.18)

> *At present, the city of Stockholm is investing heavily in expansion of the physical infrastructure at Kista Science City. What is needed is the corresponding major investment in development of human resources - the residents of Kista and the other neighbourhoods at Järva field* (ibid: p 7).
In their comments on the draft, the district council stated they found it regrettable that some of the layout sketches in the Vision give the impression that almost all the investments will be made in the "Kista" part of the Kista district, and it almost appears to have been forgotten that Kista consists of three different residential areas, only one of which, like the business district, happens to bear the name of Kista. They also highlighted the importance of developing other sectors of business than those in the "TIME" sectors - Telecom, IT, Media and Entertainment - with a view to ensuring employment opportunities for the local population of the Järva field area (ibid: pp 10-11). They felt it was important that the University offer courses in many disciplines, and proposed the establishment of a *Kista Open Academy*, both to open up training opportunities for people without the formal credentials to make them eligible for university studies, and to make it possible for people with degrees from other countries to get the equivalent degrees in Sweden directly (ibid: p 16).

In conclusion, the comments from the district council contained a proposal that the Vision be supplemented with a new chapter on *welfare*, as well as a proposal that 10% of the income from all property and real estate sales in Kista be deposited in a growth fund for general improvements in society (ibid: p. 1). Thus their comments made it explicit that the foremost interest of the district council is a development that benefits everyone in the local population.

On 15 October 2001, the Stockholm municipal council adopted the draft proposal for a Vision for Kista Science City, and the parties achieved consensus, in spite of the clear discrepancies in their opinions, that they would all work with a view to its implementation. The ambiguous way in which much of it is formulated is undoubtedly the secret of its relatively positive reception by the politicians, the business world and the general public alike. This document bears witness to the importance of diplomacy and rhetoric in bringing this kind of complex negotiating process to a successful conclusion. However, that same ambiguity makes the document open to a wide variety of interpretations and to the risk that conflicts of interest will continue to escalate during the course of bringing the project to tangible fulfilment.

Today, Kista is one of Sweden’s largest construction sites. The work is developing rapidly, and many of the plans have already been completed, not least in the business district. The new university building and Kista Science Tower have both been built, along with some of the planned student housing. Kista Shopping Mall, inaugurated November 2002 with an area of 50,000 m², has become the largest indoor shopping mall in the Nordic countries. The new mall is a popular place. People stroll the main axis, as wide as a classic city boulevard, at all hours. The catchment area of the mall is a large one, and it is frequented by a range of people from employees in the nearby business district to the inhabitants of the surrounding residential areas.

At first glance, then, Kista Mall appears to represent a kind of transboundary meeting place, where people from different population groups and classes have the possibility to meet each other, and that attracts people from different social groups.
It is, however, clear that if the ambitious plans of the city of Stockholm regarding Kista Science City are to reach fulfilment, and if "the young people of Järva field are to become the researchers and workforce of tomorrow", a shopping mall open to all will not do the trick alone. The crucial issues, therefore, are how to keep the process moving, and what groups have the strength and the power to control the future course of events.

At the moment, the party that appears to have the greatest power of initiative is the executive body of the Electrum Foundation, Kista Science City AB. This organisation was founded after the Vision had been adopted by Stockholm city, and the person appointed Managing Director was the individual who was responsible for preparing the Vision for the Executive office in the City of Stockholm. At the same time, the entire Electrum Foundation was reorganised. It is still owned by Stockholm city, Ericsson and ABB, but the board of directors now has a wider wingspan, including representatives of corporate groupings, the IT university, the property owners...
and the relevant district councils. The individuals appointed to the board are of consistently high standing, reflecting the importance attached by all the interested parties to the work of the Foundation.

The work of both the board of Electrum and of Kista Science City AB is based on the Vision, but no financial resources have been allocated to it, so no specific demands can be made on any of the individual parties. In other words, Kista Science City AB functions as a kind of voluntary collaboration, the aim of which is to help the various parties by giving higher visibility to the contexts in which they can display their common interests. This also means that the distribution of power on the board of Electrum is decisive to the degree of influence each party can bring to bear.

Often, major visions relating to integration are impeded in their implementation by financial constraints. The discussions regarding the relocation of The Royal College of Music provide a pertinent example. The Vision explicitly states that the residential area of Akalla is to be the new site of the College, and the proposal is embodied in a sketch showing a futuristic building on the Akalla town square. This (re)location has the support of all parties, but to date no financier has come forward to fund the construction of the building. A decision has been made by the Royal College of Music regarding giving up their facilities in central Stockholm, and they are pleased with the idea of moving out to the district of Kista if suitable facilities can be found. Many of the key individuals we have interviewed emphasised that new facilities must be located as soon as possible. Several of the people interviewed also stated that the only realistic alternative to avoid a situation in which the College locates somewhere other than Kista is to rebuild one of the existing disused buildings. Most of the appropriate free buildings are in the business park. This is just one of the ways in which financial constraints are threatening to jeopardize the possibility of using an attractive institution, in this case the College of Music, as an active means of revitalizing the functional and social diversity of the residential areas.

Conversely, Kista also provides examples of successful integration projects that may serve as prototypes for others to emulate. Kista Matching is the most well known example. This project began in 1997, at the initiative of the district council, with a view to providing more employment opportunities in the Kista business park for residents of the area. The background statistics were that only approximately 4 % of the 27,000 people working in the business park at that point in time were living in the Kista district, while in Järva field as a whole, there were some 7,000 people unemployed (Kista district council 2000:17). The project was implemented as a collaborative effort on the parts of the district council, the business and commerce sector and the employment office. Individual companies were asked to list their recruitment opportunities. The district council then used this information as a basis for offering the unemployed, particularly those receiving social welfare benefits, special tailor-made courses. From 1998 to 2000 some 400 individuals became gainfully employed thanks to Kista Matching (Kista district council 2001:2), and about 80% of those who completed the courses were offered permanent jobs in the business park6.
In spite of this example, I have the impression that it has been easier, to date, to fulfil the parts of the Vision relating to the business district than the parts having to do with the adjacent residential areas. For the time being, Kista district council, despite the fact that it is represented on the board of directors of Electrum, has had some difficulty in bringing its ideas of making Kista "a world leader in reversing social and ethnic segregation" to realization. There are a variety of possible reasons for this. Luis Abascal, former director of the district of Kista drew far-reaching conclusions, asserting that the residential population has now been excluded from the vision of the development of the area. He also stated that he finds it most unfortunate that the initially good cooperation between Electrum and the district council and its administration has come to an end. The executive management of Kista Science City AB, in contrast, refer to the lack of time. Because it is the responsibility of the management to coordinate work and to promote dialogue with all the companies in the area and with all the municipalities in the proximity, as well as collaborating with the regional authorities and with the Stockholm county public transport authorities and Swedish Rail, they have been overwhelmed with work. The management also emphasised that because the municipal land-use planning authorities work on the basis of a firmly established, institutionalised planning tradition, it is easier to cooperate with them than with the district councils. The district councils are the administrators of the social and cultural sectors, which, according to the management of Kista Science City AB, have to date been characterized by the absence of an institutionalised framework. Their projects tend to be of short-term, time-limited nature, which makes it difficult for cooperation with them to achieve the necessary long-term continuity.

The difficulties pointed out here by the management of Kista Science City AB, associated with integrating the district council into the long-term efforts to coordinate urban planning, confirm the fears voiced by those who were sceptical to the introduction of a district council reform in the first place. From the very outset, critical voices asserted that full decentralisation would require decentralisation not only of the "soft" sectors, but also of the technical administrations.

In Stockholm, district council reform was implemented in 1997 and what characterises the present time is that the councils are campaigning for improvements in the living conditions of their inhabitants (Bäck and Johansson 2001:169). The example of Kista, however, implies that the district councils and administrations are having difficulty bringing an influence to bear on their districts' functional land-use planning and will continue to do so as long as the work of the urban planning authorities remains centralized at municipal level.
2.2 Flemingsberg

The first tentative attempts to formulate a long-term vision for development of relations between the institutional and the residential areas in Flemingsberg were made in 1999 with the publication of *A Strategic Programme for Flemingsberg 1999-2009*. The Flemingsberg Strategy Forum, founded in 1999, took the initiative in drawing up this document. The Forum consists of "75 key individuals with vested interests in the development of Flemingsberg". It is a very general strategic programme, consisting of a short brochure describing visions, overarching strategies, overarching aims and secondary aims and strategies for Flemingsberg in the coming decade.

The principal vision is for Flemingsberg to become: firstly, one of the most attractive growth areas in Sweden during 1999-2009, and secondly that Flemingsberg should stand out as an example to emulate in terms of collaboration amongst many stakeholders and interested parties. Most of the eight main strategies listed deal with development of the institutional district, including the university, the medical research centre, Novum Research Park and Huddinge University Hospital. Two of the main strategies are of implicit interest for the "Million Programme" housing estates, the first being to make Flemingsberg an attractive place to live, and the second being to improve the services available in the area. The main and sub-aims also focus primarily on the institutional district. Concrete proposals are put forward for infrastructure improvements, including the construction of a regional travel centre with hotels and restaurants. Two proposals that could possibly be of interest to the residents of the "Million Programme" areas are that the existing shopping centre at Grantorp be remodelled, and that a pedestrian and bike path to Visättra be built. The possibility of integrating the institutional and residential districts does not even come up until the sub-goals, which include both the drawing up of a local development contract for increased integration in Flemingsberg, and that all parties concerned in decision-making and the implementation of measures must take their impacts on segregation into account (Flemingsberg Strategiforum 1999).

Although the main focus of the 1999 strategic programme is on the development of the institutional district, the document is still a preliminary attempt to get a general grip on the situation in Flemingsberg. One of the main strategic statements is "We Must Market Flemingsberg as Flemingsberg", and the map on which the strategy is based makes it clear that the strategy applies to both the institutional district and the adjacent residential neighbourhoods. The explicit purpose of the marketing campaign is to "make Flemingsberg a more sought after place in which to live, work and study, pursue research and business". This was also the very first time all the parties in the area, including municipal politicians and civil servants, property owners, land owners and representatives of companies succeeded in reaching a consensus regarding a common vision of the future. Thus this document served to reverse a trend of a kind of ad hoc decision making, which dominated the previous planning process, and where the initiative was often taken by regional and/or national authorities. For instance, the decision to construct the Huddinge Hospital, inaugurated in 1972, was taken by the regional council in Stockholm, which
was also responsible for all the subsequent renovations and extensions of what is now a huge, approximately 400,000 m², complex. The county council was also the authority responsible for establishing the Novum Research Park in 1984, while the national government took the initiative in building the Södertörn University in 1996.

The fact that there have been many interests at play, both at regional and national policy levels, in relation to the institutional district in Flemingsberg has resulted in the municipality (Huddinge) having played more of a follow-up role than being a driving force in the planning work, in spite of their planning monopoly. Once each of the public institutions has defined its own development needs, the municipality has been responsible for drawing up detailed plans to enable the new buildings, renovation work and extensions requested to be brought to realization. It is also worth noting in this context that the programme for the university area drawn up by the local building board as a commission from the municipal council in 1999, the same year the Strategiforum was established, contains no discussion regarding how to link the institutional district more closely to the surrounding "Million Programme" areas (Miljö- och Samhällsbyggnadsförvaltningen 2001).

Neither does the Draft Project Plan for Flemingsberg 2002-2004, adopted by the municipal council later the same year, contain a discussion of possible ways to improve relations between the institutional district and the existing housing areas. In this document, Flemingsberg is described as a very high priority area of municipal investment, and still the focus is on the development of the institutional district. The only mention made of the residential areas is in conjunction with establishment of new housing for students and researchers (Huddinge 2001).

There is a great deal of construction ongoing in the Flemingsberg institutional district, which appears to confirm that Flemingsberg in fact did become the main area of investment in the municipality. During the planning period, the construction of the new university building known as "Moa's Crescent" was completed, and a new university library was built. Some of the existing housing in Grantorp has been renovated and turned into student housing, and some new student housing has been built in Visättra. Furthermore, new buildings are under construction at Novum and at Karolinska Institute. Still, although many of these projects are listed as among the main objectives in the Flemingsberg strategic programme, the fact that they have achieved completion can hardly be credited to the Strategiforum. They would in all probability have been built in any case, and they are undoubtedly mentioned in the strategic programme simply because representatives of those institutions have been active in the work of the Strategiforum.

There is, though, one issue the Strategiforum has spearheaded: the renovation of the Flemingsberg shopping centre. So let us focus for a few moments on the initiatives taken to achieve this aim.

The old shopping centre, which has seen better days, is located on the fringe of the Grantorp residential neighbourhood. It is isolated from both the business park and the university by an 80 metre wide road. Since its location means that neither the university students nor the people working in the business park naturally pass by on their daily routes, the centre is mainly used by
the residents of Grantorp. Strategiforum recommended the establishment of a new, more sustainable shopping centre, and took the initiative for a feasibility study of the possibility of building a tunnel to shift the traffic from the road under ground in order to link the institutional area with the residential area and the shopping centre. A number of architects have drawn up concrete proposals but no decisions have yet been made, since their ideas are both technically complex and financially burdensome. The municipality has not displayed much interest, possibly because a tunnel is such a major infrastructure investment, and/or because they fear that a new shopping centre would pose too much competition for the existing ones in Huddinge city centre (about 3 km to the north), and Kungens kurva (about 7 km to the west).

**Flemingsberg:** 1. Huddinge University Hospital, 2. Novum Research Park, 3. Södertörn University, 4. Existing Commercial Centre, 5. Grantorp Residential Area.

The Skanska construction company, owners of the area east of the railway tracks and adjacent to the Visätttra housing estate have put forward a more realistic alternative. Skanska hold building rights to a prospective hotel and office building in this area, and have also expressed an interest
in establishing a large ICA Maxi supermarket. An architectural competition has been advertised for creation of a new shopping complex primarily for consumers with cars, but there is no indication that the proposals submitted would help reinforce either the urban qualities of the area or the possibility of creating transboundary meeting places for business employees and residents.

Since the Strategiforum is a relatively recently-established project, it is not surprising that it has very little to show as yet in terms of construction work that has actually materialised. In fact, however, there is one area in which the strategic programme has already succeeded in achieving changes that would have been difficult to accomplish without the existence of the Strategiforum. These changes have occurred in relation to the profile, or image of the area. Many of the key individuals interviewed emphasised that the active marketing policy pursued has helped change the opinion of both the media and the general public regarding Flemingsberg, as well as the relevant parties' own picture of their district. According to the people involved, this newly-established network has contributed to making the strong sides of the area visible, and to increasing insights into the potential for positive development in the future.

The importance of representations when it comes to changing the actual line of development can hardly be underestimated, therefore it is understandable that several of the people we interviewed highlighted the work that went into creating a logotype for Flemingsberg as one of the greatest accomplishments of the Strategiforum, and maintained that this work has contributed to changing people's perception of what Flemingsberg is and what it ought to be.

Comparing the results achieved in Flemingsberg with those achieved in Kista, it is clear that there are major differences, not least in terms of the abilities of their respective district councils to attract attention to the needs of the residents. Although both politicians and civil servants from the Flemingsberg district council have taken part in the work of the Strategiforum, they seem to have been far less influential when it comes to setting and affecting the agenda than the Kista district council. At this early stage of the research process, it is impossible to ascertain the exact reasons for these differences. One important thing that can, however, be explicitly registered is that the Flemingsberg district council was abolished after the most recent elections, which might signify that it never succeeded in taking on its intended role as a decentralised power. Nevertheless, such a comparison can only be made fairly if attention is also paid to the fact that all this networking began far earlier in Kista than in Flemingsberg. As mentioned above, Electrum was established in Kista as early as 1988 and during its first years it concentrated, exactly as the Strategiforum in Flemingsberg does today, on the task of marketing and promoting the area. After this, it took more than a decade before a concrete plan for integration between the business park and the surrounding "Million Programme" areas was drawn up.

In the public debate, Flemingsberg is sometimes referred to as "Kista 2", clearly illustrating the expectations that Flemingsberg will develop along the same lines as Kista has. For example, in May 2003, the Social Democratic city councillor for financial matters in Stockholm, Annika Billström declared that the Stockholm municipality intends to invest SEK 13 billion on growth-
promoting measures before the next city elections. One of the things she pledged was that investments would continue to be made in the IT/telecom cluster in Kista. She also emphasised that she hoped a "Kista 2", with its focus on biomedicine and biotechnology would take shape south of Stockholm (Svenska Dagbadet 28 May 2003).

In light of the fact that the marketing efforts invested in Kista resulted both in Kista achieving the status of the Silicon Valley of the Nordic region and being held up as an example for other parts of the Stockholm region to emulate, it is not at all surprising that the parties involved in the Strategiforum are currently putting their main energies into making the institutional district more well known.

The fact that Kista and Flemingsberg are not in phase with one another is, however, not the only source of explanation of the differences between the integration-promoting measures taken in the two areas. Other major factors worthy of further study include the significance of organisational structures. It is noteworthy, for example, that the job description for the project manager hired at the Strategiforum in Flemingsberg focuses mainly on marketing and network building\textsuperscript{10}. One of her main assignments is to promote transboundary cultural activities, and she has, for example, helped arrange art exhibitions and conferences for the people active in the area\textsuperscript{11}. In contrast, the individual hired to promote development in Kista Science City is an urban planner, and Managing Director of an organisation created to safeguard the interests of the main stakeholders and to lobby national, regional and municipal authorities and agencies.

Another relevant factor in describing the different results achieved may be that these two areas in fact had very different starting points from which to pursue their negotiational planning. In Flemingsberg, the concrete potential for achieving positive results from the negotiations are constrained by the fact that virtually all the stakeholders are public institutions\textsuperscript{12}. This also limits the potential of the municipality to negotiate, for example, by granting building rights to a party willing to construct the facilities needed. Skanska is one of the few private sector stakeholders involved, which explains why the new shopping centre might end up located on the land owned by Skanska, in spite of the fact that such a location promotes neither the objective of integration nor the visions of increasing the urban qualities of the area. In Kista, by contrast, most of the stakeholders are private enterprises, and this contributed to an agreement being concluded that made it possible to break up the enormous housing complexes and replace them with a network grid. In exchange for agreeing to this demand, which actually only has to be satisfied in relation to future renovation and expansion projects, the enterprises were granted building rights to previously unexploited property\textsuperscript{13}.

Finally, the fact that the physical points of departure for creating a coherent urban landscape are significantly different in the two areas must not be disregarded. While Kista is surrounded by a beautiful landscape, with the main barrier being the attractive, popular green zone of Järva field, Flemingsberg is physically fragmented, a landscape cross-cut by a number of traffic flows, and where the as yet unbuilt property consists primarily of "leftover" areas of little use. Huddinge
Hospital is a true colossus, as large in area as the whole of Stockholm's Old Town, and requiring a whole set of feeder streets to facilitate loading and unloading. This, too, is a physical constraint on the possibilities for creative design.

Still, none of this necessarily means that Flemingsberg is less integrated than Kista. 41% of the students at Södertörn University have immigrant backgrounds and 38% come from homes where post-compulsory school studies were not taken for granted and where the parents do not have academic backgrounds. Furthermore, roughly 20 per cent of the residents in Flemingsberg have their workplace in the nearby institutional district, mostly at Huddinge University Hospital. Neither does there seem much doubt that daily interaction at workplaces, including the university, offers far greater opportunities than a shopping mall for social and cultural integration. This speaks in favour of Flemingsberg. The positive results achieved at regional level also speak well for Flemingsberg, where active regional policy has both helped reduce the classic dependence of centre on periphery, but also contributed to improving the standard of living in the areas south of Stockholm. However, there does seem to be substantially less interest in integration at local level in Flemingsberg than in Kista.

Conclusion

In this article I have discussed the initiatives taken to increase integration between different districts. It is too early, as yet, to draw any definite conclusions regarding the long-term possibilities of increasing the spatial, social and cultural integration between the residents of the "Million Programme" areas built in the 1960s and the employees from the growth centres established in the 1990s. Our material is, firstly, limited, in that it only covers two districts, Kista and Flemingsberg. Secondly, these planning initiatives are still in early stages, and it will take a few years before any concrete, lasting results can be seen. Still, even at this stage it is clear that these projects have potential in terms of creating transboundary meeting places. This is most clearly evident in Kista, about which the Vision for the Future document contains various proposals regarding both how the areas can be better interlinked with new infrastructure and how cultural meeting places for various population groups can be established in the districts.

There are, however, numerous obstacles along the road to fulfilment of these visions and plans. One is related to the balance of power between various parties. The party in Kista that has attached most importance to taking the interests of the residents into account is the district council.
There are, however, indications that the influence of the council has decreased as the planning process has moved along. At the current stage of negotiation and planning, the establishment of urban regimes and structures for cooperation seems to be top priority; with personal relations between the different stakeholders being established and cemented. If the influence of the district councils is marginalized now because of their lack of authority in urban planning matters, there may be serious consequences in terms of the results of the planning process. The comments to the draft vision submitted by the Kista district council indicate that the district administration were well aware of this risk. Their demand was that the various neighbourhoods around Jarva field should be given more of a voice in relation to building and planning issues, for instance by being allowed to have their own district architect appointed (Kista stadsdelsförvaltning 2000:9). But their appeal was not accepted in this respect either. In fact, although an urban planner was appointed to the post of Managing Director of Kista Science City AB, the Managing Director's office was located at the Electrum foundation in the business park and not at the district council.

The Flemingsberg district council and administration have not made as distinct an imprint on the negotiation and planning process as the corresponding authorities in Kista, and now that the district council has been abolished, there is an increased risk that local efforts to achieve integration will also disappear from the agenda.

However, the balance of power includes other factors than the influence brought to bear by the various public and private sector stakeholders on the results of the negotiations. One is the extent to which the local inhabitants have been involved in discussions as to the long-term development of their districts. Because the aims of both the plans for Kista Science City and the Flemingsberg strategic programme include increasing integration between the business park and the surrounding "Million Programme" areas, it is noteworthy that the residents have not been given more opportunities to participate, for instance through representation by Non-Governmental Organisations. In both Kista and Flemingsberg, municipal politicians and civil servants have been involved in the negotiation and planning process, and the business sector is well represented. Yet the idea underpinning a shift from "government" to "governance" was not simply to strengthen the influence of trade and industry on the planning process, but rather that all the parties involved should become engaged and participate actively in the decision-making process (Elander 1999). In other words, the underlying intention was to supplement representative democracy, and ensure that decisions taken better safeguarded the everyday needs of both the inhabitants and the enterprises in the area.

An exacerbating factor associated with popular representation is the fact that the politicians serving on the district councils are not elected by the people, but appointed by the municipal council, in proportions reflecting its political composition. This means, on a scale from left to right, that the composition of the district councils seldom corresponds to that of the local electorate. There were initially fears that this fact would provoke doubts about the legitimacy of the politicians serving on the district councils. In fact, though, recent polls in Stockholm indicate,
on the contrary, that "politicians of all party affiliations have become spokespeople of the everyday needs of the people in their districts - and against all the odds - since the residents of their districts did not elect them" (Bäck och Johansson 2001:169). Still, this is no guarantee that the picture in the minds of a local council politician regarding the needs of his or her constituents is necessarily representative of the entire population of the district.

In my opinion there is a contradiction between district-based planning on the one hand, with an explicit objective of involving the residents, and planning that spans several districts, with the representatives of only the public and private sectors involved in the dialogue. From a democratic perspective, this contradiction may have grave consequences, not least because planning that spans several districts encompasses major investments, which, if they are completed, mean substantial interventions in the organisation of the everyday lives of the residents of these districts. As the example of Kista indicates, such overarching plans are often put forward by expert urban planners, in professionally-designed packages. By contrast, the renewal projects related to the individual districts are drawn up by individuals working in the social and cultural spheres, in collaboration with the residents, and are much more modestly packaged. Since the spatial representations of the big projects may be seductive, the risk is clear that the big narratives might suppress the many small stories, and shape the future, entirely irrespective of decisions already taken at local level.

Taking the thought to an extreme, one might say that we are in a situation in which the inhabitants are offered involvement in the details, and in short-term projects, but ignored when the big plans for long-term development are drawn up. The only party in our study that appears, at present, to have the potential for bridge-building between these two types of planning is the Kista district council and administration. Because responsibility for the short-term district-based projects are in their hands, and because they are also represented on the board of directors of the Electrum foundation, where they can bring an influence to bear on the long-term plans for Kista Science City, they are the only body with contacts among both the residents and the commercial sector. However, we have already shown that the district council only has a limited amount of influence on overarching plans. To date, the district administration has been able to access some funding from the district-based renewal projects to accomplish at least some of the proposals for social and cultural integration put forward in the Kista Science City project. Yet this funding is small in comparison with the funds allocated to the infrastructure and to growth promotion and when these projects are phased out, this source of funding, too, will disappear. Seen in this light, the demands made by the district council in its comments on the Vision for Kista Science City, that welfare be made one of the main objectives, and that 10 per cent of the income from sale of property and real estate in Kista be deposited in a growth fund for general improvements in society, seem entirely justified (Kista stadsdelsförvaltning 2000:1).
Notes

1 The research project: *The Potential of Public Space to Transgress the Boundaries of the Segregated City* is financed by the Formas research council. Four senior researchers and two doctoral students are working on the project. The four senior researchers are Nora Räthzel, Tomas Wikström, Finn Werne and myself, as the project leader. The two doctoral students are Lina Olsson and Mikkel Schöning Sörensen. During autumn 2002 a pilot study was carried out including observations and interviews with key individuals in four case study areas, including Kista and Flemingsberg.


4 The concept "people with foreign backgrounds" is defined as foreign citizens born abroad and Swedish citizens born abroad.

5 In 2002 the proportion of inhabitants with foreign backgrounds were: in Kista 35 %, in Akalla 45 %, in Flemingsberg 43 %, in Husby 60 %, in Tensta 62 % and in Rinkeby 68 % (http://www.usk.stockholm.se/internet/omrfakta, http://www.huddinge.se/docs/wstatistik/flemin.8 September 2003).

6 Interview with Luis Abascal, former director of the Kista district, 28 January 2003.

7 Interview with Luis Abascal, former director of the Kista district, 28 January 2003.

8 Interview with Per-Anders Hedkvist, Managing Director of Kista Science City AB, 27 January 2003.

9 24 district council were set up (and then reduced to 18 in 1998), with responsibility for approximately 75 % of municipal services in Stockholm city, including compulsory education, child care, care of the elderly, care of the disabled, park maintenance, sanitation services, and culture and recreation (Bäck and Johansson 2001, Jonsson 2002).

10 Interview with Mariana Vodovosoff, project manager at Flemingsberg Strategiforum, 28 January 2003.

11 Interview with Mariana Vodovosoff, project manager at Flemingsberg Strategiforum, 28 January 2003.

12 Interview with Åke Andersson, director of planning for Huddinge, 29 January 2003.

13 Interview with Per-Anders Hedkvist, MD Kista Science City AB, 27 January 2003.

14 http://www.sh.se, 7 July 2003

15 http://www.huddinge.se/docs/wstatistik/fleming.pdf, 8 September 2003
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